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1. Form and contents of appellant's brief. The opening brief of the appellant (or 
the petition for appeal when adopted as the opening brief) s hall contain : 
(a) A subject index and table of citations w ith cases a lphabetically arranged. 
Citations of Virg inia cases mus t refer to the Vi rginia Reports and, in addition, may 
refc- r to other reports containing such cases . 
. Cb) A brief s tntcment of the material proceedings in the lower court, the errors 
ass igned, and the questions involved in the appeal. 
(c) A clear and concise statement of the facts, with references to the pages of 
the reco rd where there i6 a11 y possibility that the o ther side may quest ion the s tate-
m ent. \Vhere the facts are controvcrt cd it should be so s tated. 
(d) Argument in support of the position of appellan t. 
The brief s hall be signed by at kast one attorney practicing in this court, giving 
his address. 
The appellant may a dopt the peti tion for appeal as his opening brief by so sta ting 
in the peti1ion, or by giving to oppo~ing counsel written notice of such intention 
w ithin five days of the receipt by appellant of the printed record, and by fi ling a 
copy of such noti ce with the clerk of the court. No alleged error not specifi ed in the 
opcni11 g brief or petition for appt'al ~ha ll be admitted as a ground for a rgument by 
appellant on the hearing of the cause. 
2. Form and contents of appdJee's brief. T ht' hrid for the appellce shall conta in : 
(a) A subject index anti table of ci tations with cases alphabetica lly a rranged. 
Citations of Virginia cases must n fe r to the \ 'irginia :Reports and, in addition, may 
refrr to other reports contain ing such cases. 
(b) A statement of the case anti of t he points involved, if the appellee disagrncs 
wi th the statement of appellant. 
(c) A sta tement of the facts which arc necessary to c-orrcct or amplify the state-
ment in appellant's brief in so far as it is deemed crroncous or inadequate, with ap-
propriate reference 10 the pages of the record. 
( d ) Argumcnt in s upport of the position of appcllce. 
T he brief 5hall be signcd by a t 11:ast one attorney practicing 111 this court, g ivi11g 
h is address . 
• '!. Reply brief. The reply brid (if any) of the appellant shall contain all the au-
thorities rdicd on by him, not rdc11ctl to in hi;; petition or opening brief. In o ther 
respects it shall conform to the requirements for appcllce's brief. 
-1. Time of fi ling. (a) Oiril rcu es. The opening brief of the appellant (if there be 
one in addit ion to the petition for appeal) sha ll be filed in the clerk's office within 
fi fteen days af te r tlw receipt hy counsel fo r apptllant of the prin ted record , bu t in no 
event less than twenty-fi ve clays before the fi r~t day of the session at which the case 
is to ue heard. The brief of the appcllec shall uc fi led in the clt:rk 's office not b kr 
th:1 11 ten clays hcfon· the first day of the ~ession at which the case is to be heard. Thi· 
reply hrief of tile appellant ~hall he filed in the clerk's office not later than the day 
bdore the fi rs t clay of the session at which the case is to be heard. 
(h) Crimina l C,1.,rs. In rrimin:tl ca~cs briefs must be ti led within the time specified 
in civil cases: provick d, howcwr, tha t in those cas\'s in which the records have not 
uc·,·n printed and dcli,·cred to couns,·l at least tw,•nty-five days before the beginning 
of the next session t>f the court , ~m:h cas<:s shall he placed a t the foot of the docket 
for that se,sion of the ,·om t, and the Commonwc·alth's brief shall he fi led at ka,t ten 
claJ·s prior to the rallin!{ nf the case·, a1~cl the reply brid for the pi:.li nt iff in errnr not 
la tc r than the clay bdore the ca\.., i~ l'alled. 
(c) SfiJJUlc1/irm of ,·01111s1•/ 11 .s to fil i nr,. Coun~\'l fo r opposing part ies may file with 
th<' cl<'rk a w ril tc n sti pula tinn d 1:11111 ing th,· time fo r fi ling briefs in any l'a ~,· ; pro-
,·i<lccl. howen ·r, th;,t all brkfs 11111s t be fi led not later than the clay before such case 
is to bc heard. 
5. Number of copie<: to be filed and delivered to opposing counsel. Twenty copies 
of eaC'M brid sha ll be) filed with thl' cle rk of tlw co,11 t, and at least two copies 111aikd 
or dcl i\'ered to oppo,in<r coun :scl on or before the day on \\'hich thl• hricf is fill'd . 
6. Size and Type. Drid -; ~hall h,· nine inches in lrng th and s ix inches in \Yid.ii. so 
as to conform in cli111 ,•11 , ions tn th,· pr inted record. anrl ~hall be printed in type not le,s 
in ~i7.t>, as to lw;~hl and width. than the type in which the record is printed. Thl' 
n ·corci number of tlw case and names of counsd shall he prin ted on the front CO\'l'r of 
all briefs. 
7. Non-compliance, effect of. T he clerk of this r our t io: rlircct,·d not to rcceivr or 
file a hdci which fails to comply with the rcci nir,•m,·nts o f thi$ r uk. Jf neither ~ide 
has lilrd a nron•'. r hrid •hr cause wi ll not be hea rd. ff one oi the oartit:s fail~ to fi le 
a prop,•r br ief he can not be hc:i rcl. hnt t he casP w ill be heard c.1· parte upon the arg\l, 
ment of the party by whom tht· brid l1as been fi led, 
. . . .. . ..:-
l;;:.:.. i.- ';:- ij \.1' ~ 
'l, y' )~,: J~~D.. .. Jr.:. i~\ .a 
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IN 'l'HE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2900 
HOLMAN B. THOMAS 
versus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Suprem,e Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, HQlman B. Thomas, respectfully· repre-1 
!3ents that on the 7th day of February, 1944, an indictment 
was found in the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County, charg-
i~g your pe_titioner with havinp:, on the 14th day of Decem-
ber, 1943, murdered A. K. Fleming; that whereupon the said 
char~e was tried before a jury of the said County and your 
petitioner was convicted of the said offense, and sentenced 
to death. and :final judg,-ment entered upon the said verdict 
by the said Court on the 17th day of March, 1944. 
A transcript of the record in this cause, and of the judg-
ment therein is herewith -filed as a part of this petition. 
Yo11r petitionAr is advised and represents to your HonorR 
tlrnt the Raid :iuchtment is erroneous, and that he is aggrieved 
thereby in the following particulars, namely: 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ERRORS ASSIGNED. 
First : The action of the Court in instructing and com-
municating with the incompleted panel of jurors, and in 
swearing officers to take charge of said panel, during the trial 
of the case and in *the absence of the defendant. 
2* Bill of Exception No. 2, Record p. 53. 
Second: The action of the Court in later swearing officers 
to take charg·e of the jury sworn to try the issues, during the 
tdal of the case and in the absence- of the defendant. 
Bill of Exception No. 3, Record p. 56. 
Third : The refusal of the Court to give the following in-
struction offered on behalf of the defendant: 
The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes every 
person charged with crime to be innocent until the Common-
wealth has established his guilt by evidence so strong, so 
clear, and so conclusive that there is left in the minds of the 
jury no reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This presumption 
is an abiding presumption, and goes with the accused through 
the entire case and applies at every stage thereof until re-
pelled by proof. And in this connection the jury are in-
structed that it is never sufficient that the accused, upon 
speculative theory or conjecture may be guilty; or that by 
the preponderance of the testimony 11is guilt is more prob-
able then his innocence, for until his guilt has been proved 
beyond all reasonable doubt in the precise and narrow terms 
as charged in the indictment, the presumption of innocence 
· still applies, aud they must acquit hin;i. And the Court fur-
ther instructs the jury that they should exclude every rea-
sonable hypothesis except that of guilt of the accused, and 
that only when no other supposition could reasonably ac-
count for all the conditions of the case establishing the guilt 
of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt as charged, could 
they arrive at the conclusion of guilt on his part. The Court 
further instructs the jurv that a reasonable doubt is that 
state of the case which, after a full consideration of all of the 
evidence, both for the Commonwealth and for the defendant, 
leaves the minds of the jury in the condition that they can. 
not say they feel an abiding- conviction, amounting to a moral 
certainty from the evi<lence in the case, that tbe defendant, 
Holman Thomas, is guilty of the charg·e against him. 
Bill of Exception No. 7, Hecord p. 74. 
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Fourth: The action of the Court in admitting evidence 
to the effect of the making of certain statements by the dece~ 
dent as dying declarations. 
Bill of Exception No. 8, Record p. 76; Bill of Exception 
No. 9, Record p. 79. 
3* *Fifth: The refusal of the Court, on the defendant's 
motion, to set aside the verdict of the jury in this case 
because the same was coutrary to the law and the evi_dence, 
and because the evidence was.insufficient to support the same. 
Bill of Exception No. 10, Record p. 82. 
Sixth: The refusal of. the _Court, on defendant's motion, 
to grant him a new trial, because of the commission of errors 
of law during· the trial of the case and. because the evidence 
was insufficient to support the verdict. 
Bill of Exception No. 11, Record p. 84. 
·QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE APPEAL. 
First: Did the Court err in instructing and communicating 
wit:µ the incompleted panel of jurors, and swearing officers 
to take charge of said panel, and in later swearing officers to 
take charge of the jury sworn to try issues, during the trial 
of the case and in the absence of the defendant? 
Second: Did the Court err in rejecting the instruction 
above offered T 
Third: Did the Court err in admitting evidence of the 
making· of certain statements by the decedent as dying dec-
larations Y · 
STATEMENT OF THE ·FACTS. 
On the early afternoon of December 13, 1943, the def end ... 
ant, Holman B. Thomas, left his place of work at Camp Pick-
ett, Virginia. He thereupon drove his automobile to Black-
stone, Virginia, where he purchased two bottles (fifths) of 
wine. He left Blackstone and drove to his home in Ken-
bridg·e, Virginia, arriving there at about 7 :00 or 7 :30 P. M. 
One of the .fifths of wine was consumed by the defendant in 
Blackstone and the other the defendant drank while travel-
ing from Blackstone to Kenbridge, (R., p. 46). 
After arrival in Kenbridge, the defendant met Coleane 
Keeton, Richard Keeton ( Coleane 's brother), and May Har-
grove. The defendant •then went home and got two 
4"" more bottles (:fifths) of wine. All four persons got into 
the defendant's automobile and, with the defendant 
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driving, went out tor a ride. The two bottles of wine pro-
cured by the defendant from his home were consumed (R., 
pp. 21, 31, 45, 46, 47). On this trip, the defendant, while turning 
his automobile around on the highway, backed the same into 
a ditch and they, with the help of some soldiers, managed to 
. -··-· .. get the car back on the highway (R., p. 21). The defendant 
tnen".drove to the home of William Edmonds in an attempt 
to find some meal wine, but found no one at Edmond's home 
(R., p~ 21). While attempting to turn the automobile around 
again, the defendant drove the same into a stump, damaging 
one of th_e wheels (R., p. 21). The party re~~rned to the 
house of Coleane Keeton, arriving there at soine time be-
tween 10:30 and 11 :30 P. M. (R., pp. 21, 46). 
Thereupon, pursuant to Coleane 's invitation, the four went 
into Coleane 's house.. Coleane and the defendant went into 
the former 's bedroom (R., pp. 21, 30, 46) and got into the bed 
together (R., pp. 46, 47). At about midnight (R., p. 27), 
Flora Keeton, Coleane 's mother, came into the bedroom 
where they were and, finding them in bed together (R.,. pp. 
27, 28, 46, 47) started beating the defendant over the head 
(R., p. 21, 27, 46, 47, 48). Flora Keeton testified that she used 
a small stick of kindling wood (R., pp. 27, 28). The defend-
ant testified that he was beaten upon the head with '' some-
thing like iron", and that the blow ''hurt his brains", (R., 
pp. 29, 48). The defendant then left the Keeton 's house. 
Witnesses for the Commonwealth testified that some time 
after the defendant left, he returned;" that he fired several 
shots through the back door of the Keeton 's house; that he 
thereupon came into the house, holding a pistol in his hand; 
that he then stated that he was going to kill everyone in the 
house and that if "the law" came there he would kill him 
also; that everyone in the house, except the small children 
of Flora Keeton, left and went for help; that the deceased 
was thereupon summoned by telephone ; that the • de-
5• ceased arrived in the vicinity of the Keeton house in his 
automobile; that an exc~ange of shots took place between 
the defendant and the deceased wherein the defendant was 
seriously and the deceased mortally wounded. 
Tucker Edmonds, a witness for the Commonwealth, testi-
.fied that he was at the scene of the shooting; that he saw the 
deceased drive up in his car; that he heard a shot, whereupon 
he, the witness, ran behind a house; that almost im~ediately 
he heard numerous other pistol shots; that he did not know 
who fired the first shot; that when he, the witness, came from 
behind the house. he saw the deceased grappling with the 
defendant and hitting the defendant over the head with his 
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pistol; that the witness went over, took the defendant's pis-
tol from him, rested the deceased on the ground, and held his 
head until the doctor arrived. . 
Oscar Brag·g, another witness for the Commonwealth, testi-
fied that he was a watchman at the Farmers' warehouse; 
that while in the warehouse he heard one shot; that he there-
upon ran over to the window and looked through; that he 
saw an exchange of shots take place between the deceased 
and the defendant; that the deceased grappled with the de-
fendant after the shooting ceased, and hit the defendant over 
his head with his gun; and that the window through which he 
witnessed these events was about 160 feet from where the 
shooting took place, but that he could see plainly what hap-
pened because the moonlight was bright on this night. 
The defendant testified that after ~,lora Keeton struck him 
over the head, he did not remember anything further which 
might have occurred until some time later when he found 
himself standing in his back yard feeling and rubbing his 
head; that "this knot back here (referring to his head) must 
have caused my blood to go to my brain. Got my brain up-
setted''; that he had no recollection of returning to the Kee-
ton house, of shooting through the door, or threatening to 
kill anyone, or of anything else which witnesses for the 
6• *Commonwealth testified that occurred between the time 
he left the house until he found himself standing in his 
yard; that while he was standing there, he heard someone 
call his name; that he took his hand down from his head, 
turned to the rig·bt, and saw the deceased; that when he 
turned he stagg·ered and, when he stagg·ered, a pistol wa~ 
fired and a bullet struck him and burned him in his chest; 
that he then heard the deceased call Tucker Edmonds telling 
the latter to g·et him (the defendant) and put him into the 
car; that he did not remember what hapuened after this. be-
cause everything went blank again; that he did not know how 
many times he may have shot or how many times the de-
ceased shot: that lie did not fire his first shot at the deceased 
until after he 11imself was shot and after he heard the · de-
ceased call to Tucker Edmonds; tlrnt he had no recollection 
of the deceased striking him over the head after the shoot-
in~:, or of his arrest. or of his bein.2· treated bv the phvsician~; 
that he did not a~:ain start remembering things until he was 
in the Sfate Farm Hospital. 
Dr. F. R. Crawford, a mPmber of th~ staff of the ~outhside 
f!omnrnnitv Ho~nital at Farmville. Vir!rinia. a witnPs~ for 
the Commonwealth. testified that tJ1e defendant wa~ RilmittPd 
to said hospital at about 6 :30 A. M. on December~ 1943; that, 
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at the time of his admiBsion, the defendant was complain-
ing· of pain and was '·turasilmg about, more or less"; that 
he was bleeding; that there wa::; pain in his chest and that it 
hurt him to breathe; that i1e ct1d not appear to be in shock; 
that he had three wounds in the left side of his chest, wounds 
in the left forearm and crepitus, a contused, malled lacera-
tion on the vault of the skuil, two superlicial wounds in the 
left shoulder; that the tip of the right ring finger was in-
jured near the base of the nail, the bone fractured and the 
finger handing from the ventral tissues ; that there was a 
minor wound on the middle finger and a smaller wound on 
the index finger; that the defendant had been shot through 
the left lung, that there was one bullet in mediastinum, that 
the left ulna had been fractured by a *through and 
7• through bullet wound; that the .finger of the right hand 
had been injured, that there was a contused wound of 
the head and abrasions on the left shoulder. The witness 
further testified that the bullet in the chest had not been re-
moved; that the wound on the top of his head was wide open; 
that a blow sufficient to produce a wound of the character 
found on top of the defendant's head would daze some per-
sons; and that if a hypodermic needle had been given the 
defendant, it would have caused him to recover from shock. 
Dr. William J. West, another witness for the Common-
wealth, testified that the defendant was admitted to the State 
Farm Hospital on Friday, December 17, 1943; that he had 
wounds in his left forearm and crepitus, a cut on the back of 
the head, a cut about the center of the scalp, three wounds in 
the left side of his chest, two superficial wounds on the left 
shoulder; that the tip of the right ring finger was injured 
near the base of the nail and the bone fractured; that there 
was a minor wound of the middle ·finger and a smaller wound 
of the index finger, and that the little finger was broken. He 
further testified that the injuries suffered from the gunshot 
wounds could have been caused by two or three bullets; that 
under the circumstances the average person would have been 
tremendously shocked if he had received such injuries, and 
that it does not take much of a wound to cause shock. 
- Susan Thomas, the defendant's wife, testified that at about 
3 o'clock A. ::.M:. on the night of the shooting, Dr. W. D. Kendig 
attended the defendant and g-ave him a ''needle in the leg''. 
Dr. Herbert C. Lee. another witness for the Common-
~ealth, testified that the deceased was brought to the Med-
ical College of Virginia, in Richmond, on December 14, 1943; 
that he first saw him there about 5 :00 o'clock A. M.; that the 
deceased was then in a shocked condition from loss of blood 
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and that his blood pre:::isure was about half of what it should 
have been; that the deceased was conscious of some pain, and 
was shivering with cold; that there was a •through and 
8* through bullet tract which ranged slightly downward in 
the left shoulder, the bullet apparently having entered 
in the left neck above the clavicale about two inches from the 
sternal end, that the point of .exit was just posterior to the 
insertion of the deltoid muscle on the left arm, that there was 
a fairly large blood tumor over the left pectoral region, that 
no radial pulse palpated in the left arm, that there was little 
if any evidence of circulation in the left hand, and that there 
was no sensation in the entire left arm below the left elbow; 
that there was a point of entrance of a second bullet in the 
right gluteal region, supposedly the site of the bullet; that 
there was no evidence of peritoneal or plural irritation, both 
bullets apparently missing these cavaties; that there was no 
blood present grossly in the urine; that there was perf ora-
tion on each side of the rectum about one inch inside the anal 
opening; that apparently one of the bullets had gone from the 
rig·ht hip through the center of the rectum and lodged in the 
left upper femur; that there was also an injury to his left 
axillary vessels and to his brachia! plexes; that there was 
apparently no further bleeding; that at no time did the de-
ceased say that he was going to die, but that deceased asked 
the witness if he would live, and that the witness replied to 
him, "I hope so''; that the deceased died from gas bacillus 
infection of the left leg and acrotum at 8 :05 A. M. Decem-
ber 16, 1943. 
E. S. Roby, another witness for the Commonwealth, testi-
fied that he arrived on the scene of the shooting shortly after 
it was finished, and went to the deceased. 10ver the objection 
of the defendant, to the overruling of which the defendant 
excepted, the witness further stated that the deceased said 
to him: "Thelbert, I am dying", and requested that the wit-
ness send for his wife and daughter. The witness further 
testified that the deceased made no statement in his presence 
as to how he g-ot shot. 
Dr. H.B. Showalter, a practitioner in Kenbridge, Vir-
9* g-inia, •another witness for the Commonwealth, testified 
that he was called to attend the deceased about 1 :30 
A. M. on the morning; of December 14, 1943; that he saw the 
deceased lying on the g-round at the scene of the shooting 
fla.t on his back; that the deceased was seriously wounded 
and in a state of shock; that he gave the deceased several 
hypodermics, which never relieved his shocked condition; 
that he accompanied the deceased to the Medical College Hos-
pital and that deceased stayed in a shocked condition until 
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he left several hours later. Over the defendant's objection, 
to the overruling of which the defendant excepted, the wit-
ness further testified that immediately upon his arrival, the 
deceased said: "There is no use taking me anywhere, this 
will be the last of me ... he shot me just as I got out of my 
car, I never had a chance". On cross-examination the wit-
ness testified that he thought that the deceased was seriously 
wounded, but that he did not know how seriously, and that 
deceased, while on the way to the hospital again stated that 
this was '' the last'' of him. · 
Mrs:· A. K. Fleming, the wife of the deceased, another wit-
ness for the Commonwealth, testified that shortly after 1 :15 
o'clock A. M. on the morning of December 14, 1943, she re-
ceived word that her husband had been shot; that within 15 
or 20 minutes, she arrived on the scene where the deceased 
was lying on the ground. Over the objection of the defend-
ant, to the overruling of which the defendant excepted, the 
witness testified that the deceased stated to her: "This is 
the end, he (defendan.t) shot me just as I got out of my car 
. . . I didn't have a chance''. 
Luther Davis, a witness for the defendant, testified that he 
had known the defendant for a few years and that his char-
acter for peace and good order was good, and that he (the 
witness) "never knew him to have but one trouble". 
David Garland, another witness for the defendant, testi-
fied that he bad known the defendant for quite a few years, 
that his reputation •for peace and good order was very 
10* good, and that he (the witness) had never known him 
to be in any trouble before. Thereafter, the Common-
wealth was permitted, over the defendant's objection, to the 
overruling of which the defendant excepted, to introduce the 
testimony of J. T. Waddill, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court 
· of Lunenburg County that the records of his office showed 
that the defendant, on August 25, 1942, was convicted in the 
Trial Justice Court in the Town of Kenbridge, Virginia, for 
being- drunk, disorderly and resisting· arrest, that he was 
flned $25.00 and sentenced to serve 30 days in jail, and that· 
the warrant of his arrest was issued upon the complaint of 
Officer A. K. Fleming-, the deceased, and to introduce into 
evidence the said warrant of arrest and judgment of convic-
tion. 
After the evidence was closed on each side and the jury 
were instructed and the case argued for both sides, the jury 
retired. and after deliberation returned a verdict nnding the 
defendant guiltv of murder in the :first degree and .fixing his 
punishment at death. 
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ARGUMENT. 
I. 
The Action of the Court in Instructing and Communicat-ing 
With the lnco11ipletecl Panel of Jurors, and. in Swearing 
Off'icers to '1.'ake Cha,rge of Said' Panel, and in, Later Swear-
ing Officers to Take Cha·rge of the Jury Sworn to Try the 
Issues, During the Trial of the Ca .. c;e an,d fri the Absence of 
the DefendaJfl;t, Constituted Reversible Error. 
On the first day of the t_rial, after the defendant had been 
arraigned, and during the course of selection of a panel of 
twenty persons qualined to serve as jurors, from which panel 
twelve jurors qualified to try the issues in the case would be 
selected, the Court, after fourteen qualified persons had been 
selected, found it impossible to complete the panel of twenty 
from the veniremen previously summoned and in attendance. 
The fourteen persons constituting the incomplete panel were 
then sent out to lunch in the custody of two officers of the 
Court who had been sworn according· to law to take 
11 * *charge of them during the time they were at lunch and 
until their return to the courtroom. The Court there-
upon selected a list of twenty additional veniremen from the 
regular jury list, as required by law when the Court finds it 
impossible to complete its panel in a case from the venire-
men previously summoned and in attendance. At this time, 
the incompleted panel of fourteen persons returned to the 
courtroom from lunch in charge of the two officers. There-
upon, in order that the first two officers might be relieved 
from the k~eping of the incompleted panel and might be used 
in summoning additional veniremen selected by the Court, 
the Court in session mid before adjournment for a recess, in 
the absence of the defendant, selected two members of the 
Virginia State Police force to act in the stead of the two offi-
cers first sworn to keep the jurv, and to take charge of the 
incompleted panel, find, also in the absence of the defendant, 
caused to be administered to them an oath that they wonld 
keeu the incomnletecl panel of fourteen persons together 
,without communication with any person and tbat.thev w011lrl 
neither ~onverse with them themselves touchin~ the trial, 
no1· permit anv otl1er nerson to do so, and would cause the 
~nicl in~ompleted panel of fourteen persons to Empear in 
nourt at 1 :4!i o'rlorak P. M. on the samP. dav. and also in thP. 
absence of the defendant. instrncterl the fourteen nP1.·~rn,~ 
who comprised the in completed part el that a recess of forty-
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five minutes would be taken, that cturing this time they would 
be in the custody of the second two officers w.ho had been 
sworn to take charge of tueIU, that they would not discuss 
tne pending case with anyone or permit anyone to discuss 
it with them, or i11 their prese.ace, a.uct tnat they would remain 
together in tbe custody of the s~cond two officers and return 
to the Court at 1 :45 o 'cloGk P. M. vv h11e ea9b of these pro-
ceedings ocouned, the defendant was absent from the court-
room and was then in the jury room, and the door between the 
courtroom and the jury room was, during all this time, closed. 
The attention of tile Court was immediately called by coun-
sel for the defendant to the fact that %/-the defendant 
13e was and had been absent from the courtroom during . 
the occurance of these events and proceedings, where-
upon, the defendant was brought back mto the courtroom, 
whereupon he, by his counsel, moved the Court to arrest the 
trial at this point and to declare a mistrial, on the ground 
that the action of the Court in swearing said officers to take 
charge. of the incomplete panel, and in instructing and com-
municating with the incompleted panel, as aforesaid, consti-
tuted reversible error. The Court, however, recalled the four-
teen members of the incompleted panel and, in the presence, 
of the defendant, again instructed them in the same manner 
in which it had instructd them in the defendant's absence, 
and thereupon overruled the defendant's motion, to which 
action the defendant excepted. The Court thereupon ad-
journed for recess until later the same day. (Record, pp. 53, 
55). 
At a later time on the first day of the trial, and after the 
jury had been selected and sworn to try the issues in the 
case, and after various of the Commonwealth's witnesses 
had testified, the Court, in preparation for adjournment for 
the day, but" before such adjournment, directed that the de~ 
fehdant be removed from the courti:oom and, in his absence, 
appointed two additional officers of the Court to keep the 
jury over night until the following morning, and caused to 
be administered to them an oath that they would keep the 
jury together without communication with any person and 
that they would neither converse with them themselves touch-
ing·. the trial, nor permit any other person to do so, and would 
cause the jurv to appear in Court on the following. morning 
at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. The attention of the Court was 1.mme-
diately called to the fact that, during all of this time, and 
during the occurrence of the events and proceedings afore. 
said, the defendant waR absent from the cour'troom and com-
pletely outside the building in which the courtroom is sit-
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uated. The defendant was then returned to the courtroom. 
The Court had not, at the time, adjourned, nor had the jury 
left their box. The defendant, *immediately upon his 
.13• return, by his counsel, moved the Court to arrest the 
trial at this point, and to withdraw the case from the 
, consideration of the jury and to declare a mistrial, on the 
ground that the action of the Court in swearing the officers 
to take charge of the jury constituted reversible error. There-
upon, the Court, in the presence of the defendant, caused the 
said officers to be again sworn to take charge of the jury, in 
the same manner as it had previously caused them to be 
s~orn in the absence of the defendant, and thereupon over-
ruled the motion made by the defendant, to which action of. 
the Court the defendant excepted. The Court thereupon 
adjourned until the following morning at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. 
(Record pp. 56, 57) .. 
A. In Virginia, a Defendant Tried for Felony Must Be 
Perso'nJlil1W Pr~s.e'Ylli at Every Stage of· Hi$ Trial from .Ar-
raignment to .Judgment. · 
At common law, even in the absence of a statute or consti-
tutional provision, the rule is well settled that the personal 
presence of the defendant at every stage of the trial is es-
sential to a valid conviction on a charge of felony. 
16 Corpus Juris, p. 813. 
In Virginia, it is expressly provided by statute that '' A per-
son tried for f el oily shall be personally present during the 
trial''. 
Code of Virginia, 1942, Sec. 4894. 
This statute is merely declaratory of the common law. 
Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923), 
and was, as was its court-created forerunner, intended and 
designed to accomplish more than mere formality or techni-
cality. It sprang from considerations deeply rooted in an es-
sential public interest as well as the welfare of a person ac-
cused of felony. As this Court stated in Noel v. Common-
wealth, supra: 
· ''We need not here enter into any discussion of the origin 
and history of this statute further than to say that the first 
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sentence above quoted was merely declaratory of a principle 
of the' cofu.nion law. 3 Rob. Pr. (old) 267. 1 Chit. Crim. 
Law, 414; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr. Sec. 688. That principle did not 
spring solely from a regard for the welfare of the accused. 
The public has an interest in every case involving the life 
or liberty of a citizen, and both in England and in this coun-. 
try it has long been recognized *as a settled rule of the 
14* common law, based as well upon public policy as upon 
the interest of the accused, that his continuous pres-
ence, from arraignment to sentence, is an essential part of 
the process of law provided for his trial and without which 
the courts have no jurisdiction to pronounce judgment upon 
him. Constitutional provisions and statutory enactments 
not in conflict with such provisions may modify or abrogate 
this general rule. But in the absence of constitutional or 
statutory change-and there is none as to felony cases in 
· Virginia-conformity to the rule is essential to jurisdiction, 
and the accused cannot waive it. The decisions in this state 
are directly and unequivocally to this effect". (Citing cases) 
And in Jackson v. C01wmonwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 
(1870), it was said : 
'' These citations are sufficient to show the strict adherence 
to the rule in all trials where the life and liberty of the ac-
cused is in jeopardy. The law is made for the protection of 
the citizen, and all are alike amenable to its penalties and 
entitled to its immunities. Whatever may be the turpitude 
of his offense, however great his criminality, every man has 
a right to an impartial trial according to law, and until found 
g·uilty by llis peers, that law presumes him innocent; and 
,gives him the ri_qht to be present to see and know all that is 
said or done by the court a:ff ecting his case." (Italics sup-
plied.) · 
It is accordingly well settled in Vir~inia that one accused 
of and tried for the commission of a felony has the right to 
be nresent during every stage of his trial from arraignment 
to judgment. 
Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 130 S. E. 398 (1925). 
Noell v. C01n1nonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923). 
Pierce v. Common.wealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 R. E. 686 (1923). 
Fetters v. Connnonwealth.135 Va. 501. 115 S. E. 692 (1923). 
ColPman v. Commonwen.lth, 90 Va. 635. 19 S. E. 161 (1894). 
Shelton v. Comm,011/loealth, 89 Va. 450, 16 S. E. 355 (1892). 
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Jackso111, v. Co1nnionivealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870). 
Hooker v. Co1nmonwealth, 13 Gratt. (54 Va.) 763 (1855). 
Sperry v. Commonwealth, 9 Leigh (36 Va.) 623 (1838). 
Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149. 
Staples v. Commowwealth, 140 Va. 583, 125 S. E. 319 (1924). 
15• *He has the right to be present when anything shall 
be done in the prosecution of the case by which he is to 
be affected. 
Sperry v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Hooker v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Bond v. Comnionwealth, supra. 
Noell v. Com1nonwealth, supra. 
Pal1ner v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Snodgrass v. C ommo12wealth, 89 Va. 679, 17 S. E. 238 
(1893). 
''We do not inquire whether the prisoner was unfavorably 
or otherwise affected by the cross examination of the witness 
in his absence. He has the right to be present, which he did 
not and could not waive. He had the right to observe every 
look, gesture, or move of the witness while he was testifying; 
and it matters not that the coitrt excluded the evidence and 
certified that it was repeated in his presence.'' . . . . . . . . . .. 
State v. Greer, 22 vV. Va. 800 (1883) (Italics supplied). 
No part of the trial can properly proceed without the pres-
ence of the defendant. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Pal'lner v. Com,monwealth, supra. 
and without the continuous presence of the accused from ar-
raignment to sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to pro-
nounce judgment upon him. 
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Palmer v. Com1nonwealth, sitpra. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
''No principle is supposed to be better settled, and, in all 
criminal trials of the grade of felony, more rig·idly adhered 
to than that in all such trials, the prisoner has a right to be 
present in every stage from the arraignment to the rendition 
of the verdict. It is held to be a rig·ht of which he cannot be 
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deprived, and which he cannot waive. So imperative is the 
rule of law, that no part of the trial can proceed without him. 
If witness~s are exami~ed, he must have an .opportunity to 
hear and know what they say. If notes of the testimony are, 
afterwards., read to the jury, it is no less his privilege and 
right to hear the reading of it. How much inuuence the read-
ing of the testimony ·in this case may have upon the minds 
of the jury, it is impossible to determme. It is not, however, 
a question, whether the effect of the reading of the testimony, 
in his absence, was unfavorable to him, or otherwise, or how 
far his case was affected by it, if at all. Under the estab-
lished and safe practice in criminal proceedings, the reading 
of this testimony was irregular and in violation of the rights 
of the prisoner., who must be present at every part of 
16* the *proceedings. In his absence, ther·e can be no trial. 
The law provides for his presence. And every step 
taken in his absence is void, and vitiates the whole proceed-
ings. On this point all authorities agree. And no question 
can be raised, as to the extent of the injury done to the pris-
oner, or whether any injury resulted from his not being pres-
ent. Circumstances might occur, were the practice to- obtain, 
where great wrong would result. The possibility for wrong 
is sufficient to secure in all trials, involving life and liberty, 
the rigid enforcement of the law.'' 
Jackson v. Comnionwealth, supra. 
The result is that a single step taken during the defend-
ant's absence is void, and its occurrence vitiates the entire 
proceeding. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
It has accordingly been held on numerous occasions by this 
Court that the absence of the defendant during a part of the 
trial constituted reversible error. In the following cases~ the 
conviction was reversed for this reason: 
Staples v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 583, 125 S. E. 319 (1924): 
Accused absent when motion in arrest of judgment argued 
and judgment entered. 
Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923): 
Accused absent on view by jury. 
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923): 
Accused absent on view by jury. 
Fetters v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 501, 115 S. E. 692 (1923) : 
Accused absent on view by jury. 
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Coleman v. Commo_nwealth,-90 Va. 635, 19 S. E. 161 (1894) : 
Defendant absent when motion for continuance made. This 
decision changed by 1919 revision of Section 4894. 
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 450, 16 S. E. 355 (1892) :· 
Defendant absent on two occasions when motion for con-
tinuances were made. This decision changes by 1919 revision 
of Section 4894. . 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870): 
Evidence read to jury in absence of accused. 
Hooker v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. (54 Va.) 763 (1855): 
Record sh:owed that, when .defendant's motion to set aside 
verdict was made and overruled, defendant appeared by at-
torney, but failed to show that defendant was personally 
present. 
17• *Sperry v. Commonwealth, 9 Leigh (36 Va.) 623 
(1838): Record :showed only appearance of defendant 
by his attorney during trial and conviction; nothing to show 
that defendant personally present. 
From the beginning to end of the trial the defendant must 
be present. ff has therefore been held in the Virginias that 
he must b~ present in the following instances : 
(1) Upon the arraignment and plea. 
State v. Young.er, 2 W. Va. 579 (1868). 
( ~) Upon the entry of a plea of not guilty. 
State v. Conkle, 16 W. Va. 736 (1880). 
(3) When evidence is heard upon a plea of not guilty. 
State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va .. 392, 62 S. E. 688 (1908). 
(4) Upon a motion for a continuance made after arraign-
ment., prior to 1919 revision. 
Shelton v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Coleman v. Commonwealth, supra. 
( 5) Upon the hearing of a motion for a change of venue. 
State v. McCoy, 91 W. Va. 262, 111.S. E. 125 (1922). 
(6) Upon the selection, examination and swearing of petit 
jurors. · 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
State v. Martin, 120 W. Va. 229, 197 S. E. 727 (1938). 
State v. Younger, supra. 
(7) When evidence is received or excluded, or witnesses 
are examined. 
Palmer v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Jackson v. Co1rvnionwealth, supra. 
State v. Stevenson, supra. 
State v. Detwiler, 60 W. Va. 583, 55 S. E. 654 (1906). 
State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676 (1901). 
even though the question and answers are repeated in the de-
fendant's presence. There is neverthless an error resulting 
from the prebious proceedings during his absence which is 
not cured, and this error is reversible: 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, sitpra. 
State v. Sheppard, supra. 
State v. Greer, supra. 
18* * ( 8) W4en testimony is read to the jury. 
Jackson v. Comrnonwealth, supra. 
(9) Upon the argument of an objection to the introduction 
of evidence. 
State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S. E. 981 (1918). 
( 10) Upon a view by the jury. 
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Pierce v. Commonwealth, s'upra. 
Fetters v. Commonwealth, supra. 
State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938 (1918). 
(11) Upon a motion to strike the state's evidence. 
State v. Sutter, 71 "\V. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811 (1912). 
(12) Upon the delivery of the indictment and written in-
structions to the jury. 
Bowles v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 (1904). 
(13) Upon rendition of the verdict. 
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Gilligan v. Conimonwealth, 99.Va. 816, 37 S. E. 962 (1901). 
(14) Upon the argument of a motion for a new trial. 
Bond v. Conwionwealth, sitpra. 
Hooker v. Connnonwealth, s·upra. 
State v. Grove, 74 ·w. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914). 
State v. Parsons, 39 vV. Va. 464, 19 S. E. 876 (1894). 
(15) Upon the argument of a motion in arrest of judg-
ment. 
Staples v. Conimonwealth, sitpra. 
(16) Upon the entry of judgment. 
Staples v. C onnnonwealth, sitpra. 
State v . .Bailey, 85 vV. Va. 165, 101 S. E. 169 (1919). 
State v. Dolan, 58 vV. Va. 263, 52 S. E. 181 (1905). 
State v. Campbell, 42 W. Va. 246., 24 S. E. 875 (1896). 
B. The Court Erred in Instructing and Cmnmunicat-ing 
With the Incompleted Panel of Jurors, During the Trial of 
the Case and in the Absence of the Defenclant. 
It is well settled that instructions given by the Court 
19• to the *jury are a part of the trial within the rule re-
quiring the presence of the defendant at all stages and 
parts thereof. It has accordingly been held in countless cases 
that the absence of the accused while the court instructs the 
jury constituted reversible error. In each of the following 
cases, the judgment of conviction was reversed because of 
accused's absence while the jury were being instructed. 
State v. Grisa.fu,lli, 135 Ch. St. 87, 19 N. E. 2d 645 (1939). 
Comnionwealth v. Cunningham, 137 Pa. Super. 488, 9 A. 2d 
161 (1939). 
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 133 Pa. Super. 437, 2 A 2d 568 
(1938). 
Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F. 2d 805 (1937). 
Fina v. United States (C. C. A. Colo.)., 46 F. 2d 643 (1931). 
People v. "JJ!cGra1ne, 336 Ill. 404, 168 N. E. 321 (1929). 
Hopkins v. State, 174 Ark. 391, 295 S. vV. 361 (1927). 
State v. Weisman, 5 N. J. Misc. 625, 137 A. 718 (1927). 
Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 135 A. 189 (1926). 
State v. Wilcoxen, 200 Ia. 1250, 206 N. ,v. 260 (1926). 
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Puckett v. Comm01zwealth, 200 Ky. 509, 255 S. W. 125 
(1923). 
State v. James, 116 S. C. 243, 107 S. E. 907 (1921). · · 
Mills v. State, 23 Ga. App. 14, 97 S. E. 408 (1918) 
Pearson v. State, 119 Ark. 152, 178 S. W. 914 (1915). 
State v. Shittzler, 82 Wash. 365, 144 P. 284 (1914). 
State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 136 P. 137 (1913). 
Hill v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 646, 145 S. W. 923 (1909). 
Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116 (1904). 
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. 14r9, 71 S. ,v. 632 
(1903). 
Quinn v. State, 130 Ind. 340, 30 N. E. 300 (1892). · 
Stat~ v. Meagher, 49 Mo. App. 571 (1892). 
State v. ·Myrick, 38 Kan. 238, 16 P. 330 (1888). 
Roberts v. State, 111 Ind. 340, 12 N. W. 500 (1887). 
Territory v. Lopez, 3 N. M. 104 (1884). 
Bonner v. State, 67 Ga. 510 (1881). 
See: 
Bowles v. Corn1nonwealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 (190~). 
20~ •In our own state, this Court has recognized the same 
rule. In Bowles v. C omniorvwealth, supra, the Court, 
during the absence of the defendant and his counsel, sent the 
instructions., previously given, and the indictment to the jury 
room at the request of the jury. This was assigned as error. 
As there were other errors in the. record necessitating a re-
versal of the conviction, this Court declined to decide the 
point, but said: 
'' Wbether the sending of the instructions to the jury in the 
absence of the prisoner would constitute reversible error, we 
need not decide, as the case must, upon other grounds, be 
remanded for a new trial. Suffice it to say that the correct 
practice is that the indictment, the written instructions of 
the court, or other papers proper to be given into the hands 
of the jury upon their retirement from the presence of the 
court, or afterwards, should be delivered to them in the pres-
ence of the prisoner. and his counsel, that objection may be 
made at that .time, if there be objection.'' 
And in Palmer v. ConimonweaUh, supra, this Court said: 
"Generally stated, the rule is that he must be present on 
his arraignment, when any evidence is given or excluded, 
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when the jury is cha1·ged, when the trial court wishes to com-
municate with the jury in answering questions by them, and 
when the jury receives further instructions. He must be 
present at every stage of the trial proper." (Italics sup-
plied.) · 
Even in a civil case, it may constitute reversible error for 
the Court to instruct the jury in the absence of a party. 
Par/et v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 128 F. 2d 361 (1942). 
Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F~ 2d 821 (1'940). 
Kreiger's Cleaners .ct Dyers v. Benner, 123 Ch. St. 482, 175 
N. E. 857 (1931). . 
Monzingo v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 2d 662 (1931). 
B1.1,rroughs v. Southern Colonization Co., 96 Ind. App. 93, 
173 N. E. 716 (1931). 
Boerum v. Seyniour Realty Co., 127 Misc. 577, 217 N. Y. S. 
484 (1926). 
Sommer v. Hitber, 183 Pa. 162, 38 A. 595 (1897). 
Chicago rt .A. R. Co. v. Robbins, 159·111. 598, 43 N. E. 332 
(1895). 
Fox v. Peninsular White Lead ~ Color Works, 84 Mich. 
676, 48 N. W. 203 (1891). 
Fillippon v . .Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 39 Ct. 435, 
63 A. Ed; 853 ( 1919). 
Read v. Cambridge, 124 Mass. 567 (1878). 
Sargent v. Roberts, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 337 (1822). 
The statements made by the Court ·in this case con-
21 • stitute an *essential part of the trial. They constitute 
a cautionary instruction to the jury as to their conduct 
out of Court, and instruction as customary as· the familiar 
instruction, in any criminal case., that the guilt of the accused 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor are they any 
less essential. Courts instruct jurors because, as individuals, 
they are not always cognizant of the public function they 
must perform. Numerous cases have recognized that the giv-
ing, in the absence of the defendant, of an instruction which 
merely advises jurors as to the· manner of discharging their 
duties as jurors, and which does not purport to advise them 
as to the legal propositions they must apply, is reversible 
error. In Duffy v. State, supra, in the absence of the defend-
ants, the jury foreman notified the judge that the jury desired 
further instructions as to the form of their verdict. The jury 
were then brought back into the courtroom, whereupon the 
Court repeated the instructions previously given as to the 
form of, the verdict. It was held that this constituted re-
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versible error. In Puckett v. Oommon'µ)ealth, supra, the trial 
judge entered the jury room and, in the absence of the ac-
cused and his counsel, asked whether a verdict had been 
reached. Upon receiving an answer in the negative, the judge 
then further instructed them that no juror should subscribe 
to a verdict which did not represent his conscientious opinion 
as to what the verdict should be, and that the law required 
the Court to keep the jury together and not permit them to 
separate. It was held that this was reversible error. And in 
State v. Shutzler, su,pra, the jury were brought back into the 
courtroom to be discharged. The Court was informed that 
they stood eleven to one. The judge, in the absence of the 
accused, then suggested that it would be proper for that one 
juror to consider whether or not he was mistaken in his 
views., and requested the jurors to return to their room 
for further deliberation. It was held that this was reversible 
error. 
22• *Society is interested in having jurors arrive at their 
verdict by the application of principles correctly repre-
senting the law. Society is equally interested in having 
jurors arrive at their verdict free from outside influences and 
pressures. 
'' This practice is based upon the principle of the common 
law that the accused, in every felony case, was not otily en-
titled to a jury free from exception when impaneled to try 
his case, but that he had the right to have them remain so 
until their verdict was rendered, by keeping them free, as 
far as possible, from all extraneous influences." Barnes v. 
Oonunonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S. E. 784 (1895). 
This twofold consideration necessitates different types of 
instructions. In order that jurors may know what legal prin-
ciples to apply, they must be advised as to the propositions 
of law which they are to apply. In order that they mav know 
how to discharge their duties and functions thus placed upon 
them, they must be instructed as to their demeanor while 
jurors. As the consideration demanding a trial by a fair 
and impartial jury uninfluenced by outside forces are as 
strong as the considerations demanding that jurors make 
their determinations by the application of correct principles 
of law., the instructions necessary to accomplish the one are 
no less essential to the trial of the case than the instructions 
necessary to accomplish the other. Indeed, in some states, a 
mere omission by the court to caution the, jurors at each ad-
journment" before permitting them to separate is reversible 
error. 
t 
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People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 86 P. 187 (1906). 
· John,son v.· Btate, 68 Ark. 401, 59 S. W. 34 '(1900). 
Walrath-v. State, 8 Neb. 30 (1878)-. 
State v~ Mulkins, 18 Kan. 16 (1877). 
But even -if considered as a gratuity, such instruction, if 
given,, is as much a part of the trial in a Virginia court as an 
instruction stating a proposition of law; in this state the 
Court is under no obligation to instruct the jury as to the 
·law applicable unless requested, and an unrequested instruc-
tion given by the Court is no less an act of the Court than 
one requested and granted. 
23* *Trial by jury would indeed be a hazardous under-
. taking if admonitory ·instructions were not given. It is 
highly probable that instructions of this type are better un-
derstood and mean more to jurors than those statin~ abstract 
principles of law, and since the life and liberty of a defend-
ant in a capital case are as much dependent upon an immuni-
zation of the jury against persuasion and influences as upon 
their being advised correctly as to the law which they must 
apply, the considerations detn~nding his presence are simi-
larly as ·strong. Only instructions of the type given in the 
case at bar can guarantee the essential fairness of the trial 
which the courts have always so zealously guarded. 
A reason·· sufficient to demand the defendant's presence 
upon the giving of an admonitory instruction to the jury is 
tlle necessity that he be there in order that he mig·ht object 
and except .to any ~ction of t~e Court there occurring in viola-
tion of his, rights. Instruction of a jury is always fraught 
with danger t.o th~ acc.use4, and _no _ste1~ from arraignment 
to judgment _.furnishes a gTeater opportunity for error _and 
inj~stice: But the pri~1ciple .demanding_ "the defendant "s pres-
ence is· mo1·e thmi. a mere advice for bis protection. His pres-
ence is guaranteed because of an abhorrence of star chamber 
methods. He must. be there to see and hear all that goes on, 
the most minute as well as the magnitudinous. But once it 
is established that the Court may, in the absence of a criminal 
rlefendant, advise jurors as to their duties and caution them 
against improper conduct, the gates will be opened and will 
never again be closed, and the line between the permissible 
and the forbidden could never again be established. The net 
result would be a step calculated to destroy a good measure 
of that public confidence essential to the functioning· of our 
judicial system. 
It is not, however, necessary for the defendant to charac-
terize the statements made by the Court in the case at bar 
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as instructions in order tba t a reversal might be forthcom-
ing. The fact remains that the Court did communicate with 
the jury. 
~4 • · *It is reversible error for the jury or a juror., either 
before or after the jury have retired for deliberation, 
to make any communication to, or receive any communication 
from, an outsider. · 
Spooner v. State, 56 Ga. App. 618, 193 S. E. 482 (1931). 
State v. Harville, 170 La. 991, 129 S. 612 (1930). 
Pitchford v. Com11ionwealth, 135 Va. 654, 115 S. E. 707 
(1923). 
State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713 (1882). 
Rigsby v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 504., 142 S. W. 901 (1912). 
Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. 1, 30 S. vV.~588 (1892). 
Accordingly, it has been held in numerous cases that it is 
error for the trial judge, in the absence, or without the hear-
ing, of the accused to communicate with the jury. 
Schefer v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 659, 40 S. vV. 2d 147 (1931). 
Schields v. United States, 273 U. S. 583, 47 S. Ct. 478., 71 
L. Ed. 787 ( 1927). 
Vaughn v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 207, 277 S. W. 646 (1925). 
K indrix v. State, 138 Ark. 594, 212 S. W. 84 (1919). 
State v . .Alexander, 66 l\io. 148 (1887). 
Territory v. Lopez, 3 N. W. 156, 2 P. 364 (1884). 
Hart v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 566, 255 S. W. 414 (1923). 
H avenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116 (1905). 
Kirk v. State, 14 Ohio 511 (1846). 
State v. Himt, 26 N. M. 160, 189 P.1111 (1920). 
State v. Murphy, 17 N. D. 48, 115 N. W. 84 (1908). 
State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). 
Booth v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 659, 145 S. W. 923 (1912). 
Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 262 (1895 ). 
The rule is the same in civil cases. In such cases, the ver-
dict will generally be set aside if the juror converse with out-
siders. 
Berland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128 (1882). 
Ohaff ey v. Fenelson, 263 Mass. 427, 161 N. E. 616 (1928). 
Vamneter v. Kitzbiller, 5 W. Va. 380 (1871). 
Turner v. Beardsley, 19 ·wend. (N. Y.) 348 (1838). 
Robinson v. Dona.hoo, 97 Ga. 702, 25 S. E. 491 (1896). 
Ca1npbell v. Chase Granite Co., 92 Me. 90, 42 A. 228 (1899). 
Holman B. Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia 23 
See: 
Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S. E. 441 (1938). 
Griffin v. Tomilson, 155 Va. 150, 154 S. E. 483 (1930). 
Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Kessinger, 122 Va. 146., 94 
S. E. 186 (1917). 
25• *New River Ry. Co. v. Honaker, 119 Va. 641, 89 S. E. 
960 (1916) . 
.And reversal is the penalty for a violation of this rule con-
sisting of a communication between the trial· judge and the 
jury without the presence of parties and their counsel. 
Meinecks v. Fidelity Inv. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 62 S. W. '2d 
623 (1933). 
Boyd v. Pennewell (Mo. App.), 78 S. W. 2d 456 (1935). 
Hunsicker v. Waidelich, 302 Pa. 224, 153 A. 335 (1931). 
Dit Cate. v. Brighton, 133 Wis. 628, 114 N. W. 103 (1907). 
Danes v. Pearson, 6 Ind. App. 465, 33 N. E. 976 (1893). 
Hurst v. Webster Mfg. Co., 128 Wis. 342, 107 N. W. 666 . 
(1906). 
Crabfree v. Hagenbaiigh, 23 Ill. 28'9 (1860). 
HT atertown Bank v. Mix, 51 N. Y. 558 (1872). 
Abbott v. H ockenberger, 31 Misc. 587, 65 N. Y. S. 566 
(1900). 
Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn, 262 (1895). . 
Gibbons v. Van, Alystyt12e, 29 N: Y. S. R. 461, 9 N. Y. S. 156 
(1890). 
In Du Cate v. Brighton, su,pra, the judge in the absence of 
the parties and counsel, went to the jury room for the pur-
pose of announcing to the· jury that the sheriff ~ould take 
them t9 supper. After making such announcement., he cau-
tioned them with reference to their conduct while going to, 
at and returning from their meal. It was held that this was 
reversible error. 
In State v. Hiint, supra, the Court during a recess, and 
during the absence of the accused and his counsel, listened 
as a juror· requested permission to examine a certain piece 
of evidence introduced in the case. The Court then informed 
the juror that the proper course for him to pursue was to re-
turn to the jury box in open court and make the request. This 
was done and the Court thereupon granted the request. It 
was held that this was a forbidden communication. 
In Hoberg v. State, supra, the trial judge in the absence of 
the accused, went to the jury room and merely informed the 
jury that if desired any information on matters of law, they 
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should come into the courtroom and· ask for it. It was held 
that this was reversible error. 
26~ *In State v. Mic,rphy, supra, the judge., after being in-
formed that the jury wished to communicate with him, 
went to the jury room- and stepped just inside the door. He 
was informed that the jury could not agree.' -He said: "I 
will a·sk ,you to consider the matter further.~ G.ood night"~ 
The defendant was then absent. It was held that this con-
stituted reversible error. 
· · In Crabtree. v. H a.genbaiigh, supra, the judge went-. to. the 
jury and merely declined to explain the meaning of the writ-
ten instructions which had previously been· given to the jury. 
'l'he parties were then absent. It was held that this was a 
coinm:unicatiou necessitating a reversal. 
Nor does the fact that the communication may .have oc-
curred prior to the retirement of the jury for deliberation ef-
fect the result. In State v. Hunt, supra, the conimunicatio1n 
was m~de prior to the retirement o.f the jury. In reversing 
the conviction, the Court said : , , · 
· "There is no more reason for saying that it is improper 
for the trial judge to communicate with the jury after it had 
retired to consider of its verdict not in open court: and in the 
presence of the parties than for him to have such communica-
tion with the jury about the case while on trial an<;l pr:ior to , 
such retirement. ·whatever fact· the juror desires to coni-
municate to the trial jlidg·e relative to the case then on trial 
should be made from the jury box in open court and in the 
presence of the parties and likewise the answer of the judge 
t11ereto.'' 
. C. The Coit'rt Erred in Swearing: Offic</ts" to ·Take "'Charge 
of the 1'Jico1iiple~ed Panel of Jurors, mid in Later Sfvearing 
Officers to Take :Charge of the Ju4"y Sworn to Try "the Issites, 
During the T·rial · of the Case· a1zd in. 'tlie Absence of the De-
fendant. 
The requirement that the defendant, in a felony case., must 
be personally present during the trial of his cas·e, from ar-
raignment to judgment, necessitates his presence throughout 
the proceedings, occurring after the arraignment, whieh are 
necessary in order to obtain the fair and impartial duty which 
he is entitled to have try his case. Such proceedings are es-
sential parts of and steps in the trial, and the absence of the 
defendant from any portion thereof requires a reversal of 
the judg·ment of his conviction. 
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27• *There£ ore, the defendant must be personally present 
when the jury are impaneled. 
State v. Martin, 120 W. Va. 229, 197 S. E. 727 (1938). 
W arfielcl v. State, 96 Miss. 170., 50 S. 561 (1909). 
Sta.te v. Crocket, 90 l\Io. 37, 1 S. W. 753 (1886). 
Rolls v. State, 52 Miss. 391 (1876). 
during the examination of a juror upon his voir dire, 
State v. Martin, siiv·ra. 
State v. Crocket, supra. 
State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 S. 415 (1911). 
when challenges are made to jurors, 
Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 37Q, 36 L. Ed. 1011, 13 
S. Ct. 136 ( 1892). . 
Hopt v. Uta.Ji, 110 U. S. 574, 28 L. Ed. 262, 4 S. Ct. 202 
(1884). 
State v. Thomas, supra. 
Cf. Pointer v. United Sta.tes, 151 U. S. 396, 38 L. Ed. ·208, 
14 S. Ct. 410 (1894). 
when the jury are sworn, 
Younger v. State, 2 \V. Va. 579 (1868). 
Doitgherty v. Commonwealth, 69 Pa. 286 (1871). 
and when au officer is sworn to take charge of the jury. 
Allen v. Co11nnonwealth, 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. 645 (1888). 
The swearing of the officer or officers who have charge of 
the jury is a necessary and essential part of the trial, and a 
failure to take this important step during the trial of the 
case is ground for vitiating the yerclict. 
State v. Osler, 56 S. D. 264, 228 N. "\V. 251 (1929). 
State v. Smith, 56 S. D. 238, 228 N. \V. 240 (1929). 
1Vashington v. State, 138 Ga. 370, 75 S. E. 253 (1912). · 
Sittherland v. State, 76 Ark. 487, 89 S. \V. 462 (1905). 
State v. Lashell (Kan. A.), 61 P. 678 (1899). 
See: 
1/alsey v. State, 42 Ch. App. 291., 182 N. E. 127 (1932). 
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Dryer v. People, 188 Ill. 40, 58 N. E. 620 (1900). 
An error in this connection is not cured by proof that the 
officer did all that a proper oath required of him to do. 
Washington v. State, supra. 
State v. Lashell, supra. 
28* *In Ba.mes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S. E. 784, 
(1895-), it was assigned as error that the jury who tried 
the accused were not, when the Court adjourned from day to 
day during the trial, committed to the custody of the sheriff., 
with instructions from the Court not to speak to them him-
self, nor to suffer any other person to speak to them, touch-
ing the trial. The record failed to disclose that the jury were 
delivered to the custody of the sheriff, or that he was ad-
monished to keep them free from communication from out..; 
siders. It was held that this constituted reversible error. 
This Court said in part: 
"M:1~. Robinson, in bis old Practice ( volume 3, p. 246; pub-
lished in 1839), says: 
"\Vhere the jury in a case of felony cannot fully bear the 
evidence and the argument of counsel on the day that they 
are impaneled, the practice in Virginia is to commit them to 
the custody of the sheriff, or other officer, who is directed to 
keep them together, without communication with any other 
person, and to cause them to appear before the court at the 
hour to which it adjourns. At the time of so committing the 
jury to the custody of the officer, it is usual to administer an 
oath to the officer to the following effect: 'You shall well 
and truly, to the best of your ability, keep this jury and 
neither speak to them yourself, nor suffer any other person 
to speak to them, touching any matter relative to this trial, 
until they return into court.' The records in Kennedy's Case, 
2 Va. Oas. 510 (decided in 1826), and in l\Iendum's Case, 6 
Rand. (Va.) 704, as is stated in Bennett's Case, 8 Leigh., 745 
(cleceided in 1837), showed this to. be the practice, except that 
the record in those cases failed to show that the sheriff in 
whose custody the jury were placed was sworn. 
"We have examined records in capital cases of recent date, 
now on file in the clerk's office of this court, and find that they 
show the jury, at each adjournment of the court, was placed 
in the custody of the sheriff, or other proper officer, with 
instructions not to speak to them himself, not to allow any 
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one to speak to them touching the trial. We think this may 
the ref ore be regarded as the settled practice in this state. 
'' This practice is based upon the principle of the common 
law that the accused., in every felony case, was not only en-
titled to a jury free from exception when impaneled to try 
his case, but that he had the right to have them remain so 
until their verdict was rendered, by keeping them free, as far 
as possible, from all extraneous influences. 
"We think it may be safely said that any practice so salu-
tary and wise, and so admirably calculated to protect and in-
sure the rights and interests of both the accused and the 
Commonwealth in felony cases, and which has been uniformly 
pursued for a great length of time, ought to be regarded as 
showing what the law is on the subject. 
29,.. *"vVe are of opinion, therefore, that, where the rec-
ord in a capital case shows that the jury were adjourned 
from one day to another, it ought to show that upon such 
adjournment they were committed to the custody of the proper 
officer., with instructions not to speak to them himself, nor to 
allow any one else to speak to them, touching the trial of the 
case in which they are engaged. 
'' As the record in this case fails to show this, the judg-
ment of the trial court must be reversed, the verdict set aside, 
and a new trial awarded.'' 
In Allen v. ComnionweaUh, supra, the Court said: 
"In addition to the reason for this already suggested, the 
Criminal Code provides, by Section 245, .for the selection and 
swearing of an officer to take charge of them. He is the only 
person who has access to them. He is in authority; and, if 
dishonest, might inflict g-reat injury upon the defendant by 
influencing them against hiIIL The latter has the right., there-
fore, to know who he is, and to object to him if unfil, from 
bias or any other cause. The ground of objection may and is 
likely to be known only to the accused. He also has a right to 
see that he is sworn as required by law.'' (Italics supplied.) 
As shown by the record in this case, the only admonition 
given by the Court to the officers in charge of the jury was 
contained in the oath administered to them in the absence of 
the defendant, and, since under tl1e decision in Barnes v. Com-
monwealth, supra, the omission of such admonition is fatal 
to the judgment of conviction, it follows without question that 
in Virginia the swearing of such officers is a necessary and 
essential part of the trial. 
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The complaint of the defendant is not that the officers, in 
either case, should have been sworn to keep the jury,, but, 
rather that such· swearing should in each instance have oc-
curred in his presence in the courtroom. The errors com-
mitted in this respect are accentuated by the fact that neither 
the officers sworn to take charge of the incomplete panel upon. 
the first occasion, nor those later sworn to take charge of 
the completed panel sworn to try the issues in the case, was 
the sheriff, a deputy, a bailiff, or other officer already sworn 
to safely keep the jury. 
D. The Fact That, TV hen the I ncompleted Pmiel of Jurors 
lVas Delivered to the Citstody of the Officers, ancl the Officers 
Sworn, the Jury Had Not Been Sworn to Try the Issu-es, Is 
·W ithoitt Consequence. 
That the jurors bad not been sworn to try the issues, at the 
time the officers were sworn to keep the incompleted 
30• panel, and the *prospective jurors were admonished as 
to .their conduct until the court reconvened, is imma-
tPrial. The right of the accused to be present during the 
trial begi.ns, not when the jury are sworn, but at the arraign-
ment. 
Plamer v. Crnnmonwealth, sittJra. 
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra-. 
Pierce v. Conimonwealth, supra. 
Fetters v. Connnonwealth, s1ipra .. 
Coleman v. Comm()nwealth, supra. 
Shelton v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Jackson v. Cmnmonwealth, supra. 
Hooker v. C 01nmonwealth, su.pra. 
Sperry v. Commonwealth, sitpra. 
Bond v. Commonwealth, sitpra. 
Staples v. Commonwealth, supra. 
State. v. Y oimger, supra. 
State v. Conkle, suvra. 
State v. Stevenson, supra . . 
State v. McCoy, sitpra. 
8tate v. Martin, supra. 
Conseque;ntly, the absence of the accused from proceedings 
occurring before the jury are sworn, such as from the arraign-
ment and plea 
State v. Younger, supra. 
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or upon an entry of a plea of not guilty, 
State v. Conkle, supra. 
or when evidence is heard on a plea of not guilty,, 
State v. Stevenson, supra. 
or upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue. 
State v. McCoy, sitpra. 
or upon the selection, examination and swearing of petit 
jurors, 
State v. M a-rtin, supra.. 
Sta.te v. Younger, S'U,pra. 
constitutes an error reversible to the same extent as if the 
fatal proceeding had occurred after the jury were sworn. 
In Virginia, prior to the 1919 re·dsion of section 4894, the 
absence of the <;1.efendant upon the making, after arraignment 
and before the jury were sworn, of a motion for a continuance, 
was reversible error. 
Colenian v. Co11im,011iwealth, sitpra. 
8h elton v. C onnnonwealth, sitvra. 
31 * *The fact that the section was revised so as to ex-
pressly dispense with the presence of the defendant 
upon the making of such motion, either before or after ar-
raignment, demonstmtes an intention that he must be present 
at all other stages of the trial after his arraignment. 
E. The Def end ant TY as Absent fro11i the Cowrtro01n During 
the Occurence of the Events Complained Of. 
Upon the second occasion of the Court's swearing of officers 
to take charg-e of the jury, the defendant, was completely out 
of the· courtroom And on the outside of the building in which 
the courtroom is located. Upon the first occasion, when the 
officers were sworn and the incomplete panel admonished, tlw 
Pcc11sed was also comnletelv out of the courtroom, and waR 
in the jury room, which adjoins the courtroom. The door 
between the jury room and the courtroom itself was closed. 
Under such circumstances, the accused was, upon each oc-
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casion, absent within the meaning of the rule requiring his 
presence. · 
It is well settled that the rule under consideration requires 
the presence of .the accused within the courtroom where the 
trial is occurring, and that where a part of the trial occurs 
while the accused is in a room adjoining the courtroom, he is 
'not "present" and reversible error has been committed. 
State v. Martin, 120 W. Va. 605., 197 S. E. 727 ( 1938). 
State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 531, 94 S. E. 981 (1918). 
State v. Younger, 2 ,V. Va. 531 (1868). 
Foreman v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 567, 132 S. Vv. 937 (1910). 
F. The Fact That Counsel for the Defendant ffJT ere at All 
Times Present is Immaterial. 
The fact that counsel for the defendant in this case were 
present at the time of the proceedin~ in bis absence does not 
alter the case. In Virginia, the. right of the defendant to be 
present throughout the trial cannot he waived either by him 
or his counsel. 
32* «<Noell v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Pierce v. C omnionwealth, suvra. 
Shelton v. Con1/lnonwealth, su,pra. 
Fetters v. Conunonwealth, supra . 
.And it is well settled in this state that the presence required 
is that of the defendant personally instead of by his attorney. 
S1Jerry v. Com1nonwealth, supra. 
Hooker v. Comnionwealth, supra. 
Lawrence v. Connnonwealth, 30 Gratt. (71 Va.) 845 (1871). 
Thus, the mere presence of counsel for the defendant at the 
time instructions are given to the jury in the absence of the 
defendant himself does not insulate such proceeding against 
error. 
State v. James, supra. 
People v. McCrane, supra. 
Schafer v. State, supra. 
If the presence of counsel nullifies, in such cases, the pos-
sibility of reversal, it would do so in other cases of proceed-
ings occurring in the absence of the accused. Then his right 
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to be present in person would be reduced to a mere right to · 
have his counsel present. 
G. The Errors Could Not Be Cured by Repeating, in the 
Presence of the Def mulant, the Events 1'Vhich Occurred Dur., 
ing His Absence. 
As the right of the accused to be personally present during 
the trial of his case extends to every part of the trial, to every 
occurrence during the trial of the case. Once a portion of the 
trial has. taken place during his absence, the jurisdiction of 
the Court to continue the trial comes to an end, and the trial 
must be started from the beginning·. A repetition of the 
events which occurred during his absence cannot cure the 
defect, for, in point of fact, those events which occurred dur-
ing his absence remain, despite such repetition, of events oc-
curring out of his presence. The situation then is that the 
events have occurred twice, once in the absence of the accused 
and once in his presence, and the absence of the accused when 
they first occurred is sufficient to necessitate a retrial of the 
case. 
The authorities are therefore in accord with the rule that 
the subsequent repetition of events occurring during the 
.33• absence of the •accused, the repetition occurring in the 
presence of the defendant., does not cure the error. 
Jackson v. Conimonwea.zth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870). 
State v. Shepvard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. W. 676 (1901). 
State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 (1883). 
Booker v. State, 81 Miss. 391, 33 S. 221 (1903). 
In Jackson v. Commonwealth, S'U,pra, upon an indictment 
for murder, after the jury retired for deliberation, they came 
into court and stated that there was a ,difference of opinion 
with respect to the testimony of a witness, and asked that he 
might be recalled. Thereupon., a portion of the testimony· of 
said witness, as taken down, was read to the jury, neither the 
witness nor the defendant being· then in court. While the 
testimony was being read, the defendant was brought into the 
courtroom, and it was agreed by counsel both for the defend-
ant and the Commonwealth that the witness should be ex-
amined in person in the presence of the defendant, which was 
accordingly done. It was held that the conviction neverthe-
less must be reversed. 
In State v. Greer, supra, the defendant's counsel asked, dur-
ing the trial, that the defendant be permitted to retire. The 
defendant did retire in charge of the jailor. Upon defend-
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ant's request, the jailor put the defendant in his cell., without 
the knowledge of counsel either for the state or the defendant. 
The jailor returned to the courtroom, and it was thought by 
counsel for both sides that he brought with him and that the 
latter was then present in the courtroom. Thereupon, the at-
torney for the state proceeded to cross-examine a witness, 
asking two questions, which the witness answered in the ab-
sence of the defendant. It was then discovered that the de-
fendant was absent. The court immediately stopped the ex-
amination of the witness, instructed the jury to pay no atten-
tion to the evidence introduced in the absence of the def end-
ant, ruled out the same, and directed the defendant to be· 
34• brought into court, when this was #done, the attorney for 
the state put the same two questions to the witness and 
received the same two answers. It was held that the con-
viction must be reversed, the Court saying: 
''It was the duty of the court to observe whether the pris-
oner was present, and to permit nothing to he done in his 
absence; and if the court through inattention was not ob-
servant of the absence of the prisoner as soon as it was ob-
served, he shoitld have arrested the trial at once, directed the 
jury to be withdrawn, and cor,1/rn.ence the trial again or con,-
tinue the case. Better the expense of a ne-ip trial than that 
the obvioitS right of the prisoner be invaded. If this b'ltlwark 
of Uberty shoitld be broken down by attempting to cure such 
an error by excluding the evidence received in the absence of 
the prisoner, and having it repeated in his presence, we know 
not where we could draw the line, and we should soon be with-
out a rule to guide us." (Italics supplied.) 
Likewise, in State v. Shevpard, supra, in the absence of the 
defendant, two questions were asked of and answered by a 
witness for the state, the defendant then being in jail. After-
wards., the defendant was brought into court and the prosecut-
ing- attorney asked the witness the same questions and re-
ceived the same answers. It was held that the conviction 
must be reversed. 
H. It is Not Essential That Prejudice Resulting from the 
.Absence of the Accused be Shown. 
There can be raised no issue concerning prejudice or injury 
to him. It is well settled in the Virginias that since the pres-
ence of the defendant is jurisdictional, and cannot be dis-
pensed with, no prejudice or injury resulting from his absence 
need be shown. 
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J a-ckson v. C 01n1nonweaUh, supra .. 
State v. Grove, 74 "\V. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914). 
State v. Slwpvard, 49 "\V. Va. 582, 29 S. E. 676 (1901). 
State v. Greer, sitpra. 
"And no question· can be raised, as to the extent of the 
injury done to the prisoner, or whether any injury results 
from his not being present. Circumstances might occur were 
the practice to obtain, where great wrong would result. The 
1~ossibility for wrong· is sufficient to secure· in all trials., in-
volving life and liberty, the rigid enforcement of the law." 
Jackson v. C oni11ionwea.lth, s·upra. 
35* 
The Court Erred in Refusinl} to Grant and Give to the Jury 
the Instruction as Off ererl by the Defendant. 
The defendant requested the following instruction: 
'' The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes every 
person charged with crime to be innocent until the Common-
wealth has established his guilt by evidence so strong, so 
clear, and so conclusive that there is left in the minds of the 
jury no reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The presumption 
is an abiding presumption, and goes with the accused through 
the entire case and applies at every stage thereof until re-
pelled by proof. And in this connection the jury are instructed 
that it is never sufficient that the accused, upon speculative 
theory or conjecture, may be guilty; or that by the prepon-
derance of tbe testimony his guilt is more probable than his 
innocence, for until bis guilt has been proved beyond all rea-
sonable doubt in the precise and narrow terms as charged 
in the indictment, the presumption of innocence still applies, 
rmd they must acquit him. Ancl the Goud further instructs 
the jury that they should exclude every rectso1za,'f?le hypothesis 
except that of guilt of the accused, and that only when no other 
,c:u,pposition would rea.sonably acco·unt for all the r:onrlition8 
of the case establishing the ,quilt of the acc,used beyond all, 
reasonable doubt as chargecl, CO'ltld they arrive at the conclu-
sion of guilt on his part. 
"The Courf further instructs the jury- that a re~sonable 
doubt is that· state of the case wl1ich, after a full considera-
tion of all the evidence, both for the Commonwealth nNl for 
the defendant, leaves tlrn minds of the jury in the condition 
that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, 
amounting· to a moral certainty from the evidence in the case. 
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that the defendant, Holman Thomas, 1s guilty of the charge 
against him.'' 
The Court deleted, over objection of the defendant, the 
italicized portion of this instruction, anq gave the i·emainder. 
The deleted portion of the instruction under consideration 
must be considered in the light of the elementary principles 
which it soug·ht to exemplify to the jury. 
In order that a conviction of a criminal defendant mav be 
had, his guilt must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt., 
and if the jury have any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of 
the accused, he must be acquitted. 
36* *Dixon v. C01n1nonwealth, 162 Va. 798, 173 S. E. 521 
(1934). , 
T-Villson v. C01nmonwealth, 160 Va. 913, 168 S. E. 344 (1933). 
WaUers v. Connnonwealth, 159 Va. 903, 165 S. E. 495 
(1932). 
Clarke v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 922, 166 S. E. 541 (1932). 
Keeton v. Connnonwealth, 152 Va. 1036., 148 S. E. 783 
(1929). 
Du,ggins v. C01n11ionwealth, 153 Va. 857, 149 S. E. 471 
(1929). 
Ramey v. Co111,1nonwealth, 145 Va. 848, 135 S. E. 755 (1926). 
Jones v. Connnonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 126 S. E. 74 (1925). 
Grahani v. Com,monweqlth, 140 Va. 452, 124 S. E. 429 
(1924). 
Canter v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 794, 96 S. E. 284 (1918). 
Potts v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 732, 73 S. E. 470 (1911). 
Bitrton v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. -892, 62 S. E. 376 (1908). 
This is the ''universal golden rule in every criminal case, 
and tlrn standard of comparison and measurement of all in-
structions''. 
Lee, The Criminal Trials in the Virginias, Section 629. 
State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 561 (1896). 
and when any instruction, no matter what its verbiage, can 
he shown to be the equivalent of this standard, it is proper 
and right that it should be given. . 
State v. Lowry, supra. 
The defendant in a criminal case is never required to prove 
any fact beyond a reasonable doubt., or by a preponderance 
of the evidence. All he has to prove in any case is such a 
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state of facts as will raise a reasonable doubt in the minds 
of the jury as to the existence of the fact or facts sought to be 
established by the Commonwealth. 
Hale v. Comnionwealth, 165 Va. 808, 183 S. E. 180 (1936). 
Sims v. C onimonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 115 S. E. 382 ( 1923). 
"'Where the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, 
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, 
the jury cannot arbitrarily adopt that interpretation which 
incriminates him. 
Dixon v. Cornmonwealth, su.pra. 
Ma1nsfield v. Convmonwealth, 146 Va. 279, 135 S. E. 700 
(1926). 
37* *Canter v. Commonwealth, sitpra. 
Wooden v. Commonwealth, 117 Va. 930., 86 S. E. 305 
(1915). 
Starke v. Co'>wnio'>iwealth, 116 Va. 1039, 83 S. E. 545 (1914). 
Burton v. Convrnonwealtli, 108 Va. 892, 62 S. E. 379 (1908). 
State v. Kelly, 105 W. Va. 124, 141 S. E. 633 (1928). 
It is not sufficient that the evidence is consistent with the 
guilt of the defendant; it must be inconsistent with his in-
nocence. 
Sti.ne v. Com'lnonwealth, 162 Va. 856, 174 S. E. 758 (1934). 
Triplett v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 577, 127 S. E. 486 
(1925). 
Keeton v. Commonwealth, sitpra. 
Wooden v. C ommonweaUh, sitpra. 
Brown v. Co'lnmon.wealth, 97 Va. 791, 34 S. E. 882 (1900). 
Hairston v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 757, 32 S. E. 797 (1899). 
Johnson v. Com'>nonwealth, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796 (1878). 
Consequently, in all cases, the evidence must be such as 
excludes any rational hypothesis of the innocence of the ac-
cused, and, to warrant his conviction, his guilt must be proved 
so clearly that there is no reasonable theory consistent with 
the evidence upon which he can be innocent. 
Stine v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Dixon v. Conimonwealth, supra. 
Clarke v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Triplett v. Comnionwealth, sitpra. 
Widgeon v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 658, 128 S. E. 459 
(1925). 
36 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Wooden v. Com,11ionweaUh, s1,1,pra. 
Starke v. Conwionwealth, supra. 
Canter v. Com11ionwealth, supra. 
Burton v~ Com,1nonwealth, supra. 
J ohnsen)v; Commonwealth, supra. 
. ' 
McBride v. Commonwealth, 95 Va. 818,, 30 S. E. 454 (1898). 
Jones v. Conimonwealth, 103 Va. 1012, 49 S. E. 663 (1905). 
Bundick v. Comnionwealth, 97 Va. 783, 34 S. E. 454 (1899). 
State V. Kelly, 105 Vv. Va. 124, 141 s. E. 633 (1928). 
State v. Noble, 96 W. Va. 440, 123 S. E. 237 (1924). 
In Dixon v. Connnonwealth, supra., the Court said: 
'' In vV ooden 's Case., 117 Va. 930, 86 S. E. 305, 306, Ann. 
Cas. 1917D, 1032, Judge Cardwell held that 'It is well set~ 
tled by numerous cases that it is not sufficient to create a 
suspicion or probability of guilt but the evidence must 
38* go *f'urther and exclu.de every reasonable hypothesis ex-
cept that of gu·ilt'-that is to say, except that of guilt of 
the crinie charged." (Italics supplied.) 
In Canter v. Comnionwea.lth, supra, it was said: (Quoting 
Burto?z v. Conunonwealth, siipra): 
"In order to justify a conviction, juries are told that every 
fact necessary to a verdict of guilt must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that, if there be a reasonable doubt 
as to any fact, they shall acquit; that the res·itlt of the evidence 
must be to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
and be consi.~tent only with the guilt of the accused.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
Likewise, in Jones v. Comm,onweatlh, supra, the Court, 
quoting McBride v. Cormnonwealth, supra, said: 
"The prisoner is presumed to be innocent until his g·uilt 
is established, and he is not to be prejudiced by the inability 
of the Commonwealth to point out any other criminal agent, 
nor is he called upon to vindicate his own innocence by nam-
ing· the guilty man. No rests secure in that presumption of 
innocence until proof is adduced which establishes his guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and, whether the proof be direct 
or circmnstantial, it 111,ust be such as excludes any rational 
hypothesis of the innocence of the prisoner.'' 
The instruction, as requested by the defendant, states the 
propositions established by these cases., and falls squarely 
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within the scope of these decisions. The deleted portion of 
the requested instruction is in the exact lang'Uage of forms 
approved for use iu the Virginias. 
Lee, The Criminal Trial in the Virginias, Section 669, Form 
No. 5. 
Casperian, Instructions; The Law and Approved Forms 
for Virginia & ·west Virginia, Section 2113, Form No. 9. 
and is also in the exact language of a decision of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Wast Virginia. 
State v. Noble, supra. 
where the Comt, in disposing· of an assignment of error based 
upon an alleged misinstruction of the jury said: 
"It may be observed that instruction No. 4 for defendant, 
on the question of 'reasonable doubt', told the jury in 
39* substance that they '" shouJd exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis excevt that of guilt of the ace-used, and that 
only when no other su,pposition would reasonable account for 
all the conditions of the case establishing the guilt o.f the ac-
cused beyond all reasonable doubt as charged coulcl thev ctr-
rive a.t the conclilrSion of guilt on his part. Considering these 
two instructions together ( and instructions must be consid-
ered as a whole)., we can find no error.'' (Italics supplied.) 
There were 11ypotheses, other than that the homicide wa(,j 
murder in the first degree, which the jury might have adopted 
in their verdict had such instruction been given, and which 
they were bound to exclude before the verdict returned in 
this case could be reached. If the evidence for the defencbnt 
were believed, a case of justifiable homicide in self-defense 
was established. Or, if the testimony as to the intoxicated 
and dazed condition of the defendant were believed, they 
could find bim guilty only of murder in the second degree. 
The deleted portion of this instruction could, as none other 
given by the Court, advise the jury that it was their dutv to 
exclude these hvnotheses before the verdict whicl1 they 
repelled could be' found. . 
The error committed in clcletin~ this portion of the re-
quested instruction is not affected by the fact that an in-
str1,ction on the nresumption of innocence was also contained 
in the requested instruction and g·iven by the Court. 
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Ca1npbeli v. Co1nm,01iweaUh, 162 Va. 818, 174 S. E. 856 
(1934). 
Widgeon v. Commonwealth, supra. 
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 504,129 S. E. 259 (1925). 
The defendant is entitled to instructions in his own lan-
guage, and if instructions requested by him properly pro-
pound the law, they should be given and it is reversible error 
to refuse to do so. 
State v. Kerns, 47 W. Va. 266, 34 S. E. 734 (1899). 
State v. Koski, 100 vV. Va. 101, 130 S. E. 100 ( 1925). 
State v. Galford, 87 W. Va. 358, 105 S. E. 237 (1920). 
State v. Verto, 65 W. Va. 628, 64 S. E. 1025 (1909). 
40* *III. 
The Coitrt Erred in Ad·mitting into Evidence Certain State-
ments Allegedly Made by the Deceased as 
Dying Declarations. 
The statements allegedly made by the deceased, and ad-
mitted into evidence in this case as dying declarations, did 
not comply with the legally established requirements which 
must be satisfied in order that such statements may be ad-
missible. 
In order that a statement made by a deceased person may 
be admitted as a dying declaration, it is essential that the· 
declarant, at the time of making of the declaration, had a 
consciousness of the approach of death. 
Patterson, v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 807, 75 S. E. 737 
(1912). . 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870). 
Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 618 (1857). 
May v. State, 55 Ala. 41 (1876). 
Even a repetition of a declaration, first made during an 
expectation of death, after a subsequent change of this ex-
pectation by the recurrence of a hope of life, is inadmissible. 
Rex v. Colvin, 3 Dom. L. R. 404 (1923). 
State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 S. 390 (1899). 
Statements are admissible as dying declarations only where 
all hope, not only of ultimate recovery, but of the prolonged 
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continuation of life, has left the mind of the person making 
them. 
Jackson v. C oni1nonwealth, supra . 
.And any hope of recovery, however slight, existing in the 
mind of the deceased at the time the declaration was made 
renders it inadmissible. 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
In addition to this, the belief must ·be, not merly of the 
possibility of death, nor even of its probability, but of its 
certainty. 
· Compton v. CO'lmnonwealth, 161 Va. 980, 170 S. E. 613 
(1933). 
Patterson v. Commonwealth, supra. 
llf er,cepts v. State Ind·ustrfol Accident Corn., 167 Ore. 460, 
118 P. 2d 1061 (1941). 
41 * * Biggs v. Cornmonwealth, 150 Ky. 657, 150 S. W. 803 
(1912). 
Fannie v. State, 101 Miss. 378, 59 S. 2 (1912). 
Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 P. 63 (1893). 
Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 S. 232 (1896). 
Peak v. State, 50 N. J. L. 222, 12 A. 701 (1888). 
Smith v. State, 9 Hump. (Tenn.) 17 (1848). 
Tip v. State, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 502. 
The expectation must be of a speedy death. An expecta-
tion of ultimate but distant death is not sufficient. 
Peovle v. Cassesse, 251 Ill. 422, 96 N. E. 274 (1911). 
Saylor v. C01nrnonwealth, 97 Ky. 184, 30 S. W. 390 (1895). 
Lester v. State, supra. 
United States v. Schneider, 21 D. C. 381 (1893). 
State v. Wilson, 117 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 443 (1893). 
McHugh v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858). 
In Patterson v. Commonwealth, suvra, defendant upon a 
trial for murder, was convicted of murder in the second de-
gree and given six years in the penitentiary. To lay the 
foundation for the admission of a dying declaration, the Com-
monwealth called witnesses who testified that decedent, when· 
assisted declared, "Lay me down and let me die,.,; Common-
wealth called anotl1er witness, who testified that decedent 
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said he felt poorly, and he did not reckon taking medicine 
would do any good, but that he would take it, and that dece-
dent made no arrangements about dying, but talked about 
wanting to go to a hospital. The attending physician testi-
fied that decedent said that if nothing was done to relieve 
his pain he would die ; that the physician relieved his pain 
and that decedent said he rested easier. The wound inflicted 
on decedent consisted of a shot, which took effect in his right 
leg between the knee and body. Declarant died in the eve-
ning of the day he was shot. In holding· the declaration in-
admissible, the Court said: 
"It is very true that in ascertaining consciousness of ap-
proaching· death recourse should naturally be had to all the 
attending circumstances, such as the nature of the injury, 
etc., but in this case neither the nature of the injury nor the 
circumstances shown clearly warrant the conclusion that the 
deceased was conscious of approaching *death when 
42* he made the statements introduced as his dying dec-
larations. It will not do to say that because death did 
actually occur a few hours after the declarations were made 
the conclusion must be reached that the declarant was con-
scious of approaching death when they were made.'' 
Likev.11.se, in Jackson v. 0 o-nunonwealth, supra, defendant, 
upon a trial for murder was convicted of murder in the sec-
ond degree and given five years in the penitentiary. In the 
progress of the trial the Commonwealth proposed to intro-
duce the dying declarations of the deceased which were ob-
jected to by the prisoner, but admitted by the Court, and the 
prisoner excepted. Decedent, Alexander Bruce, received a 
wound which caused his death on the 26th of January and 
died on the 28th of .January. The physician who dressed the 
wound had no hope of his recovery, though another, who was 
called to see him, did have at first some hope. One of them 
said, ''I heard Mr. Bruce at no time express any hope of re-
covery. He was preparing for and apprel1ensive of death 
all the time.'' He frequently so expressed himself.'' An-
other of the physicians said: "Mr. Bruce was under the im-
pression he would die; and was so impressed all the time.'' 
Another physician, who said he manifestly thought he would . 
die from the wound. "\Vitness often heard him exnress him-
~elf and never l1eard him express a different opinion. They 
nll testified to his frequent repeating the expression "what 
a horrid death''. It was in proof that he made his will and 
requested one of the witnesses to take an interest in his for-
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mer servants and said he had left them a homestead for each 
family. These conversations referred to by the witnesses, 
were on the day he rceived the wound. Another witness 
stated he sat up with the deceased the last night of his ill-
ness, from a quarter to twelve o'clock till daylight. The de-
ceased was asleep when the witness went in. When he awoke, 
the witness said to him, "Old man, you have had a very good 
nap". He said: "Yes 'm who knows but I may get well". 
In holding that the declarations could not be admitted, it was 
stated: 
'' The evidence disclosed in this record, there is much 
43* which would bring these declaratio;ns of *the deceased 
within the rule as above laid clown. (The Court quot~d 
1 Wharton's Am. Crim. Law, Sec. 671. In Bull's Case 14 
Gratt. 620, it is laid down: "The rule of law is now well set-
tled, that to render a dying declaration admissible evidence, 
they must be shown to have been made when the declarant 
is under a sense of impending death, and without any ex-
pectation or hope of recovery." 
"He seems impressed with the belief, that he must soon 
die of the wound inflicted upon him. He frequently so ex-
pressed himself; yet, after these declarations were made, he 
used an expression as to himself, ~vhich seemed to indicate, 
that all hope of recovery was not gone from his mind. vVhen 
told by the attendant that he had 'a good nap', he replied, 
'yes', who knows but I may get well'. This certainly im-
plies the -existence in his mind of a possibility if not a prob-
ability of recovery. It would seem that at that time he was 
not ''without any expectation or hope of recovery'.'' 
"From all the attending· circumstances of this case, as 
represented in the record, the conclusion reached is, that dec-
larations were inadmissible.'' 
In tlie case of C01npton v. Comnior11wealth, supra, the de-
fendant was upon· a trial for murder and was convicted ancl 
after setting out the fact at length the record further dis~ 
closes that the decedent was placed in an automobile by a 
witness and another person and conveyed to the hospital at 
Richlands, a distance of several miles. During the progretiP. 
of the journey, the deceased stated several times that 'he 
thought he was killed'. After making the statement, 'I be-
lieve I am killed', he then asked the witness if he thoug·ht the 
wound serious. The witness replied that he could not tell. 
The decedent then said, 'I want to tell you bow this thing 
happened'. He said when the defendant went in the house 
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and came back with the pistol he· st~ted 'Damn you, I have 
got you where I want you now, and I am going to kill you\ 
uver the obJection of me ctefo11aant, tne scatement was ad .. 
mitted as a dying declaranou. ·upon t11e decedent's arrival 
at the hospital, he informed tue auctor that 1le had been shot 
by the detendant and he did not tlnnk he would get well. The 
doctor informed him that he could not tell; tnat he would 
have to be operated upon. The decedent was operated on in 
the afternoon . and djed durmg tlie night. Again over the 
objection of the defendal).t, the doctor was permitted to tes-
tify that the decedent stated to him that just before the 
44* fellow shot him he told him he would shoot his :)..heart 
out. The brother of the decedent was permitted to tes .. 
tify: 'He told me after he said he was bound to die, he said, 
lhe tolled me up to Mr. Charles Compton's and shot me'. In 
holding these (1eclara tions inadmissiole, the Court said: 
'' The crux of the defendant's contention is that no proper 
foundation was laid for the introduction of the alleged dying 
declarations. In that contention we concur.'' 
'' Prior to the introduction of the evidence complained of, 
no proof was offered that Strouth (the decedent) was in real-
ity in extremis or articulo mortis. There was no· evidence• 
tending to show his general appearance, his strength or lack 
of strength, his pulse, his heart action, or any other physical 
symptom except pain; nor was it shown that any vital organ 
of the body had been penetrated, or what the exact nature 
of the wound was. True it is that Dr. Williams (the doctor) 
stated that an operation was necessary, as Strouth (the dece-
dent) was bleeding very profusely. It is also true that the 
doctor stated to Strouth (the decedent) that he would get 
him "fixed up", and offered his encouragement as to the 
result of the operation. Not once did he indicate to Strouth 
(the decedent) that he was in extremis. Though perfectly 
rational for several hours after he was shot, according· to the 
testimony of all the witnesses, it is a significant fact tlrnt at 
no time did Strouth (the decedent) speak of his affairs, ex-
press any regret that he could not live, or leave any message 
to his relatives." 
"In the Patterson case, su,pra, which in onr opinion con-
trols the case at bar, the foundation for the admission of a 
dying qeclaration was laid ·by the introduction of a witness 
who stated that the deceased said, 'Lay me down and let me 
die'. In holding that the subsequent alleged dying· declara-
tion was inadmissible. ~T udge Cardwell said: 'This was 
nothing more than a simple exclamation on the part of the 
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deceased, actuated doubtless by the sensation of pain and 
suffering at the time in his wounded leg·, but in no wise proves 
that he thoug·ht he was g·oing to die, and threw no light what-
e'7er, as we, shall presently see, on his frame of mind five or 
six hours after, when the so~called 'dying· declarations' under 
consideration were made.'' 
~']following the Patterson Case is Pendleton v. Common-
wealth, 131 Va. 676, 109 S. E. 201. There the Patterson Case 
is dealt with at length and the doctrine laid down by Judge 
Cardwell, that dying declarations must be made under a sense 
of impending death, is approved.'' 
'' Mere belief in the possibility or even the probability, of 
death is not sufficient; there must be a certainty of it even-
tually.'' 
45* *'' Subsequent inquiries by an injured person as to 
whether the person addressed thought he would live 
shows a sufficient hope of recovery to defeat his dying dec-
laration as evidence, though he had declared his expectation 
of impending death.'' 
"These dying declarations are an anamoly in the reception 
of evidence, and are only admissible where all hope not only 
of ultimate recovery, but of a prolonged continuance of life, 
has left the mind of the person making them. Any hope of 
recovery, however slight, existing in the mind of the de-
ceased at the time the declaration is made, would undoubt-
edly render the ev.idence of such declarations inadmissible." 
'' When the rule above stated 'is applied to the evidence 
admitted, it is manifest that the evidence, in the absence of 
a proper foundation for its admission, was prejudicial." 
. 
Thus as we can see dying declarations are an anamoly in 
the reception of evidence and are only admissible where all 
hope of prolonged continuation of life has left the mind of 
the person making them. There must be a consciousness of 
approaching death, and this must be precisely shown as a 
foundation before it is proper to introduce statements as dy-
ing· declai'ations. Before the introduction of the evidence 
complained of by the defendant, there was no sufficient proof 
offered by the Commonwealth to show that the decedent, 
A. K. Fleming, wns in reality in extremis or articula mortis. 
The evidence as offered tending to show the physical con-
dition of the decedent indicates that he was wounded by two 
separate bullets, one of which passed through the chest with-
out striking anv bone or encumbrance and the other entered 
the rig·ht hip. There is no showing- at- all that any vital organ 
of the body had been penerated. True it is that in ascertain-
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ing the consciousness of approaching death reflection should 
naturally be made upon all of the surrounding circumstances, 
such as the nature of the injury, etc., but in the case here 
under consideration neither the nature of the injury nor the 
surrounding circumstances adequately justify the conclusion 
that the decedent was conscious of approaching death when 
he made the statements introduced as his dying declarations. 
On this score too, it *is important to remember that 
46* there is nothing in the record of this case to indicate 
what was the state of mind of the decedent at the time 
when he made the statements introduced as his dying declara-
tions. 
One of the first persons to reach the decedent after he had 
been shot was Dr. H.B. Showalter. He was the first physician 
to attend him. The decedent said to Dr. Showalter, ''There 
is no use taking me anywhere. This will be the last of me. 
He shot me just as I got out of my car. I never had a chance'.' 
Another person who was soon to arrive after the decedent 
was shot was E. S. Roby. The decedent said to Roby, ''Ethel-
bert, I am dying". Still another person to arrive soon after 
the decedent had been shot was his wife, Mrs. A. K. To 
her, the decedent said, "This is the end. He shot me as 
I got out of the car. I didn't have a chance. These state-
ments and assertions, "I am dying'', "There is no use tak-
ing· me anywhere. This will be the last of me'' and "This 
is the end", made by the decedent to persons who arrived 
shortly after he had been shot were in point of substance 
the same as the statements made by the decedent in the .case 
of PattersfJn v. Commonwealth, supra. And in holding· the 
subsequent alleged declaration of the • decedent, in the Pat-
terson Case, was inadmissible, Judge Cardwell said: 
''This was nothing more than a simple exclamation on tbe 
part of the deceased, actuated doubtless by the sensation of 
pain and suffering· at the time in his wounded leg, but in no 
wise proves that he thought he was going to die, and threw 
no lig:ht whatever, ... on his frame of mind ... when the so-
called 'dying declarations' under consideration were made." 
As shown by the record, though clearly rational in his 
mental conduct for several hours after he was shot, it is 11 
si~nificant fact to note that at no time did the decedent, .l\ .. K. 
FlPminP.'. spAak of his affairs nor did he mention, even to bi~ 
wife. what, if anything, should be done about his affairs, nor 
did he express any regret to her that he was leaving her. 
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. . 
In his several declarations he seemed more completely con-
cerned with the manner in which he was shot. 
The evidence in the record of this case then seems to clearly 
establish the fact that, at the time of the making of the state· 
ments made by the decedent in this case at bar and ad-
47* mitted into evidence "'as dying· declarations, he was not 
in extremis and that he was very decidedly not under 
a sense· of impending death without any hope of recovery. 
It should appear eminently significant to aid in deciding the 
question as to whether the. decedent, A. K. Fleming·, was un-
der a sense of impending death and without any hope of re-
covery at the time of the making of the statements admitted 
into evidence as his dying· declarati,ons, that, approximately 
four hours after he had made these statements, "I am dy-
ing'', "There is no use taking me anywhere. This will be 
the last of me'' and '' This is the end'', he used an expression 
as to himself, which seemed to indicate that all hope of re-
covery was not gone from his mind, when he asked Dr. Her-
bert C. Lee, his attending physician, whether he would live, 
whereupon, Dr. Lee said 'he hoped so'. 
'' Subsequent inquiries by an injured person as to whether 
the person addressed thought he would live shows a suffi-
cient hope of recovery to defeat hi~ dying declaration as evi-
dence, though be had declared his expectation of impending 
death." Conivton v. ConnnonweaUh, su,pra. 
These statements made by the decedent, A. K. Fleming, 
and admitted into evidence as his dying· declarations consti-
tute the sole evidence in the case at bar pointing to the de-
fendant, Holman B. Thomas, as being the one to .fire the first 
shot, and the only evidence controverting the defendant's 
testimony that the decedent shot first. Under such circum-
stances their improper admission was clearly prejudicial to 
him. 
When the rules above stated are applied to the evidence 
admitted, it is manifest that the statements of the decedent, 
A. K. Fleming, admitted into evidence as his dying declara-
tions, in the absence of proper foundation for tlieir admission 
were prejudicial and inadmissible as dying declarations. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner submits that for the reasons set out in tM~ 
his petition, which is hereby adopted as llis brief, that the 
46 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
judgment of the trial ·court should be set aside and a new 
trial awarded him. 
48* '!!'Counsel for the petitioner hereby request that they 
be permitted· to arg·ue orally the matters contained in 
this petition upon the application for a w:r;it of error and 
supersedeas, and certify that a copy hereof has been for-
worded by registered mail to the Honorable W. E. Neblett, 
Commonwealth's Attorney for Lunenburg County, Virginia, 
Lunenburg·, Virginia, who was Commonwealth's Attorney 
when this case was tried and who prosecuted the same on 
behalf of the Commonwealth. Said copy was mailed June 9, 
1944. The original is .filed with the Clerk of this Court in 
Richmond, Virginia. · 
HOLMAN B. THOMAS, Petitioner, 
By Counsel. 
J. BYRON HOPKINS, Jr., 
SPOTTS"\VOOD W. ROBINSON, III., 
LYNWOOD E. SMITH, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
49* *CERTIFICATE. 
We, J. Byron Hopkins, Jr., Spottswood W. Robinson, III, 
and Lynwood E. Smith, attorneys practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in our opinion 
it is proper and the ends of justice will be served for this 
Court to issue its writ of error and supersedeas and review 
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County in 
the case of the Cornnionwealth v. Holman B. Thomas, of 
which this record is annexed. 
J. BYRON HOPKINS, JR., 
119 E~st Leigh Street, 
Richmqnd, Virginia. 
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, 
Consolidated Bank Bldg., 
Richmond. Virginia. 
LYNWOOD E. SMITH, 
Consolidated Bank Bldg., 
Richmond. Virginia. 
R. H. COOLEY, JR., 
133 Harrison Street, 
Petersburg, Va. 
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Received June 9, 1944. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Rec'd 7 -5-44~ 
G.L.B. 
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded; said supersedeas, 
however, is not to operate to discharge the petitioner from 
custody, if in custody, or to release his bond if out on bail. 
July 31, 1944. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
Received July 31, 1944. 
M.B.W. 
RECORD 
The following is a true transcript of the indictment and all 
the orders entered in the Circuit Court Clerk's Office for the 
County of Lunenburg in the case of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia against Holman B. Thomas: 
On the 28th day of January, 1944, the following vacation 
order was entered: 
It appearing to the Court that in the cases of the Common-
wealth v. Drewry R. Coleman, and Commonwealth v. Holman 
Thomas,, felonies pending in the Circuit Court of Lunenburg 
County. for good cause shown, more than twenty-four venire-
men will be required, the Clerk of said Court is ordered and 
directed to draw a Venire of forty-four, instead of the reg-
ular venire for the trial of the aforementioned cases, and the 
Sheriff of Lunenburg County is directed to summons Forty 
of the said Veniremen to serve as Jurors for the trial of said 
cases, which are set for trial on F'eb. 8th and 9th 1944. 
Enter 
JOEL W. FLOOD, Judge. 
January 26th, 1944. 
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To the Clerk of the Circitit Cowrt of Lunenburg County. 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg 
County, the 28th day of January, 1944. 
The foregoing· vacation order was this day received in said 
office and admitted to record. 
Teste: 
J. T. WADDILL, JR., Clerk. 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 524. 
VIRG INI.A. : 
IN THE 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Holinan B. Thomas, Defendant. . 
ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. 
Be it remembered; that heretofore, to-wit: at a Circuit 
Court held for the said County of Lunenburg at the Court-
house thereof on the 7th day of February, 1944, E. L. Gee, 
Gentleman Foreman, 0. L. Harris, H. S. Morgan, L. D. Capps, 
S. R. Royall and T. W. Seward were sworn a special grand 
jury of inqu~st for the body of this County and after being· 
charged by the Court, retired to their room and after some 
time returned into Court and presented the following indict-
ment: "Commonwealth of Virginia v~ Holman B. Thomas, 
Homicide, a true bill", which indictment is in the words and 
figures following to-wit: 
page 3 ~ Virginia, · 
County of Lunenburg, to-wit: 
In the Circuit Court of said County. 
The jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia and in and 
for the body of the County of Lunenburg and now attending 
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the said court at its February 'ferm, 1944, upon their oaths 
present that Holeman B. Thomas on the 14th day of Decem-
ber, 1943, in said County in and upon one A. K. Fleming 
then and there being feloniously, wilfully and of his malice 
aforethoug·ht, did assault; and the said Holeman B. Thomas, 
a certain pistol, then and there charged with gun powder and 
leaden bullets, which said pistol he, the said Holeman B. 
Thomas, in his hand then and there had and held, then and 
there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, did 
discharge and shoot off, at, against and upon the said A. K. 
Fleming, and that the said Holeman B. Thomas with the 
leaden bullets aforesaid, out of a pistol by the said Holeman 
B. Thomas discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then and 
there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought 
did strike, penetrate and wound the said A. K. Fleming in 
and upon the left shoulder with severence of the left auxil-
iary artery and brachia} plexes, and in and upon the right hip 
of him, the said A. K. Fleming, g·iving to him, the said A. K. 
Fleming·, then and there with the leaden bullets af oresaicl, 
so as aforesaid discharged and shot off out of the pistol afore-
said by the said Holeman B. Thomas in and upon the left 
shoulder and the right. hip of him, the said A. K. Fleming, 
mortal wounds, of which said mortal wounds he, the said 
A. K. Fleming from the said 14th day of December, 1943, to 
the day of December 16, 1943, in the City of Richmond, State 
of Virginia, did languish, and lang11ishing·, did live, on which 
said 16th day of December, 1943, the said A. K. Fleming, in 
the City of Richmond aforesaid, of the said mortal 
page 4 ~ wounds died. And so the jurors aforesaid, upon 
their oaths aforesaid, do say that the said Holeman 
B. Thomas, him the said A. K. Fleming;, in the manner and 
b:v the means aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully and of his malice 
af orethougllt did kill and murder ag-ainst the peace and dig-
nitv of the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Found upon tl1e evidence of A. B. Shackleton. Osca-r Bragg-, 
E. S. Roby, Jr., vV .. n. Durham. and Dr. H. B. Showalter, wit-
nesses called in open court and sworn by me this 7th day of 
February,· 1944. 
E. L. GEE 
Foreman. 
pag·e 5 } At a Circuit Court held for t11e County of J,nnen-
bur~ at the Courthouse there~f on tbP · 7tl1 day of 
F0bruary, 1944, the following order was entered: 
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Commonwealth of Virginia, · Plaintiff 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant. 
On motion of the Attorney for the Commonwealth Oscar 
Bragg, E. S. Roby, Jr., and W. D. Durham personally ap-
peared in open court and entered into and acknowledged a 
recognizance in the penalty of $100.00 each, conditioned for 
their appearance, before this court, as witnesses in this case 
on Tuesday, February 8, 1944 at 10:00 A. lVL 
Common Law Order Book #11, page 526. 
page 6 ~ At a Circuit Court held for the County of Lunen-
burg at the Courthouse thereof on the 8th day of 
February, 1944, the following order was entered: 
It appearing to the Court that it will be impossible to ob-
tain a panel of twenty jurors, free from all legal exceptions 
from the list heretofore summoned by the Clerk of the Court 
in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Holman B. 
Thomas, the Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to issue 
a ,vrit of Venire Facias to Complete the Panel, directed to 
the Sheriff of this County, who is hereby ordered to summon~ 
the· following persons, selected by the Court from the jury 
list, to appear forthwith before this Court on Tuesday, F1eb-
ruary 8, 1944: ·w. T. Edwards, A. B. Chandler, Jno. M. 
Fowlkes, E. W. Gee, C. D. J olms, J. Wade Waddill, W. F. 
Hanks, T. H. Hart, J. J. Mylum, Sr., D. M. Turner, Ben 
Hite, D. S. Amos, A. B. Arvin, T. J. Arvin, Jr., G. ·w. Gauld-
ing, S. G. Hawthorne, W. C. Layne, F. F. Clarke, M. G. Cur-
rin, and Macon F. Fears. 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 528. 
page 7 ~ At a Circuit Court held for the County of Lunen-
burg at the Courthouse thereof on the 8th day of 
February, 1944, the following order was entered: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant 
Holman B. Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia 51 
ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth and the 
accused, Holman B. Thomas, was led to the bar in the cus~ 
tody of the Sheriff of this County, and being arraigned, 
plead not guilty to the indictment. And from a panel of 
twenty jurors, summoned by the Sheriff of this County, by 
virtue of a Writ of Ven.ire Facias to him directed, .furnished 
by the Clerk of this Court, examined by the Court, and found 
free from all legal exceptions and qualified to serve as ju-
rors, according to law, the accused and the Commonwealth 
struck four, each, and the remaining twelve, viz., W. S. Price, 
Ozlin L. Taylor, R. B. Seaborn, J. J. Mylum, Jr., W. J. Mor-
ton, E. C. Britt, E. F. Burnett, R. H. Bohannon, D. E. Buch-
anan, J.M. Fowlkes, E.W. Gee and C. D. Johns, were sworn 
the truth of and on the premises to speak and after having 
heard a part of the evidence the said jurors were given in 
charge of E. L. Slayton and P. W. Howell, Officers of this 
Court, to whom was administered an oath that they would 
keep the said jurors together without communication with 
any person and that they would neither converse with them 
themselves touching this trial, nor permit any other person 
to do so and would cause the said jurors to appear in Court 
tomorrow morning at 9 :30 o'clock. And the prisoner is re-
manded to jail. 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 528. 
pag·e 8 ~ At a Circuit Court held for the County of Lunen-
burg at the Courthouse thereof on the 9th day of 
February, 1944, the following order was entered : 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant. 
ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. 
This day came the Attorney for the Co~monwealth and 
the accused, Holman B. Thomas, was again led to the bar 
in the custody of the Sheriff of this County, and the jury, 
sworn on yesterday, appeared in Court in charge of the two 
officers in pursuance of their adjournment anf!_ after having 
heard all of the evidence, instructions of the Court, and ar~-
ments of counsel, retired to their room and after sometime 
returned into Court and rendered their verdict, which is in 
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. the following words, to-wit: "We the jury ,find the defend-
ant guilty of murder of the First Degree and fix punishment 
at death. Jno. M. Fowlkes, Foreman." Thereupon the pris-
oner, by his counsel, moved the court to set aside the said 
verdict, and grant him a new trial, which motion the Court 
doth set for hearing on Friday, :March 17, 1944 at 10 :00 
o'clock o'clock A. M. And the said prisoner is remanded to jail.,· 
Common Law Order Book # 11, pag·e 529. 
pag·e 9 ~ At a Circuit Court held for the County of Lunen-
burg· at the Courthouse thereof on the 9th day of 
February, 1944, the following order was entered: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant. 
It appearing to the Court that Holman B. Thomas was on 
the 9th day of February, 1944, by a jury of the County of 
Lunenburg, convicted of murder in the first degree and that 
said jury has fixed his punishment at death; and it fmther 
appearing to the Court that certain motions are pending be-
fore this Court in connection with the trial and conviction 
of the said Holman B. Thomas. 
It is therefore, ordered by the Court, that Holman B. 
Thomas be forthwith transported by the Sheriff of this 
County to the Henrico County Jail, and there immediately 
delivered into tbe care and custody of the Jail or of said 
County, and by him safely kept pending the further orders 
of this Court. 
Common Law Order Book #11, page 529. 
page 10~ Virginia, 
County of Lunenburg·, to wit: 
. In the Circuit Court of said County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
11. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant. 
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ORDER IN VACATION. 
On consideration whereof, it appearing to the court in va-
cation that Holman B. Thomas was committed to the Hen-
rico County Jail at Richmond, Virginia, pursuant to an or-
der entered on February 9, 1944; and it further appearing 
to the court that a motion will be heard on March 17 to set 
aside the verdict of the jury entered on February 9, 1944, 
and it will be necessary for the said Holman B. Thomas, the 
defendant, to be present when the motion as aforesaid will be 
argued by counsel : 
So the ref ore, is is adjudg·ed and ordered that A. B. Shack-
leton, Sheriff of said County shall deliver the body of the 
said Holman B. Thomas, the defendant, to this Court at 10 
o'clock A. l\L on March 17, 1944; and the court doth further 
adjudge and order that the keeper of the Jail of Henrico 
County or the Sheriff of Henrico County shall deliver the 
body of the said Holman B. Thomas to A. B. Shackleton, 
Sheriff of Lunenburg County, for delivery to the Circuit 
Court of said County and take his receipt therefor in ac-
cordance with this order. 
And it is so ordered. 
To J. T. Waddill, Jr., Clerk of said Court: 
Enter the above order as a vacation order. this 14 day of 
March, 1944. 
JOEL W. FLOOD, Judge. 
page 11 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg 
County, the 15th day of March, 1944. 
The fore2·oinq,· vacation order was this day received in said 
office and admitted to record. 
Teste: 
J. T. WADDILL, JR., Clerk. 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 538. 
page 12 ~ At a Circuit Court held for the County of T,unen-
burg at the Courthouse thereof on the 17th clay 
of March, 1944, the following order was entered: 
54 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v~ 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant 
ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. 
This day again came the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
and Holman B. Thomas, who stands convicted in this Court 
of murded in the first degree, was again led to the Bar of this 
Court in the custody of the Sheriff of this County, where the 
said prisoner, by his counsel, renewed his motion to set aside 
the verdict rendered against him by the jury on the 9th day 
of February, 1944, and grant him a new trial. Whereupon, 
after hearing the arguments of counsel for the defendant 
and counsel for the Commonwealth, the Court being fully ad-
vised, is of the opinion that the said verdict of the jury 
should not be set aside, and doth overrule the motion for a 
new trial in this case, to which ruling the defendant, by conn~ 
sel, excepted. Thereupon, the defendant, by counsel, re-
newed his motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and 
grant him a new trial, which motion the Court doth again 
overrule, and to which ruling the defendant, by counsel, again 
excepted. 
It then being demanded of the said Holman B. Thomas, if 
anything for himself be had or knew to say why the Court 
should not now proceed to judgment and execution against· 
him of and upon the premises, in accordance with the verdict 
of the jury heretofore rendered against him, and nothing 
further being offered or alledged in delay thereof, it is there-
fore, considered by the Court that sentence of 
page 13 ~ death be and it is hereby pronounced against him, 
the said Holman B. Thomas, and that he be exe-
cuted and put to death on the 16th day of June, 1944, be-
tween the hours of sunrise and sunset, in the manner pre-
scribed by law. It is further ordered that the Superintendent 
of the State Penitentiary at Richmond, Virginia, do cause 
the said Holman B. Thomas to be safely removed from the 
jail of this County to the Penitentiary of the Commonwealth 
at Richmond, Virginia, where the said Holman B. Thomas 
shall be safely kept until the 16th day of June, 1944, on which 
said day, between the hours of sunrise and sunset the said 
Superintendent of the said Penitentiary shall cause the said 
Holman B. Thomas to be electrocuted until he is dead. And 
it is· so ordered. 
Holman B. Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia ~5 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 539. 
page 14} At a Circuit Court held for the County of Lunen-
burg at the Courthouse thereof on the 17th day 
of March, 1944, the following order was entered: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas, Defendant 
ON AN INDICTMENT FOR MURDER. 
It is hereby ordered that Holman B .Thomas, who stands 
convicted in this Court of murder in the first degree, and 
whose punishment has been fixed at death, be forthwith, by 
the Sheriff of this County, transported to the Henrico County 
Jail, and there immediately delivered into the care and cus-
tody of the J ailor of the said Henrico County Jail, and by 
him the said Jail or safely kept, pending the further orders 
of this CoUI't. 
Common Law Order Book # 11, page 540. 
State of Virginia, 
County of Lunenburg, to-wit: 
I, J. T. Waddill, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
County and state aforesaid, do hereby certify that the fore-
going- is a true and correct transcript of the indictment and 
all the Orders in the Case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
Holman B. Thomas, which were submitted to the presiding 
Judge and copied herewith in accordance with his directions. 
And I do further certify that a notice of the intention of 
the said Holman B. Thomas to apply for a transcript of the 
record in said case was dul:v given to the opposite party 
throug·h his counsel. 
page 15 } Given under my hand and seaL of said Court, 
this 19th day of May, 1944. 
J. T. WADDILL, JR., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg, County, Virginia. 
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Dr. Herbert C. Lee. 
page 16 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Holman B. Thomas. 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 1. 
. i 
j 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the follow-
ing evid~nce on behalf of the Commonwealth and of the de-
fendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all of the evi-
dence that was introduced, save one pair of trousers, one war-
rant of arrest and conviction, and six photographs, four of 
which were admitted into evidence and two of which were ex-
cluded upon objection of the defendant: 
page 17 ~ WITNESSES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. 
DR. HERBERT C. LEE. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Dr. Herbert C. Lee testified that the deceased was brought 
to the Medical College of Virginia at Ric.hmond on Decem-
oer 14, 1943, that he first saw him there about 5 :00 A. M. 
The deceased was in a shocked condition from loss of blood 
and his blood pressure was about balf of what it should be. 
The patient was conscious of having some p_ain. He was 
shivering with cold. Many hot water bottles were placed about 
his body and several blankets were placed over him. There 
was a through and through bullet tract which ranged slightly 
downward in the left shoulder. The bullet apparently entered 
in the left neck after having grazed the chin and entered just 
above the clavicale about two inches from the sternal end. 
The point of exit was just posterior to the insertion of the 
_deltoid muscle on the left arm. There was a fairly large 
hematoma (blood tumor) over the left pectoral region which 
apparently was not increasing jn any size. There was no 
·radial pulse palpated in the left arm. There was little if any 
evidence of circulation in the left hand, and there was no sen-
sation in the entire left arm below the left elbow. There was a 
second point of entrance of a second bullet in the right gluteal 
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Reverend George Harris. 
region and there was no point of exit. Examination revealed 
a fairly tender swelling in the left femoral region which was 
supposed to have been the site of the bullet. This bullet 
ranged slightly downward. There was no evidence of peri-
toneal irritation or of plural irritation, both bullets apparently 
missing these cavities. The patient was catheterized, and 
there was no blood present grossly in the urine. A finger 
was inserted in his rectum, and about 1 inch inside of the 
anal opening a perforation was felt on each side of the rectum, 
and apparently the bullet had gone from the right hip through 
the center of the rectum and lodged in the left upper 
page 18 ~ femur. He unquestionably had an injury to his 
left axillary vessels and to his brachial plexes. Ap-
parently there was no further bleeding. The patient died from 
gas bacillus infection of left leg and scrotum at 8 :05 A. M. 
December 16, 1943. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Dr. Lee testified that the deceased was able to talk; that the 
left arm could not have moved-" It could have moved but 
I don't think it could "-and that at no time did the deceased 
say he was going to die, but that the deceased asked him 
if he would live, and he (Dr. Lee) replied, "I hope so". 
page 19 ~ REVEREND GEORGE HARRIS. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Reverend Gxorge Harris testified that he is a Baptist minis-
ter at Kenbri~e, Virginia; that for many years he has been 
an amateur photographer taking and developing photographs ; 
that on February 4, 1944, at the request of the Common-
wealth's Attorney of Lunenburg County he went to the scene 
of this shooting and made six photographs; that Mr. Ethelbert 
Roby and Mr. Oscar S. Bragg was present; that the dark 
automobile and the gTay automobile as shown in the photo-
graphs marked Exhibits Nos. 2, 4, and 5 were placed as shown 
in said photographs by Mr. Roby and Mr. Bragg. The photo-
graph, Exhibit No. 2, being taken with the camera pointed 
to the west, No. 4 being taken with the cnmera placed directly 
beneath a window in the warehouse building, which window 
was pointed out to him by Mr. Bragg, the camera pointing in 
a northerly direction; that the photograph, Exhibit No. 5, 
shows in its right fore ground the back of the house of Flora 
58 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Richard Keeton. 
Keeton and is pointing in a southerly direction, the cars in 
the left back ground being the two cars as shown in Exhibits 
Nos. 2 and 4, the house of Flora Keeton having been desig-
nated to him by Mr. Roby. The photograph, Exhibit No. 6, 
shows the front door and south side of the house of Flora 
Keeton, the same having been pointed out by A{r. Roby, the 
camera being pointed in an easterly direction. Exhibits No. 
1 and 3 were also identified by the witness. The witness also 
testified that he personally developed the photographs and 
that they were true and accurate reproductions of the ob-
jects and scenes photographed. None of the photographs was 
offered in evidence or exhibited to the jury at this time, but 
were delivered to the Clerk, marked by him for identification 
and retained in his possession. 
page 20 ~. CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Reverend Harris testified that he was not present when the 
gun battle took place between the deceased and the defendant, 
and that he took the pictures of the scene of the shooting 
after cars had been placed at the said scene by the Common-
wealth's witnesses; that these pictures were taken some time 
after the shooting on Friday, February 4, 1944. 
page 21 ~ RICHARD KEETON. 
DIRECT EXAMlNATION. 
Richard Keeton testified that he lives in Kenbridge; that on 
the night of December 13, 1943, a little after d~rk, about 7 :30 
or 8 :00 P. M., a party consisting of Holman Thomas (the 
defendant), Coleane Keeton (his sister), May Hargrove (his 
girl friend) and himself, was made up near Holman Thomas's 
house and a short distance from where he lives; that all four 
got into Holman Thomas 's automobile, he in the back seat 
with May Hargrove, and Coleane Keeton on the front seat 
with Holman Thomas who was driving. They started to Vic-
toria and got nearly to Dalton's Grill when Holman Thomas 
decided to turn around and go back to Kenbridge to get some 
meal wine. They had been drinking some wine, about three-
:fiftbs. In turning around, he backed his automobile into a 
ditch and some soldiers helped them get the car back on the 
road. Then Thomas drove through Kenbridge on the Black-
stone road and went to the home of a colored man, William 
Edmonds, looking for some meal wine. Thomas knocked on 
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the door .. but no one answered. Thomas turned the car around, 
running into a stump and doing some damage to one of the 
wheels, and then drove back to Kenbridge, stopping at Mr. 
Williams 's service station where he bought some gas, later 
returning to Flora Keeton 's house about 10 :30 and 11 :00 
P. M.; that he and May Hargrove went into the front room 
of this home while Holman Thomas and Coleane Keeton went 
into the middle room which did not have a stove in it and 
where several of Flora Keeton 's children were asieep. About 
fifteen minutes later Flora Keeton, his mother, came into this 
room and a fuss took place between her and Thomas, she hav-
ing caught them in the bed. He heard his mother ask Thomas 
what he was doing in there and heard Thomas ask her not 
to hit him; she struck him over the head with something and 
he ran out of the house. Then in about twenty or thirty 
minutes Thomas came back. He heard a noise at 
page 22 t the kitchen door, sounded like two boards slapping 
together, then the report of a pistol which was fired 
either two or three times. Thomas knocked the door down and 
rushed on into the room where he (Keeton) and May Har-
grove were with a pistol in his hand and his thumb on the ham-
mer; he said, "I am going to kill everybody in this damn . 
house". Then he (Keeton) rushed into his mother's room; 
he did not recall whether he or his mother thumbbolted the 
door; his mother, Graham Nelson and three small children 
were in her room, they all were sitting up in their night 
clothes, and Graham had his overalls on but his shoes off. 
Then Thomas said, "God damn it, open up this door". He 
(Keeton) asked Graham to give him the shotgun but Graham 
threw it behind the bed where he could not reach it. While 
Thomas was striking on the door, he raised the windo·w and 
jumped out; then he heard Thomas break the door down and 
as he came into the room, his mother said to him (Thomas) 
that she would not tell his ·wife or anybody that he had been 
over there, and Thomas said he was going to '' kill all of the 
God damn children", and that "if anybody calls the law, r 
will kill him (the law), too". 
He testified further that he went to the Farmer's Ware-
house and asked Mr. Bragg to call Mr. Fleming over the tele-
phone. Some few minutes later Mr. Fleming came by the 
warehouse and Keeton told Mr. Fleming what this man had 
said, that he would kill him if he came down there, and· Mr. 
Fleming drove on to the scene where the shooting later oc-
curred. 
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Dr. F. R. Craw/ ord. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Richard Keeton testified that he was at the time of his tes-
timony in jail and had been so incarcerated since January 16, 
1944; that he was in jail awaiting trial; that he has been an 
inmate of the Virginia State Penitentiary twice; that when 
they got into Thomas's automobile, he (witness) occupied the 
back seat with May Hargrove and that his sister (Coleane 
Keeton) was in the front seat with Thomas. 
page 23 }- DR. F. R. CRAWFORD. 
. 
DIR,ECT EXAMINATION. 
Dr. Crawford testified that he is a member of the staff of 
the Southside Community Hospital at Farmville; that the de-
fendant was admitted to the Farmville Hospital at about 6 :30 
A. M. on December 14, 1943; that the patient was complaining 
of pain, was thrashing about, more or less. However, he did 
not appear to be in shock. The pain was in his chest and it 
hurt him to breathe. He stated further that the physical ex- · 
amination at that time showed: Patient was bleeding. He had 
wounds in his left forearm and crepitus. He had a contused1 
malled laceration on the vault of the skull which was bleed-
ing. He had three wounds in his chest, all on the left side. 
There were two superficial wounds in the left shoulder, one 
little more than a brush burn, and the tip of the right ring 
finger was injured near the base of the nail, the bone fractured 
and the finger hanging from the ventral tissues. There was 
a minor wound of the middle finger and still less wound of 
the index finger. His abdomen appeared essentially nega-
tive though it was not particularly examine·d except for evi-
dences of puncture wounds. 
Dr. Crawford testified that his shmmary made on December 
16, 1943, shows: Patient was shot through left lung, one bullet 
in mediastinum, left ulna fractured by through and through 
bullet wound, and fingers of right hand injured, and abrasion 
of left shoulder. Condition fair. Patient discharged to hos-
pital at State Farm as a matter of precaution. He also 
had contused wound of head, improved. 
, Dr. Crawford testified that the X-Ray reports showed as 
follows: 
Plain A. P. and lateral views of the shaft of the left fore-
arm show a shattering type of fracture through the mid por-
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tion of the ulna. Many small fragments are dis-
page 24 ~ tracted with the associated soft tissues. There are 
a few small metalic fragments. After :fixation the 
alignment is good in both views. 
PA. view of chest shows a metallic fragment (bullet) to the 
left of the 9th dorsal body. Heart shadow is normal. There 
is density in lower half of left lung. There is no definite free 
air beneath the diaphragm. 
Plain film of abdomen shows moderate generalized gaseous 
distension of the hollow viscus as suggesting partial ileus. 
Impression: 
First, foreign body in left thorax; second, traumatic pneu-
monia in left base; third, paralytic ileus; fourfh, shattering 
fracture of mid left arm. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
On cross examination Dr. Crawford testified that the bullet 
in the chest was not removed; that the wounds on the fingers 
could have been made by almost any instrument; that the 
wound on top of the head was wide open; that the blood bad 
come from the head, but not a great deal; that the wound on 
the shoulder could have been made by a blunt instrument. 
Dr. Crawford further testified that a blow sufficient to pro-
duce a wound of the character found on top of the defendant's 
head would daze some persons. Dr. Crawford also testified 
that if a hypodermic needle had been given the defendant, it 
would have caused him to recover from shock. 
page 25 ~ DR. "WILLIAM J. vVEST. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Dr. vVilliam J. Vv est testified that the defendant was ad-
mitted to the State Farm Hospital on Friday, December 17, 
1943; that the patient had wounds in his left forearm and 
crepitus; that he had a cut on the back on the head and a cut 
about the center of the scalp which were closed by stitches; 
that he had three wounds in his chest, all on the left side· 
there were two superficial wounds in the left shoulder, on~ 
little more than a brush burn, and the tip of the right ring 
finger was injured near the base of the nail and the bone 
fractured; there was a minor wound of. the middle finger and 
still lesser wound of the index finger; that the finger tip (ring 
• 
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finger) was . worse than the other fingers on the right h~nd; 
that on December 20, 1943, the X-Ray showed that the httle 
finger was broken; that his forearm was put in a plaster cast 
around the small bone of the arm; that he was given tetanus 
antitoxin; that on January 28, 1944, he was discharged in 
a fairly good condition, so far as life and death were con-
cerned. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Dr. William J. ,vest stated that under the circumstances the 
average person would have been tremendously shocked if he 
had received such injuries and that it does not take much of a 
wound to cause shock; and that the injuries suffered from 
the gunshot wounds could have been caused by two or three 
bullets. "· · 
page 26 ~ DR. H. B. SHOW ALTER. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Dr. H. B. Showalter testified that he had been practicing 
medicine at Kenbridge, Virginia, since 1934; that he was called 
to attend A. K. Fleming on December 14, 1943, at about 
1 :30 A. M.; that he found Mr. Fleming lying on the ground 
flat on his back; that he was in a state of shock, seriously 
wounded, and he removed his clothing to see the wounds ; 
that it was a pretty cold night, the ground was frozen; that 
he gave him several hypodermics, it never relieved his shocked 
condition; and that he accompanied him to the Medical Col-
lege Hospital and he stayed in that shocked condition until he 
left several hours later. Over the defendant's objection· ( to 
. the overruling of which the defendant excepted), Dr. 
Showalter further stated that immediately on his arrival, Mr. 
Fleming said, '' There is no use taking me anywhere, this 
will be the last of me-he shot me just as I got out of my 
car, I never had a chance''. 
The witness testified that he removed the clothing of Officer 
Fleming, and that he could identify this clothing. Counsel for 
the defendant at this point objected to the introduction of any 
articles of clothing which would bring to the attention of the 
jury blood stains. The Commonwealth then exhibited the 
trousers of Officer Fleming. The court directed the trousers 
be folded so that a hole in the seat thereof identified by the 
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witness as a bullet hole could be shown to the jury but so as to 
conceal the blood stains as far as possible. The court then 
overruled the objection of counsel for the defendant and the 
witness identified the trousers and pointed out the bullet hole 
to the jury, the trousers be.ing folded as directed by the court. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Dr. Showalter stated that he thought Fleming was seriously 
wounded but he did not know just how seriously, and that he 
removed his clothing to see the wounds; that he made a similar 
statement to him on the way to the Medical College Hos-
pital-that this was the last of him. 
page 27 ~ FLORA KEETON. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Flora Keeton testified that she is forty-four years old; that 
she lived in Kenbridge, Virginia; that she was home on the 
night of December 13, 1943; that Holman Thomas was at her 
house about midnight in the second bedroom; that she found 
Thomas in bed with her daughter, Coleane Keeton; that there 
were three little boys, her children, in the same bed; that she 
drove Thomas out and hit him with a small piece of kindling 
wood; and that Thomas left his shoes and hat at her house. 
Flora Keeton testified further that some time later, about 
1 :00 A. M. on the morning of December 14, 1943, she heard 
something slapping on the back kitchen door three times with 
a board; that she got up and started to see what was happen-
ing; then she seard several shots that scared her so she sat 
down, and in a minute Thomas burst the door open t6' her 
bedroom and came in, pointed his pistol at her and said, '' Are 
you going to tell anybody I have been here 1'' She said, 
''No, I am not ~;oing· to tell anybody". Thomas said, '' Are 
you going to tell my wife that I have been here?'' She an-
swered, ''No''. Thomas then said, '' If you tell the law or go 
get him, I will kill him, too, the damn son of a bitch. I will 
kill you, too, and then I will kill mysef' '. Then he started 
to back out of the door, and when he got into the other room, 
she went out the window to Mr. Ethelbert Roby's home to 
get him to call the law. 
She testified further that there were two bullet holes through 
the kitchen door near the lock, that the bullets continued on 
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and lodged in the wall, and that there was another bullet which 
went through her bedroom window above her bed and lodged 
in the qeaver board wall near the stove. 
page 28 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Flora Keeton stated that she was not in her bedroom when 
the bullet was fired through the window; that the defendant 
did not hurt anybody in her house; that he had all of his 
clothes on except his shoes and hat;· that she carried a light 
in the bedroom; that she did not like the fact that the de-
fendant was in the bed with her daughter; that Coleane 
Keeton, her daughter, when in bed with the defendant, did 
not have off anything except her shoes, and that they, Coleane 
and the defendant, did not appear to be drunk. 
page 29 ~ GRAHAM NELSON. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Graham Nelson testified that he was at Flora Keeton 's 
house on the night the defendant was there ; that he was 
awakened by a noise on the outside of the house which sounded 
like someone slapping on the door with a board; that the next 
thing he knew he heard someone stumbling through the 
kitchen; that Holman Thomas came in his bedroom with a 
pistol in his hand and said he was going to kill everybody in 
there, and kill the law, too, if he came down there; that 
Thomas went out of the room and he ran over to Tucker Ed-
monds 's house to get him to help get Thomas out of the house; 
and after waking Tucker up, he was so lqng coming out that 
lie (Graham Nelson) ran up to the Warehouse to call the law 
and stayed there until all the shooting was over. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Graham Nelson stated that there were four rooms in Flora 
Keeton 's house; that he lived at her house; that he didn't see 
any shotgun except the shotgun that Richard Keeton had · 
that he heard a gunshot; that he didn't talk to anyone about 
the case except Tucker Edmonds; that he (witness) asked 
Edmonds to come and help get the defendant out of Flora 
Keeton 's house; that he saw no one hit Thomas, and that when 
he ran out of the house, he was scared. 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Coleane Keeton testified that she was eighteen years old; 
that she lived in Kenbridge, Virginia, with her mother, Flora 
Keeton; that she, the def enclant, May Hargrove and Richard 
Keeton, her brother, got together in a party on the night of 
December 13, 1943, between 9 :00 and 10 :00 P. M.; that the 
defendant came to her house and stayed about five minutes 
and they went out in the defendant's car; that the defendant 
drove; that while they were riding in the car, she and May 
Hargrove were sitting in the back seat; that they started 
on a ride to Victoria but turned around and came back to 
Kenbridge, going out on the Blackstone road and later re-
turning home; that they all went to her house; that the de-
fendant came in the room in which she slept; that there were 
two children in the bed in her room; that her mother, Flora 
Keeton, came in her room, argued with the defendant, and 
put him out of the house; that in about ten or fifteen minutes 
the defendant came back to the house; she heard three shots 
and he (Thomas) stated, '' I will kill you right now, I will 
blow your brains out''; that everybody left the house except 
the witness and the children. 
At this point counsel for the Commonwealth asked the wit-
ness if the defendant forced her to leave the house with him 
at the point of the gun, to which question the witness replied 
in the negative. After repeating the question in another form 
and receiving a negative answer, counsel advised the court 
that he was taken by surprise by the answer of the witness 
and requested that the court permit counsel to ask the witness 
leading questions. The court permitted counsel to ask the 
witness several leading questions upon this subject, to which 
ruling defendant excepted. 
Counsel then asked the witness several leading questions 
and the witness testified that the defendant said 
page 31 ~ to her, '' If you don't come out, I will shoot you'', 
and took her by the arm and at the point of his 
pistol forced her to go with him from the house and up the 
path toward defendant's car. 
CROSS EXAl\HN.ATION. 
Coleane. Keeton stated that she didn't drink any wine; that 
the defendant was standing at the bed when her mother, 
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Flora Keeton, came in the bedroom; that her .mother asked 
him what he was doing; that he said nothing in answer to 
her; that she clidn 't hear him say anything else; that Graham 
Nelson slept in the same room with her. 
page 32} MRS. A. K. FLEMING. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Mrs. A. K. Fleming testified that she had lived in Ken-
bridge, Virginia, for six years; that she is the wife of Officer 
A. K. Fleming, the de.ceased; that she was awake·at the time 
Mr. Fleming got the telephone calls to come down to the 
Farmers Warehouse to quell a disturbance, the first of which 
was about 1 :00 A. M., and the latter about 1 :15 A. 1\L; that 
very shortly after that she was told Mr. Fleming had been 
shot, and within fifteen or twenty minutes from the last tele-
phone call she arrived at the scene where Mr. Fleming was 
lying on the ground; that he had been shot and was in con-
siderable pain. 
Mrs. Fleming testified further, over the defendant's ob-
jection (to the overruling of which the defendant excepted) 
that Mr. Fleming said to her, "This is the end. He (defend-
ant) shot me just as I got out of my car-I didn't have a 
chance''. 
page 33 ~ TUCKER EDMONDS. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Tucker Edmonds testified that Graham Nels on came over to 
his house and woke him up about 1 :00 A. M. on Tuesday 
morning, December 14, 1943, for the purpose of getting 
Thomas out of Flora Keeton 7s house; that he did not hear 
the shooting at Flora Keeton 's house since he was asleep; 
that when he came out of his house, he saw the defendant 
going up the path toward the defendant's parked automobile 
pulling Coleane Keeton by his left hand with his pistol in his 
right hand; that he was cursing; that he asked the defendant 
to turn Coleane aloose and go on home; that the defendant 
cursed and continued on up the path toward his automobile 
with Coleane; that he was standing near the house of Robert 
Lee Maddux and saw the lights of an approaching automo-
bile; the car stopped an~ he recognized Mr. Fleming over the 
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hood of the car ; he heard a shot and ducked behind the corner 
of Robert Lee Maddux 's house; he did not know who fired this 
shot; almost immediately he heard other numerous · pistol 
shots, and as he came from behind the corner of the house, 
saw Mr. Fleming grappling with the defendant and Mr. Flem-
ing was beating the defendant over the head with his pistol; 
that he (Edmonds) went to Officer Fleming, took the de-
fendant's pistol away from him; that as he (Edmonds) rested 
Fleming on the ground, he left the defendant's pistol under 
him; that Fleming started to calling Mr. Ethelbert Roby say-
ing, '' Come here, Ethelbert, he (defendant) has shot me''; 
that he held Mr. Fleming's head until the doctor got there 
and they took him up to the warehouse, and w:hile he was sit-
ting there holding Mr. Fleming's head, Thomas went down 
across the field. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Tucker Edmonds stated that he was at present a prisoner in 
jail awaiting to be tried; that he had previously been sen-
tenced to two years in the penitentiary, the sen-
page34 ~ tence, however, being suspended; that when he first 
saw the defendant on the night in question, before 
Fleming arrived at the scene, there was a small knot on the 
front of the defendant's head; that he didn't know who fired 
the first of the exchanged shots between the defendant and 
Fleming; that the defendant was shot by Officer Fleming. 
page 35 ~ E. S. ROBY. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
E. S. Roby testified that he lived in Kenbridge, Virginia; 
that in the early morning of December 14, 1943, at approxi-
mately 1 :15 A. M., since he looked at his watch at the time, 
someone crying called him; that he went to the window and 
recognized that it was Flora Keeton; that Flora had come 
to get him to call up Mr. -Fleming over the telephone to quell 
a disturbance which was created at her house by the defend-
ant. Flora stated that '' This man has shot up my house and 
threatened everybody down there and the law"; that the wit-
ness did not have a telephone and he sent Flora over to the 
Leader Warehouse to call Mr. Fleming; that he put his clothes 
on and drove down to th~ Leader Warehouse. At approxi-
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mately 1 :20 or 1 :25 A. M. Mr. Fleming stopped at the ware-
house and got out of his car; that he said, ''l\fr. Fleming, from 
what Flora tells me, this man is a real dangerous man and has 
threatened to kill you, and I wouldn't go clown there unle::,s 
you had some help", and Flora stated, "Chief, don't go down 
there, he is going to kill you'', and Mr. Fleming said, '' I know 
him", and drove off; that about a minute and a half or two 
minutes elapsed when he heard someone calling him-he dicln 't 
hear the shots-and he got ther~ in about two minutes from 
-the time he heard the calls. · 
Mr. Roby testified further that when he got there, he found 
Officer Fleming lying on the ground with Tucker Edmonds 
holding .his head. Over the objection of the defendant (to 
the overruling of which the defendant excepted), the witness 
further stated that Officer Fleming said to him, '' Thelbert, I 
am dying'', and requested the witness to send for his wife 
and daughter; then Mrs. Fleming came and later Dr. H. B. 
Showalter and they moved Mr. Fleming to the Farmers Ware-
house. 
Mr. Roby testified further that since the death of his 
father, Mr. E. S. Roby, Sr., he has taken over his 
page 36 ~ father's business; that he owns the house in which 
Flora Keeton lives; that the Keetons live on what 
is commonly called Chinch Alley; that Tucker Edmonds lives 
about thirty-five feet on the rear of the Keetons; that he (wit-
ness) lives about three hundred fifty yards from the Keeton 
house. 
That the witness testified further that on February 4, 1944, 
he and Oscar Bragg were present with Mr. George Harris 
when the photographs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were taken; 
that ho saw the position of the car of the defendant and the 
car of l\fr. Fleming on the night of the shooting, and that 
cars as shown in the photographs Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are in the 
true position of the car of Officer Fleming and the defendant, 
the gray car being that of the defendant and the dark car 
behind and to the right thereof as shown in the photographs 
represents the car of Officer Fleming. 
The witness also testified that the photograph No. 5 shows 
in the right foreground the back door of the Flora Keeton 
house, and that the man who is partly •shown in the left fore-
ground sits on the steps of Tucker Edmonds house; that the 
white house in right center is occupied by Robert Lee :Maddux. 
The photograph No. 6 was identified by the witness as being 
the front door and sou th side of the house of Flora Keeton. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Mr. Roby stated that when he got there, Fleming's body 
was lying very near the town alley not on the property occu-
pied by defendant; that Fleming made no statement in his 
presence as to how he got shot; that he owns the houses in 
Chinch Alley, the section of town where the ·defendant and the 
Keetons live; that he is familiar with that section because 
visits all of the houses he owns in Chinch .Alley to inspect 
them every week or two. He further stated that at 
page 37 ~ the time he saw Fleming lying on the ground his 
feet were at about the center of his automobile. He 
further stated that it was a brig·ht moonlit night. 
page 38 ~ BERKELEY MOORE. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Berkeley Moore testified that he telephoned Officer Fleming 
to come down to Flora Keeton 's to quell a disturbance there. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Berkeley Moore stated that Flora Keeton lived on the street 
which was called Chinch Alley. 
page 39 ~ E. M. BRIDGFORTH. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
E. l\I. Bridgforth testified that he was l\Iayor of the Town 
of Kenbridge~ and that Officer Fleming had been Chief of 
Police of the Town of Kenbridge for about six years and was 
County Police Officer of Lunenburg County for Columbian 
Grove, Brown's Store and Lochleven Magisterial District. 
page 40 ~ LUCAS BELL. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Lucas Bell testified that he went to the spot where Officer 
Fleming was lying· after he had been shot and found a pistol 
under him; that it was not the pistol Fleming usually carried. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Lucas Bell stated that he didn't know whose pistol it was he 
found under Fleming; that it was not the pistol Fleming 
usually carried. 
A. B. SHACKLETON. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
A. B. Shackleton testified that he was the Sheriff of Lunen-
burg County and that Lucas Bell gave him the pistol he said 
he found under Fleming. Sheriff Shackleton had the pistol in 
view of the jury. The defendant objected to the exhibition of 
the pistol by the Sheriff before the jury and moved the Court 
to withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial to the overruling 
of which motion the defendant excepted. 
page 41 ~ OSCAR S. BRAGG. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Oscar Bragg testified that he was forty years old and worked 
as a watchman at the Farmers Warehouse, Kenbridge, Vir-
ginia; that about midnight of December 13, 1943, Richard 
Keeton came to the warehouse and asked him to call the law 
(Mr. Fleming) to quell a disturbance at his house, as·Holman 
Thomas had shot it up; that he called Mr. Fleming and then 
went on ·about his work; that some few minutes later he saw 
Mr. Fleming go by the warehouse in the direction of the dis-
turbance; that about two minutes later he heard a shot, just 
one shot; then he ran over to the window to see what was 
happening and just as he looked through the window, he saw 
Fleming standing a few feet in front of the headlights of his 
car; almost at once he heard shots and saw the flash of gun-
fire from in front of Fleming and slightly to his right; that at 
this time both Fl~ming and the other person were firing; that 
Fleming moved toward the gunfire, and :finally he saw Fleming 
grab a man, and he could see and heard the blows as Fleming 
hit him over the head ,vith his pistol; that he heard Fleming 
call out, "Catch him, Tucker; Catch him, Tucker! Don't let 
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him shoot me again". The witness testified that at no time 
after he looked out of the window did Fleming turn his back 
to the direction from which the flashes of gunfire came; he saw 
Tucker run up behind Thomas, grab his arms from behind, 
and at the same time Fleming was hitting Thomas over the 
head with his gun, he could hear the blows distinctly; that 
Fleming staggered back toward his car, anq he (Fleming) 
went all around the car and staggered up against the right-
hand door calling Ethelbert Roby; he then ran out to get 
Roby and they both went down to where Fleming was lying 
on the ground beside his car. 
The witness, Oscar S. Bragg, further testified that on Feb-
ruary 1, 1944, he and Mr. Ethelbert Roby went to 
page 42 ~ the scene of the shooting with the photographer, 
George Harris; that he, Bragg, saw the position of 
the car of Mr. Fleming and the gray car of the defendant on 
the night of the shooting; that both cars were placed by hini 
(Bragg·) and Mr. Roby as shown in the photographs and that 
the dark car as shown in the photographs is in the true posi-
tion occupied by Mr. Fleming's car at the time of the shoot-
ing, and that the gray car is the car of the defe11-dant and 
is shown in the photographs in the true positions which it 
stood on the night of the shooting. The witness further testi-
fied that the Exhibit No. 4 was taken in his presence and that 
the camera ,vas immediately under the window from which 
he looked on the night of the shooting and was pointing to-
ward the scene of the shooting as observed by him. 
Whereupon, the Commonwealth at this time offered the 
photographs, Exhibits Nos. 1 through 6, in evidence, none 
of the photographs having been exhibited to the jury until 
this point in the evidence. The court thereupon rej:ected 
photographs Nos.1 and 3 being two photographs which showed 
two persons in posed positions. The court then asked counsel 
for defendant if tl}.ey had any objection to photograph No~ 2 
and counsel for defendant replied in the negative. They were 
then asked if they objected to Nos. 5 and 6 and counsel for 
def end ant replied in the negative. They were thereupon asked 
if they objected to the photograph No. 4 and counsel for de-
fendant stated that they did object to No. 4 because the photo-
graph showed persons standing in the photograpli. Where-
upon the court overruled this objection and admitted photo-
graphs Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 and they were at this time exhibited 
to the jury. 
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page 43 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Oscar S. Bragg stated that he was at the window of the 
warehouse about one hundred sixty feet from where the 
shooting took place between Officer Fleming and the defend-
ant, Thomas; that he could see plainly what happened be-
cause it was a moonlit night; that his attention was first at-
tracted by the first shot fired., and that he saw Fleming hit 
Thomas over the 11ead with the butt of his pistol three times 
after the shooting l1ad ceased. 
page 44} H. S. W .ALLA CE. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
H. E. ·wallace testified that he traced the blood around the 
car of Officer Fleming; that it started from around the side 
that Fleming· got out of, went around the back of his car and 
stopped around on the other side. 
c:aoss EXAMINATION. 
H~ S. ·wallace stated that he arrived at the scene of the 
shooting· between 1 :30 and 2 :00 A. :M. on the morning of De-
cember 14, 1943; that he was not present when the shooting 
took place but that he saw the blood and that he conldn 't tell 
where it started. 
Upon this testimony the Commonwealth rested its case. 
pag·e 45} ·wITNESSES FOR THE DEFENDANT. 
MAY HARGROVE. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
May H3:rgroce testified that she lived in Kenbridge, Vir. 
ginia; that she saw the defendant at Flora Keeton 's at about 
9 :00 P. M. on December 13, 1943; that she, Coleane Keeton, 
Richard Keeton and the defendant, Thomas, went for a ride in 
Thomas' car; that Coleane Keet.on and Thomas sat in the 
front seat together, while she and Richard Keeton sat on the 
back seat together; that they all drank wine; that Thomas had 
been drinking before she :first saw him. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
May HargroV"e stated that she could not say how much wine 
they had been drinking; that she didn't drink much; that 
Coleane _Keeton drank right much wine. 
page 46 ~ HOLMAN B. THOMAS. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Holman B. Thomas testified that on December 13, 1943, he 
got off from work at Camp Pickett about 3 :30 P. M. and came 
on out to Blackstone., Virginia; that he boug·ht two bottles 
(fifths) of wine in Blackstone, drank one bottle (fifth) and 
started home, and drank the second fifth before he got to Ken-
bridge; that no one was with him and that he was driving his 
car; that he got to Kenbridge about 7 :00 or 7 :30 P. :M. and 
went straight home; that he came out to bis car to spread a 
coat over the motor and while there, he met Coleane Keeton, 
Richard Keeton and May Hargrove ; that Coleane said she 
would like to have some wine to drink; that be went home and 
got two fifths of wine from under the wood house; that all 
four drank one of the fifths of wine and stood and talked; that 
they got into his (defendant's) car and went out toward 
Blackstone and drank the other fifth of wine; that Coleane 
wanted some cigarettes to· smoke and he went back to Ken-
bridge and got her cigarettes; that it was then around 10.00 
or 10 :30 P. M.; that then all of them went back home about 
11 :30 P. l\I.; that he put his car in his back yard; that Coleane 
said, "Come go with me home"; that all four went into the 
house; that when they got there, he went in Coleane 's bed-
room and she got in her bed; that Coleane said, "Come on", 
and he took his shoes off and got in the bed with her; that 
Coleane 's mother, Flora Keeton, came in the bedroom and 
started to beating him over the head; that l1e got out of the 
bed and left. · 
Holman Thomas testified further that '' this knot back here 
(referring to his head) must have caused my blood to g·o to 
my brain. Got my brain upsetted,'' and didn't remember any-
thing until he was standing in his back yard rubbing his head; 
that the blood was running· down his head; that 
page 47 ~ while he was standing there., Coleane and Tucker 
were standing up on the hill; that while standin5 
in the back yard rubbing his head, somebody called his name; 
tliat he took his hand down from his head when he turned to 
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the right and he saw Officer Fleming standing up on the hill; 
that he turned and when he turned, he staggered, and when he 
staggered, a pistol fired and burned in his chest; that at this 
time Fleming said, "Get him, Tucker, and put him in the 
car"; that he couldn't say what happened after this; that he 
cloesn 't know how many times he shot and he doesn't know 
how many times Fleming shot. 
Holman B. Thomas testified further that he came to this 
county some years ago from South Carolina with Mr. J. E. 
Tindal, a cotton farmer; that he worked with Mr. Tindal on 
the farm for several years; that he worked for E. M. Bridge-
forth, the Mayor of the Town of Kenbridge; that he is at 
present employed at Camp Pickett near Blackstone, Virginia; 
that he is married and has one sqn about grown. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Holman B. Thomas stated that after he got off from work 
in Blackstone, Virginia., he parked his car and bought two 
fifths of wine and did some Christmas shopping; that he 
drank one fifth of wine before leaving Blackstone; that he 
drank the other one fifth of wine in Kenbridge, Virginia; that 
about 7 :00 P.M. he was in his yard putting a blanket over his 
car when Coleaue Keeton came and asked him for some wine; 
that at the time the only wine he had was put away for Christ-
mas, however, he got one bottle; tbat they made up a party 
with May Hargrove, Richard Keeton and Coleane Keeton and 
himself and went for a drive; that they went to look for more 
wine; that they returned to the Keeton's home and all four 
went in; that Coleane called him to her bed; that 
page 48 ~ Flora Keeton, Coleane's mother, beat him over the 
head with something like iron and the blow hurt 
his brains; that the next thing he remembered he was feeling 
and rubbing his head in his own yard; that he heard a voice 
call and as he staggered around a bullet knocked him back and 
"he felt like a blaze of fire g·ot in his chest; that the bullet 
knocked the breath .out of him; that he shot after he was 
shot; that he doesn't know about driving toward Victoria; 
that he remembered getting- in bed with Coleane for about 
thirty minutes; that when Flora Keeton hit him on the back 
of his head because he was lying with his face downward; that 
Flora Keeton pushed him out of the back door of her house; 
that he doesn't deny going back in Keeton 's house; that he 
doesn't deny shooting· in the Keeton 's house; that he doesn't 
deny threats to kill Flora Keeton, her children or the law; 
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that he doesn't know who shot him; doesn't have any memory 
of what happened after he was beaten at the Keeton 's and 
that he doesn't deny Officer Fleming hitting him over the head 
after the shooting; that he has no recollection of any of these 
acts; that he doesn't remember going towards the pigpens 
back of the house after being shot; that he doesn't remember 
being arrested; that he doesn't remember being treated by 
D:r. Kendig or Dr. Crawford; that he doesn't remember things 
until he was at the State Farm Hospital and then a very little 
for some time; that he came to momentarily just before the 
bullet burned him in his chest ; that he made the shots after 
Police Officer Fleming had called Tucker; then everything 
went blank again; that he was standing in his back yard when 
the shooting took place; that Officer Fleming was standing 
upon the hill; that he was unable to give an explanation of 
why the bullets that struck Officer Fleming should range down-
ward in his body from the point where he had shot at him. 
The witness stated further that he did not deny that he 
told Coleane Keeton that- "I will kill you right now., I will 
blow your brains out''; he did not deny that he forced Coleane 
Keeton to leave her house with him at hte point of a pistol; 
that he has no recellection of these acts. The witness ad-
mitted that the gray car as shown in Photographs 
page 49 ~ Nos. 4 and 5 was correctly placed by the witness 
for the Commonwealth; he did not deny that the 
dark car as shown in photographs Nos. 4 and 5 representing 
Officer Fleming's car was not correctly placed by the wit-
nesses for the Commonwealth. 
SUSAN THOMAS. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
'This witness testified that she is Holman B. Thomas' wife; 
that Dr. W. D. Kendig saw the defendant at about 3 o'clock 
on the night of the shooting and gave him a '' needle in the 
leg.'' 
page 50 ~ \ LUTHER DAVIS. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Luther Davis testified that he had been knowing Holman 
B. Thomas a few years and that his character for peace and 
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good order was good. ''Never knew him to have but one 
trouble.'' 
DAVID GARLAND. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
David Garland testified that he was a minister of the Gospel 
and had been living in Kenbridge for a number of years; that 
since Holman B. Thomas had been living in Lunenburg 
County, which had been quite a few years, his reputation for 
peace and good order was very good; that he had never known 
of Thomas to be in any trouble before. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
David Garland stated that he had never known of Thomas 
to be in any trouble; that he had never heard of him being 
drunk or disorderly; that he had never heard of him being 
convicted for being drunk, disorderly, or resisting arrest and 
being fined twenty-five dollars and sentenced to thirty days 
in jail by the Trial Justice of Lunenburg County. 
Upon this testimony the defendant rested his case. 
page 51 ~ COMM:ON1VEALTH'S WITNESSES FOR RE-
BUTTAL. 
J. T. WADDILL, JR. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
J. T. W addilL, Jr., testified, over the defendant's objecti9n 
(to the overruling of which defendant excepted), that he was 
the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County, Virginia; 
that from the records in his office Holman B. Thomas was, on 
the 25th day of August, 1942, convicted in the Trial Justice 
Court in the town of Kenbridge, Virginia, for being drunk, 
disorderly and resisting· arrest and was fined $25.00 and sen-
tenced to thirty days in jail; that he was arrested upon the 
complaint of Officer A. K. Fleming on the 9th day of August, 
1942. Whereupon the said record of the conviction of said 
misdemeanor was admitted into evidence by the Court over 
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.A.. B. Shackleton. 
the defendant's objection, to the overruling of which the de-
fendant excepted. 
l\.. B. SHACKLETON .. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
A. B. Shackleton testified that he was the Sheriff of Lunen-
burg, County, Virginia, and that he got close to Holman B. 
Thomas after he had been shot and at the time of his arrest 
thereafter and be could not smell any alcohol on his breath. 
Upon this testimony the Commonwealth rested its case. 
Upon this testimony the defendant rested his case. 
page 52 ~ And the defendant hereby tenders this his Bill 
of Exception No. 1 and prays that the same may 
he signed, sealed and enrolled as a part of the record in this 
case., which is accordingly done this 13 day of May, 1944. 
page 53- ~ Virginia : 
JOEL "\V. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versits 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 2. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case, and during 
the course of selection of a panel of twenty persons qualified 
to serve as jurors, from which panel twelve jurors to try the 
issues in the case would be selected, the Court, after fourteen 
persons qualified to serve as jurors had been selected, found 
it impossible to complete the panel of twenty qualified per-
sons from the veniremen previously summoned and in attend-
ance. Thereupon, the fourteen persons constituting the in-
complete panel were sent out of the courtroom to lunch in the 
custody of two officers of the Court who had been sworn ac-
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cording to law to take charge of them during the time they were 
at lunch and until their return to the courtroom. Thereupon 
the Court selected a list of twenty additional veniremen from 
the regular jury list., as required by law when the Court finds 
it impossible to complete its panel in a case from the venire-
men previously summoned and in attendance, and the incom-
plete panel of fourteen persons then returned to the court-
room from lunch in the charge of the two officers aforesaid. 
Thereupon, in order that the· two officers aforesaid, might be 
relieved from the keeping of the incomplete panel and might 
be used in summoning the additional veniremen selected by 
the Court as aforesaid, the Court in session and 
page 54 ~ before adjournment for a recess, in the absence of 
the defendant, selected two members of the Vir-
gfoia State Police Force to act in the stead of the two officers 
first sworn to keep the jury, as aforesaid and to take charge 
of the incomplete panel, and, also in the absence of the de-
fendant, caused to be administered to them an oath that they 
would keep the said incomplete panel of fourteen persons to-
gether without communication with any person and that they 
would neither converse with them themselves touching the 
trial, nor permit any other person to do so., and would cause 
the said incomplete panel of fourteen persons to appear in 
Court at 1 :45 P. M. o'clock on the same day, and also in the 
absence of tl1e defendant, instructed the fourteen persons who 
comprised the incomplete panel that a recess of forty-five 
minutes would be taken, that during this time they would be in 
the custody of the second two officers who had been sworn to 
take charge of them, that they would not discuss the pending 
case with anyone or permit any one to discuss it with them, 
or in their presence, and that they would remain together 
in the custodv of the second two officers and return to the 
Court at 1 :45 .. o'clock P. M. During the occurrence of these 
proceedings the defendant was absent from the courtroom 
and was then in the jury room and the door between the court-
room and the jury room was during this time closed. There-
upon, the Court's attention was immediately called by coun-
sel for the defendant to the fact that the defendant was and 
had been absent from the courtroom during the occurrence of 
the events and proceeding·s aforesaid. Thereupon, the de-
f edant was brought back into the courtroom, whereupon he 
by his counsel, moved the Court to arrest the trial at this 
point and discontinue further proceedings., and to declare a 
mistrial, on the ground that the action of the Court 
pag·e 55 } in swearing said officers to take charge of the in-
complete panel, and in instructing and communi-
\ 
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eating with the incomplete panel, as aforesaid, during t.n.e 
trial of the case and in the absence of the defendant, cons ti ... 
tuted reversible error. Thereupon, the Court recalled the 
fourteen members of the incomplete panel and, in the pres ... 
ence of the defendant, again instructed them that they would 
remain in the custody of the two officers last sworn to take 
charg·e of them, that they would not discuss the pending case 
with any one, or permit anyone to discuss it with them, or in 
their presence., that they would remain together in the custody 
of the two officers aforesaid and return to the courtroom at 2 
·o'clock P. M., and thereupon overruled the motion made by 
the defendant, to which action of the Court the defendant ex-
cepted. The Court thereupon adjourned for a recess until 
2 :00 o'clock P. M. on the same day. 
And the defendant hereby tenders this his Bill of Excep-
tion No. 2 and prays that the same may be signed, sealed and 
enrolled as a part of the ·record, which is accordingly done 
this 13 May, 1944. 
page 56 ~ Virginia : 
JOEL ,v. FLOOD (Seal) 
J udg·e of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 3. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case, after the 
occurrence of the events and proceedings set forth in Bill of 
Exception No. 2, to which reference is hereby made, and after 
the jury had been selected and sworn to try the issues in the 
case, and after the Commonwealth had introduced various 
witnesses who testified in its behalf, the Court, in preparation 
for adjournment for the day, and before such adjournment, 
directed that the defendant be removed from the courtroom. 
and, in his absence, appointed two additional officers of the 
Court to keep the jury over the nigl1t until the following 
morning, and caused to be administered to them an oath that 
they would keep the jury together without communication 
with any person and that they would neither converse with 
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them themselves touching the trial, nor permit any other per-
son to do so, and would cause the jury to appear in Court on 
the following morning· at 9 :30 o'clock .A. M. The attention 
of the Court was immediately called by counsel for the Com-
monwealth to the fact that, during the occurrences of the 
events and proceedings aforesaid, the defendant was and had 
been absent from the courtroom and completely .outside the 
building· in which the courtroom is situated. The defendant 
was immediately returned to the courtroom the 
page 57 ~ court had not adjourned nor had the jury left their 
box. ·whereupon, he, by his counsel, moved the 
Court to arrest the trial at this point .and discontinue further 
proceedings in the case, and to withdraw the case from the · 
consideration of the jury,, and to declare a mistrial, on the 
ground that the action of the Court in swearing said officers 
to take charge of the jury sworn to try the issues in the case, 
during the trial of the case and in the absence of the defend-
ant, constituted reversible error. Thereupon, the Court in 
the presence of the defendant, caused the said officers to be 
again sworn to take charge of the jury in the same manner as 
it had previously caused them to be sworn in the absence of 
the defendant, and thereupon overruled the motion made by 
the defendant, to which action of the Court the defendant 
excepted. The Court thereupon adjourned until the follow-
ing morning at 9 :30 o'clock A. M. 
And the defendant hereby tenders this his Bill of Excep-
tion No. 3, and prays that the same may be signed, sealed and 
enrolled as a part of the record, which is accordingly done 
this 13 day of :May, 1944. 
page 58 ~ Virginia : 
JOEL ,v. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judg·e of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 4. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the defend- . 
ant, Holman B. Thomas., to maintain the issue on bis part 
Holman B. Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia 81 
introduced as a witness Luther Davis, who testified that he 
had known the defendant, Holman B. Thomas, for several. 
years and that his character for peace and good order was 
good, which testimony is to be found on page 34 of the tran-
script of evidence, as contained in Bill of Exception No. 1, 
and asked to be read a~ if here inserted; and also introduced 
as a witness David Garland, who testified that he had known 
the defendant, Holman B. Thomas, for quite a few years, that 
his reputation for peace and good order was very good., and 
that he had never known of him to be in trouble before, which 
testimony is to be found on page 34 of the transcript of evi~ 
dence, as contained in Bill of Exception No. 1, and asked to be 
read as if here inserted; whereupon the Commonwealth, to 
rebut this testimony, introduced as a witness J. T. "\Vacldill, 
Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County, Vir~ 
ginia, who testified that from the records in his office the de-
fendant, Holman B. Thomas, was on the 25th day of August., 
1942, convicted in the Trial Justice Court in the Town of Ken-
bridge, Virginia, for being drunk, disorderly and resisting 
arrest and was thereupon fined the sum of $25.00 
page 59 ~ and sentenced to serve 3Q days in jail, and that 
he was arrested for the commission of said mis-
d~meanor upon a warrant issued upon the complaint of Of-
ficer A. K. Fleming on the 8th day of August, 1942, which 
testimony is to be found on page 35 of the transcript of evi-
dence, as contained in Bill of Exception No. 1, and asked to 
be read as if here inserted., whereupon the Court admitted 
into evidence and permitted to be read and given to and con· 
side red by the jury the following, purporting to be the war-
rant of arrest and the record of conviction of the Defendant, 
Holman B. Thomas: 
State of Virginia, 
Town of Kenbridge, to-wit: 
To the Sergeant or any Police Officer of said Town: 
"\VHEREAS, A. K. Fleming has this day made complaint 
and information on oath before me E. M. Bridgeforth of said 
Town of Kenbridge, that Holman Thomas in the said Town 
,of Kenbridge, did on the 8th clay of Aug·. 1942, unlawfully 
get drunk, act disorderly and resist arrest, in violation of an 
ordinance of the said Town. 
THESE ARE THEREFORE, to command you, in the name 
of the Town of Kenbridge to apprehend and bring before the 
Trial Justice of Lunenburg County the body of the said Hol-
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man Thomas to answer the said complaint, and to be further 
1 dealt with according to law; and you are directed to sum-
mon .................... as witnesses. 
Given under my hand this 8th day of Aug., 1942. 
E. M. BRIDGEFORTH, Mayor. 
State of Virginia, 
Town of Kenbridge, to-wit: 
I, E. l\L Bridgeforth do certify that S. P. Jones and 
................ as his surety, have this day acknowledged 
themselves indebted to the Commonwealth of Virginia in the 
sum of $50.00, to be levied on their respective goods and 
chattels, upon this condition: That the said Holman Thomas 
slrnll appear before the Trial Justice Court of Lunenburg 
County, Virginia., on the 10th day of Aug. 1942, at 10 o'clock 
A. l\L to answer for the offense charged in the above warrant, 
or any continuance thereof until the charge is finally dis-
posed of or until it is declared void by order of a competent 
Court. . 
page 60 ~ Given under my hand this 9th day of Aug. 1942. 
E. M. BRIDGEFORTH, Mayor. 
Upon the defendant's plea of Not Guilty to the within 
charge, and upon examination of the witnesses, I find the ac-
cused guilty as charged, and adjudge that he pay a fine of 
$25.00 and costs. & serve a jail sentence of 30 days. 
W. E. N., T. J. 
8-10-42. 
To the admission of which testimony and of the said war-
rant of arrest and record of conviction the defendant objected, 
for the reasons that said evidence was not admissible to prove 
the bad character of the defendant for peace and good order, 
or to prove the guilt of the defendant of the crime for which 
he was being tried, or to prove any substantive fact in issue, 
or to impeach the credibility of the defendant as a witness 
in his own behalf, or to prove a motive to commit the crime 
for which he was being tried., or to prove any fact relevant 
to the case, but the Court overruled the defendant's said ob-
jection and permitted the said evidence to g·o before the jury, 
to ,vhich action of the Court the defendant excepted, and 
hereby tenders this bis Bill of Exception No. 4 and prays 
that the same may be signed, sealed and enrolled as a part 
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of the record in this case, which is accordingly done this 13 
day of May, 1944. 
pag·e 61 } Virginia : 
JOEL ,v. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 5. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case, and at the 
conclusion of the taking of the testimony therein, the Court, 
at tlrn request of the Commonwealth, gave and read to the 
jury the following instructions numbered 1, 2,, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 
9, and at the request of the defendant, gave and read to the 
jury the following instructions lettered A, B, C, D, E, F, H, 
I, J., K and M, and, upon its own motion and over the objec-
tion of the defendant (which objection of the defendant, the 
reason stated therefore, and the exception taken by the de-
fendant to the overruling of said objection, arc set forth at 
length in defendant's Bill of Exception No. 7, and asked to 
be read as if here inserted) gave the following instruction 
lettered L, which said instructions given and read to the jury· 
at the request of the Commonwealth, the defendant and upon 
motion of the Court, respectively, as afore said, being all the 
instructions given and read to the jury on behalf of the Com-
monwealth, the defendant and the Court in this case: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 
Any willful, deliberate or premedita,ted killing of a human 
being is murder of the first degTee. All other murder is mur-
der of the second degree. 
page 62 ~ Voluntary manslaughter is unlawful homicide 
done in heat of sudden passion and not from 
malice. 
Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of one accidentally, 
contrary to the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of 
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some unlawful, but not felonious act; or in t4e improper per-
formance of a lawful act. 
Given J. vV. F. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. 
The Court instructs the. jury that where a homicide is 
proved malice is implied and the presumption in this Com-
monwealth is that it is murder in the second degree; and the 
burden of proof is upon the Commonwealth to show that the 
killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated and is, there-
fore, murder in the first degree and upon the accused to in-
troduce sufficient evidence to cause a reasonable doubt to 
arise in the rµinds of the jury that it is murder in the second 
deg-ree or that it is only manslaughter or that he acted law-
fully and is, therefore, not guilty. 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
The Court instructs the jury that to constitute wilful, de-
liberate and premeditated killing·-murder in the first de-
gree-it is not necessary that the intention should exist for 
any particular length of time prior to the actual killing, it 
being only necessary that such intention should come into 
existence for the first time at the time of the killing, or 
any time previous. 
Given J. W. ~,. 
page 63 ~ INSTRUCTION NO. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury that a mortal wound given 
with a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer.~ 
without any provocation or even with very slight provoca-
tion, is prima fa.cie wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing·. 
Given J. "\V. F. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
Voluntary drunkenness does not excuse crime. Every crime 
committed by one in a state of intoxication, however, great, 
is punished just as if he were sober. Drunkenness, therefore, 
ran never be relied on as an excuse for murder. It matters 
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not how drunk one is, if he purposely slay another, without 
other excuse, palliation, or justification than that of his 
drunkenness., he is just as guilty of murder as if he had been 
sober. There are certain grades of crime, however, which a 
drunk man may not be capable of committing. When a man 
has become so g-reatly intoxicated as not to be able to de-
liberate and premeditate, he cannot commit murder of the 
first degree, or that class of murder under our statute de-
nominated a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. But 
so long as he retains the faculty of willing, deliberating, and 
·premeditating, though drunk, he is capable of committing 
murder in the first degree ; and if a drunk man is guilty of &. 
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing., he is guilty of 
murder in the first degree. If a mortal wound be given with 
a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, 
without any or on very slight' provocation, but at the time of 
inflicting the wound the slayer's condition from intoxication 
is such as to render him capable of doing a wilful, deliberate 
and premeditated act, he is then guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree. 
page 64 ~ INSTRUCTION NO. 7. 
The Court instructs the jury that ''malice'' aforethought 
necessary to constitute the crime of murder may be either ex-
press or implied. The word ''malice'' in the fore going defini-
tions of murder is used in a technical sense, and includes 
anger, hatred and revenge. It is not confined to ill will to 
any one or more particular persons, but is intended to denote 
an action flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, done 
with an evil mind and purpose and wrongful intention, where 
the act has been attended with such circumstances as to carry 
in them the plain indication of a heart reg·ardless of social 
duty and deliberately bent on mischief; therefore malice is 
implied by law from any willful, deliberate and cruel act 
against another., however, sudden. 
The court further instructs the jury that malice is pre-
sumed from the fact of killing unaccompanied with circum-
stances of extenuation. 
Given J. ,v. F. 
INSTRUCTION NO 8. 
The Court instructs the jury that the credibility of wit-
nesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and the law is 
that, where a number of witnesses testify directly opposite to 
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each other, the jury is not bound to regard the weig·ht of evi-
dence as equally balanced. The jury has the right to de-
termine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, 
their manner of testifying·, and their apparent candor an<l 
fairness, their apparent intelligence and from all the other 
surrounding circumstances appearing at the trial, which wit-
nesses are more worthy of credit, and to give credit accord· 
ingly. 
Given J. W. F. 
page 65 ~ INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
The Court instructs the jury that in all criminal cases, the 
burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt; that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as 
may be reasonably and honestly entertained as to any mate-
rial and substantial fact essential to prove the crime charged. 
Reasonable doubt must be based upon the evidence, or lack 
of evidence. It must be serious and substantial in order to 
warrant an acquittal. It must be a doubt of a material fact 
or facts necessary for the jury to believe to find a verdict of 
conviction, and not of immaterial and non-essential circum-
stances. If., after considering all the evidence, you can say 
you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge 
made in the indictment, then you are satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, as that term is used in the law, and should 
brillg in a verdict of guilty. 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION A. 
The Court instructs the jury that to constitute murder in 
the first degree, the evidence must clearly and distinctly 
prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the defendant was 
not only incited to tlie killing of the deceased by malice, and 
desperate wickedness of heart, but such killing must have been 
a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated act on the party of 
the defendant; in other words, at the time of the killing the 
prisoner must have distinctly understood what he willed and 
intended to do; he must have also reflected., and deliberated, 
and premeditated that be would kill the deceased, or do him 
some serious bodily injury, the probable result of whieh would 
be death. And if there be a reasonable doubt 
page 66 ~ whether be had willed, and deliberated, and pre-
meditated to kill the deceased, or do him some 
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serious bodily injury, which would probably occasion hi$ 
death, they ought not to find him guilty of murder in the first 
degrea ' 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION B. 
The Court instructs the jury that in order for the killing 
to embrace the necessary elements of premeditation and de. 
liberation there must have been on the part of the defndant a 
former design and intention to kill, in execution of which the 
homicide was committed. 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION C. 
To constitute a killing murder in the second degree, it must 
appear from the ~vidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
killing was done from malice.,----.that is, from a wicked and de .. 
pra ved heart. 
Given J. W. F. · 
INSTRUCTION D. 
The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe 
from the evidence in the case beyond all reasonable doubt 
that the said killing was done by the defendant, Thomas, as 
charged in the indictment, but not wilful, deliberately and 
premeditatedly, but with. malice, they should find him guilty 
of murder in the second degree. 
Given J. W. F. 
page 67 ~ INSTRUCTION E. 
The Court instructs the jury that although they may believe 
from the evidence that the deceased at the time he was shot 
was attempting to arrest the defendant, yet if they further 
believe from th evidence that in making such attempt he shot 
at the defendant, and thereupon, because of said shooting at 
the defendant by the deceased, the defendant believing him-
self in imminent danger of being killed or sustaining great 
bodily injury, and being without fault in provoking the affray., 
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returned the :fire and killed the deceased, such killing was 
not murder. 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION F. 
The Court instructs the jury that when a:ri officer attempts 
to arrest a person charged with a felony and used more force 
than is reasonably necessary to make the arrest, the officer 
himself becomes a wrongdoer and the person whose arrest is 
sought, if himself without fault, can resist such excessive 
force and even kill the officer if necessary to preserve his 
own life or to save himself from serious bodily harm. 
Given J. vV. F. 
INSTRUCTION H. 
The Court instructs the jury that althoug~ upon a trial for 
murder, where the defendant relies upon self-defense, in 
justification of the killing, the burden is upon the defendant, 
yet this in no wise relieves the Commonwealth from proving 
all the elements of murder if it se~ks a conviction, beyond a 
reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reason-
able hypothesis. 
Given J. W. F. 
I 
page 68 ~ INSTRUCTION I. 
The Court instructs the jury that when one without fault 
is attacked by another in such a manner or under such cir-
cumstances as to furnish reasonable g·rounds for apprehend-
ing a design to take away his life or to do him some great 
bodily harm, and there is reasonable ground for believint? the 
danger imminent that such design will be accomplished; and 
the person assaulted has reasonable ground to believe, and 
does believe, such dang~r is imminent, he. may act upon such 
appearances, and, without retreating, kill his assailant, if he 
has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that such 
killing is necessary in order to avoid the apparent danger; 
and the killing under such circumstances is excusable., even 
though it may later turn out that the appearances were false 
-that there was in fact neither design to do him some serious 
injury nor danger that it would be done, but, of all this the 
jury must judge from all the evidence and circumstances in 
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tlie c~se. ~nd the jury are further instructed t~at a m~n, 
when assaulfed, is held accoµntable- under the law only for.; 
the exe1~cise or such judgmen,t a,s ~s wan·anted by the circum-
st~nces as they reasonably appear to him at the time,· and 
that ;whether the danger was apparent o.r · not' is always to be 
determined. from the standpoint from ,vhich the defendant 
vi~wed it at th~ ~~me he a~ted. · · 
Given J. Vl. F. 
INSTRUCTION J . 
•• • - t ' 
The Co-qrt il\structs the jµry t~at in all cases whe.re the 
questio:µ ii:~ ~etween murder in t~ie first clegree and mqrcler 
~:q · the second deg.ree, the fact of drunkenness ma,y be proved, 
and should be considered by the jury, as tending to sho'.V the 
- . mental state . of the def enda,1t, and whether the 
page 69 ~ killing sprung from a premeditated purpose to kill, 
or frpm passion excited by inadequate provocation. 
If the jury believe-from the evidence that the defendant gave 
the deceased the wound& fr.om wl\ich he died, as charged in 
the indictment.. without adequate provocation, and through 
1~e,c¥l.e~s wickeq,1.ess of -h~~r.~, bu~ at the time of so doing, his 
cpnµ1t~pn fro,m u~to41ca,bo:q was s:qch as to render him in-: 
capab,le'"of (:~ping ~ wilful, ·a~liber~te a11d premeditated act, 
~~~n:qat the ~ctwas not cqm1~Jt~ed ~~ p.ursuanc~. of a pur~ose, 
w1If~1ly;, delib.erately and pxemeditateclly fprmed b,efpre he 
~e~a~~ ·h~~q;~Mte~, to· c~>IUµ\\t w-qr~ei;, tl~ey Gannot ~~1µ bim 
g.\l11ty~ qf m\u.4er in t:\w ~r.$t degree. .A~d the C~nu;.t f~r.ther 
twstructs t}ie -jui~y. that if they pel\eve frpm 'the evidence that 
tµ,~ 4~f~w'\~nJ at t11e th~e he ki,1~4 tlw d~ceased was in sue~ a 
~t~te ~.r :µn11:~ ca1:1&eq by th~ ex~es~iv~ ~r\n~ing 9~ ~~to;icat-: 
tn~- .liquQr~, ~~ ~I1~t a, r~US.Qm\Ne 10.1r1'1.~ co-qW e;ist l\S ~o ~i~ 
3:~~h~y to 4~1ilwr~te fWcl Pi1'e11w<:ht~~e t~~~Y ~annoJ ~,1~ lu~ 
g~:n!~Y ~.f WW~~d_er 111 the :!i1,·&t ~~gr~~-
Given J. "'\V. F . 
. • ; t - * i 
The Collrt ins_tmcts the jury that wh~.n a p~1·son charge~l 
with C~-~J}W, pu_t$ bis ·~h~r~cter 'in i~SU~ by introducing· ~V'~-~nce 
~9at Ii~ ~s a p.~r&~:m w~Q ~~s b.een ~n orq~rly a~d lll~y-aWdi~g. 
c~t\Z~.~' th~I~ th<:. Co)n~o.nw,~~,th lw~ ti,~ right ~~ u,{~P,~l\3Ce. 
evidence of his bad character. And the Oqurt fur.tlw.r. m'.'. 
structs the jury, that in determining the question• of I the de'.. 
f end~~t ~s g-µ,ilt or. ~n~oc~nce in this case, it is their duty to 
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take into consideration the good character of the defendant~ 
as developed from the evidence in this case; and if from such 
evidence, as well from all tbe other evidence, facts and cir-
cumstances in the case, the jury have a reasonable 
page 70 ~ doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, they must 
find him not guilty. And the Court further in-
structs the jury that evidence of good character is highly im-
portant if the case is one of reasonable doubt, and good char-
acter should make it preponderate in favor of the accused. 
The Court further instructs the jury that evidence of good 
character should be considered by the jury in determining the 
question of malice, premeditation and deliberation and may be 
of itself sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the existence 
of the necessary elements of murder in the first degree and 
where such reasonable doubt is raised by evidence of good 
character it is conclusive in favor of the prisoner, as to his . 
being guilty of murder in the first degree. 
Given J. W. F. 
INSTRUCTION L. 
Tl1e Court instructs the jury thatthe law presumes every 
person charged with crime to be innocent until the Common-
wealth has established his guilt by evidence so strong, so 
clear, and so conclusive that there is left in the minds of the 
jury no reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This presumption 
is an abiding· presumption, and goes with the accused through 
the entire case and applies at every stage thereof until re-
pelled by proof. And in this connection the jury are in-
structed that it is never sufficient'that the accused, upon specu-
lative theory or conjecture may be guilty; or that by the pre-
ponderance of the testimony his guilt is more probable than 
his innocence., for until his guilt has been proved beyond all 
reasonable doubt in the precise and narrow terms as charged 
in the indictment, the presumption of innocence still applies, 
and they must acquit him. 
page 71 ~ The Court further instructs the jury that a rea-
sonijble doubt is that state of the case which, after 
a full consideration of all the evidence, both for the Common-
wealth and for the defendant, leaves the minds of the jury in 
the condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding con-
viction, amounting to a moral certainty from the evidence in 
the case, that the defendant, Holman Thomas, is guilty of the 
~barge aga.inst him. 
Given as amended J. W. F. 
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INSTRUCTION M. 
The Court instructs the jury that the credibility of the wit-
nesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and that where a 
number of witnesses testify directly opposite to each other, 
the jury is not bound to find the defendant guilty solely be-
cause the state has the greater number of witnesses. The 
jury have the right to determine from the appearance of the 
witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, and their 
apparent candor and f ajrness; their apparent intelligence or 
lack of intelligence, and from all other surrounding circum-
stances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are more 
worthy of credit, and to give credit accordingly. 
The Court further instructs the jury that it is not necessary 
that a witness shall be impeached by the evidence of his gen-
eral bad reputation for truth and veracity in ·order for the 
jury to refuse to believe him; the jury may refuse to believe 
a witness because of bis demeanor on the stand; his suspicious 
conduct in regard to the case; his zeal and warmth, or from 
the fact that he has been contradicted in material circum-
stances, or from the fact that his statements under oath are 
contradictory and inconsistent, if the jury believe from any 
such cir~umstances such witness is unworthy of 
page 72 ~ belief, the jury may give his testimony such weight 
as they deem it entitled to under the circumstances. 
Given J. W. F. 
And the defendant heerby tenders this his Bill of Excep-
tion No. 5, and prays that the same may be signed, sealed and 
enrolled as a part of the record., which is accordingly done 
this 13 day of May, 1944. · 
page 73 ~ Virginia: 
JOEL W. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
. , Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
92 S~pr~~~ Cqur.t ~f ~pp~al~ or V~!g~~!~ 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 6. 
-. I 
Be, it r.ememb~re~ that on th~ trial 9f this_.case, and at the 
~on~usfon of the. taking· -~f the testimony thei~ein, tbe follow-:-
i:ug }nstructipn was offe.re.d on· behalf of· the: defendant; to-wit: 
••.•• • '· ' . t '•. : ' ' •' • • . .. -·· . ' •• 
l'he Court instr.ucts the jury that although th~y may not 
belie.ve frpm-t~e ev'icfonce in this case that tlie d~~i1darit, liol-
ma)i 'l:honias., shot and ~illed A. •. K~ Fleming ii\ self def e:ru~e, 
y~t if' ~t app,earf;i fr.qm' the evfdenc~ that tlie kilµng w~s -~wt 
pe_cau~e of -~ny.' p:revio-qs grU:dge, -or :qialice·, buf"wa$ done 'in 
th~ cou:rse of~ ~n1dden quar1,·e1; in'mµtual'comb&t,. upon suµcle.n 
provo_ cation,, a~q' 'tb. ~t t~~e· pr01V,O,Cat~O~l. "\Va_s m~:re th~n sl,ght; 
yo~ c~1111:9~ ~¥ff t~e defendant,. H;olw~~ 'l'ho~a~,. _gui!ty. 0£ ~ny 
l~~g·her. <;>ffe_ns~ t~. a1~ volµ11:tary m_ ~n~1~-µglit~r_ ·, wh~c4 \S P"Hmsh-:-
~b.1e. ~y confi~Emient in-tb;e'p,~~ite.nti~ri 11~.t l~s~. th~n pne-~or 
~o~·e thf:1:µ ¥,~e. y.e3:n~. · 
ReJ.used exc~pti@ J. ,v. f. 
\ • . •. ! • - • ' - ~ '-· .. • • 
T:t\e Oourt 1~ef~~~~ to $"r~nt s~~~ in~tr.u_ct\?,~ ~r p~qnit it 
to be. r~a~l tp. th~, J~l'Y,, to, ~h1~h r-~,~ng ~1'~ a~~lp~ (!~ ~h~. c~-~~·-t 
the d~f~~~ant. ~xcept~.d, on the g1.Q1'nd tlu1:t this msfruct10n 
~1i11;10.~rite~ t~e p,~·~P.oJ~,ition ?,f 1~,f ~hi~];i $h0i~ld)~ c911troW~g· 
1u this case, and te1i1.~~1·~ th1~ his_ ~ill of :m:;ceptio.n No. 6, and 
p'rays that the same m1ay be signed, sealed an·d enrolled as a 
part pf tlte r~c9.r.d~ which is accordingly done this 13 day of 
May, 1944. 
page 7 4 ~ Virginia : 
JOEL W'~ f.LOODi (S~~\) 
J.µdge o;f tlie Ci:,;cniit · (.foud of' 
, .... Lune~buri-Ooµ:µty .. ' .. 
• . • ... ~. ' • ., - l • 
I~ t~~ Oi~cu~t Court of Lunenburg County . 
. -\. ' ' .. - -... t. ~... . ..... ~ 
Common_ww:i.\t:µ o{ "X~~~i~.~~ 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
~I~-~ Q-:f ~-~9.Ef'1;~9~ }fO~ 7. 
Be it. remembered ~hat on the t,·-~~~ 9J thi~ c~~~' ~.~~ ~~ tl;i.~ 
conclusion of the takmg of the teshmonv therein, t\w. foJlow-
ing instruction was offered ~n behalf of t1'~ ~~r~~d~¥,t,. ~o.-:wi~: 
The court instructs the jury that the law presumes every 
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person charged with crime to be innocent until the Common-
wealth has established his guilt by evidence so strong, so 
clear, and so conclusive that there is left in the minds of the 
jury no reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This presumption· 
is an abiding presumption, and goes with the accused through 
the entire case and applies at every stage thereof until re-
pelled by proof. And in this connection the jury are in-
structed that it is never sufficient that the accused, upon spec-
ulative theory or conjecture may be guilty; or that by the 
preponderance of the testimony his g·uilt is more probable 
then his innocence, for until his guilt has been proved beyond 
all reasonable doubt in the precise and narrow terms as 
charged in the indictment, the presumption of innocence still 
applies, and they must acquit him. And the Court further 
instructs the jury that they should exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis except that of g·uilt of the accused, and that only 
when no other supposition could reasonable account for all 
the conditions of the case establishing· the guilt of the ac-
cused beyond all ~easonable doubt as charged, could they ar-
rive at the conclusion of guilt on his part. 
The Court further instructs the jury that a reasonable 
doubt is that state of the case which, after a full considera-
tion of all the evidence, both for the Commonwealth and for 
the defendant, leaves the minds of the jury in the condition, 
that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction, amount-
ing to a moral certainty from the evidence in the case, that 
the defendant, Holman Thomas, is guilty of the charge against 
him. 
Refused and given as amended in instruction L. excep-
tion J. W. F. 
page 75 ~ The Court refused to g·rant said instruction or 
permit it to be read to the jury, and, over the ob-
jection of the defendant, made for the stated reason that .the 
instruction offered announced the proposition of law should 
be controlling in this case and therefore. should be given and 
read to the jury as offered, gave and read to the jury, in 
place of the instructfon offered, Instruction No. L.. as _set 
forth in defendant's Bill of Exception No. 5, to which ref er-
ence is hereby made and asked to be read as if here inserted; 
to which ruling and action of the Court in refusing to j?rant 
and read to the jury said instruction offered. and in rivin!? 
and reading to the jury, in place of the instruction offered, 
said Instruction No. L, the. defendant excented. and tenders 
this his Bill of Exception No. 7, and prays that the same may 
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be signed, sealed and enrolled as a part of the record, which is 
accordingly done this 13 day of May, 1944. 
page 76 ~ Virginia: 
JOEL "\V. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
·commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 8. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth, in order to maintain the issue on its side, intro-
duced as a witness Dr. Herbert Carl Lee, who testified that 
the deceased was broug·ht to Richmond to the Medical Col-
lege of Virginia on December 14, 1943, about 5 o'clock A. M., 
and placed under his care; that the deceased was in a shocked 
condition from loss of blood; that his blood pressure was 
about one half of what it should be; that deceased was able 
to talk; that he was wounded by two separate bullets, one of 
which passed through his shoulder and chest, and the other 
entered the right hip; that the first bullet passed entirely 
through his shoulder and chest, with a range downward, 
without striking any bone or encumbrance ; that the second 
bullet entered the right hip with a range slightly downward, 
and did not come out; that deceased lived a little over 48 
hours after entering the hospital, during which period he 
did not at any time state to the witness that he was dying; 
that the deceased asked the witness whether he, the deceased, 
would live, whereupon the witness stated to him, ''I hope so"; 
that the deceased died from gas gangrene in the left leg 
about 8 :00 o'clock A. M. on December 16, 1943, which testi-
mony is to be found on pages 17 and 18 of the transcript of 
evidence, as contained in defendant's Bill of Ex-
page 77 ~ ception No. 1, and asked to be read as if here in-
serted. 
Thereafter, the Commonwealth, in order to maintain the 
issue on its side, introduced as a witness E. S. Roby, who 
testified that early on the morning of December 14, 1943, he 
went to the place where the shooting- had occurred; that he 
there found the decedent lying on the ground. Over the ob-
jection of the defendant, to the overruling of which by the 
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Court the defendant excepted, the witness further testified 
that the deceased thereupon said: '' Ethelbert ( meaning the 
witness) I am dying", and requested that his wife & 
daughter be brought to his side, which testimony is to be 
found on pages 35, 36 and 37 of the transcript of evidence, as 
contained in defendant's Bill of Exception No. 1, and asked 
to be read as if here inserted. , 
Thereafter, the Commonwealth, in order to maintain the 
issue on its side, introduced as a witness Dr. H.B. Showalter, 
who testified that he was called to attend the deceased on 
December 14, 1943, at about 1 :30 o'clock A. M.; that he found 
the deceased lying on the ground flat on his back; that ·he, 
the witness, thought the deceased was seriously wounded, 
but he, the witness, did not know how seriously; that he re-
moved the clothing of the deceased to see the. wounds, which 
testimony is to be found on page 26 of the transcript of evi-
dence, as contained in defendant's Bill of Exception No. 1, 
and asked to be read as if here inserted. 
Thereupon, the latter witness, Dr. H. B. Showalter, was 
asked by the Attorney for the Commonwealth whether the 
deceased then made any statement to him, the witness, to 
which question the defendant objected, on the ground that 
no such statement then made by the deceased un-
page 78 } der circumstances appearing from the aforesaid 
testimony was competent or admissible to prove 
any fact in issue in this case, either as a dying declaration of 
the deceased or as a part of the res gestae; but the Court 
overruled the defendant's objection upon the ground that 
such statement was admissible as a dying declaration of the 
deceased, and permitted the said witness to answer said 
question, to which ruling and action of the Court the defend-
ant excepted; whereupon the said witness, in answer to the 
question aforesaid, testified that the deceased then stated: 
'' There is no use taking me anywhere, this will be the last of 
me-he shot me just as I got out of my car, I never had a 
chance", which testimony is to be found on page 26 of the 
transcript of testimony, as contained in defendant's Bill of 
Exception No. 1, and asked to be read as if here inserted. 
And the defendant tenders this his Bill of Exception No. 
8, and prays that the same may be signed, sealed and en-
rolled as a part of the record which is accordingly done this 
13 day of May, 1944. 
JOEL W. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
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In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 9. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth in order to maintain the issue on its side, intro-
duced as a witness Dr. Herbert Carl Lee, who testified that 
the deceased was brought to Richmond to the Medical Col-
lege of Virginia on December 14, 1943, about 5 o'clock A. M., 
and placed under his care ; that the deceased was in a shocked 
condition from loss of blood; that his blood pressure was 
about one half of what it should be; that deceased was able 
to talk; that he was wounded by two separate bullets, one of 
which passed through his shoulder and chest~ and ihe other 
entered the right hip; that the first bullet passed entirebr 
throug·h his shoulder and chest, with a range downward, 
without striking any bone or encumbrance; that the second 
bullet entered the right hip with a range slightly downward, 
_and did not come out; that deceased lived a little over 48 
hours after entering the hospital, during which period he did 
not at any time state to the witness that he was dying; that 
the deceased asked the witness whether he, the deceased, 
would _live, whereupon the witness stated to him, "I hope 
so''; that the deceased died from gas gangrene in the left 
leg· about 8 :00 o'clock A. M. on December 16, 1943, which 
testimony is to be found on page 17 and 18 of the transcrjpt 
of evidence, as contained in defendant's Bill of 
page 80 ~ Exce-pti_on No. 1, and asked to be read as if here 
inserte-d. 
· Thereafter, the Commonwealth, in order to maintain the 
issue on its side, introduced as a witness Dr. H.B. Showaltet, 
who testified that he was called to attend the deceased on 
December 14, 1"943, at about 1 :30 o'clock A. M.; that he found 
the deceased lying- on the ground flat on his back; that he, 
the witness, thoug:ht the deceased was seriouslv wounded, but 
he, the witness. did not know how seriously; that he removed 
the clothin~ of the deceased to see the wounds. which testi-
monv is to be found on naJ2·e 26 of the transcript of evidence. 
as contained in defenrlant's Bill of Exception No. 1, and 
asked to be read as if here inserted. 
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Thereafter, the Commonwealth, in order to maintain the 
issue on its side, introduced as a witness ht S. Roby, who tes-
tified that early· on the morning of December 14, 1943, he 
went to the place where the shooting had occurred;; that he. 
there found the deceased lying on the ground, which testi-
mony is to be found on pages ;:s5, 36 and 37 of the transcript 
of evidence, as contained in defendant's Bill of Exception 
No. 1, and asked to be read as if here inserted. 
Thereafter, the Commonwealth, in order to maintain the 
issue on its side, introduced as a witness Mrs. A. K. Fleming, 
who testified that she was the wife of the deceased; that about 
1 :00 o'clock A. M. on the morning of December 14, 1943, she 
received a message that the deceased was hurt; that she went 
to the scene of the shooting and there saw the deceasd lying 
on the ground, which testimony is to be found on page 32 o:t' 
the transcript of evidence, as contained in the defendant's 
Bill of Exception No. 1, and asked to be read as if here in-
serted. 
page 81 ~ Thereupon, the latter witness, Mrs. A. K. Flem-
ing, was asked by the Attorney for the Common-
wealth whether the deceased then made any statement to 
her, the witness, to which question the defendant objected, on 
the ground that no such statement then made by the deceased 
under circumstances appearing from the aforesaid testimony 
was competent or admissible to prove any fact in. issue in 
this case, either as a dying declaration or as a part of the 
res gestae; but the Court overruled the defendant ~s objec-
tion upon the ground that such statement was admissible as 
a dying declaration of the deceased, and permitted the said 
witness to answer said question, to which ruling and action 
of the Court the defendant excepted; whereupon the said 
witness, in answer to the question aforesaid, testified that 
th deceased then stated: "This is the end. He (the defend-
ant) shot me as I got out of the car. I didn't have a chance," 
which testimony is to be found on page 32 of the transcript 
of evidence, as contained in the defendant's Bill of Ex~ep-
tion No. 1, and asked to be read as if here inserted. 
And the defendant tenders this his Bill of Exception No. 9, 
and prays that the same may be signed, sealed and enrolled 
as a part of the record, which is accordingly done this 13 day 
of May, 1944. 
JOEL ,v. FLOOD (Sefll) 
J m;lge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
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BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 10. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth and the defendant, to sustain their several issues, 
introduced various witnesses who testified as fully set forth 
in the transcript of testimony certified by the Honorable Joel 
W. Flood, Judge, of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County, 
Virginia, who presided at the trial (said certificate and tran-
script being set forth at length in defendant's Bill of Ex-
ception No. 1, and asked to be read as if here inserted), and 
which evidence was presented to the jury, and after hearing 
the same and at the conclusion thereof, and after receiving 
instructions, the jury returned a verdict in words as follows: 
"We the jury find the defendant guilty ot murder in the 
First Degree and fix punishment at death. J no. M. Fowlkes, 
Foreman.'' 
Whereupon the defendant moved the Court that the ver-
dict of the jury be set aside, a new trial be awarded the de-
fendant, that the Court arrest judgment therein and not pro-
nounce the same, on the ground that manifest errors were 
committed during the trial, and because no judgment could 
be lawfully rendered ag·ainst him in this case, for the follow-
ing reasons, to-wit: That the action of the Court in instruct-
. ing and communicating with the incompleted panel 
page 83 ~ of jurors, and in swearing officers to take charg·e 
of said panel, and in later swearing officers to 
take charge of the jury sworn to try the issued, during the 
trial of the case and in the absence of the accused, consti-
tuted reversible error; that the action of the Court in per-
. mitting the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence the 
warrant and conviction of a prior offense committed by the 
defendant constituted reversible error; that the Court erred 
in refusing to grant and give to the jury Instruction '' L '' as 
requested by the defendant; that the Court erred in refusing 
to grant and give to the jury Instruction "G'' as requested 
by the defendant; that the Court erred in admitting into evi-
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dence certain statements allegedly made by the decedent as 
dying declarations; that the Court erred in admitting into 
evidenc~ photographs purporting to reproduce the scene of 
the shooting according to the theory of the Commonwealth; 
and that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and lacked 
evidence sufficient to support it. 
The Court overruled said motion and entered its judgment 
in accordance with said verdict, to which ruling and action 
of the Court the defendant excepted, and tenders this his Bill 
of Exception No. 10, and prays that the same may be signe<t, 
sealed and enrolled as a part of the record, which is accord-
ingly done this 13 day of May, 1944. 
pag·e 84 ~ Virginia : 
JOEL W. FLOOD (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
In the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
versus 
Holman B. Thomas 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 11. 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth and the defendant, to sustain their several issues, 
introduced various witnesses who testified as fully set forth 
in the transcript of testimony certified by the Honorable ,Joel 
W. Flood, Judge, of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg County. 
who presided at the trial (said certificate and transcript 
being set forth at length in defendant's Bill of Exception 
No. 1, and asked to be read as if here inserted), and which 
evidence was presented to the jury, and after hearing the 
same and at the conclusion thereof, and after receiving in-
structions, the jury returned a verdict in words as follows: 
''We the jury find the defendant guilty of murder in the 
First Degree and· fix punishment at death. Jno. M. Fowlkes, 
Foreman.'' 
Whereupon after the Court had overruled the defendant ~s 
motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the 
evidence, as set forth in detail in defendant's Bill of Excep-
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tion No. 10, and asked to be read as if here inserted, the de-
fendant moved the Court to grant him a new trial upon the 
same grounds assigned in support of his previous motion to 
set aside the ·verdict, as set forth at length in defendant's 
Bill of Exception No. 10, to which reference is 
page 85 ~ hereby made for the grounds assigned in support 
of this his motion for a new trial, and asked to be 
read as if here inserted. 
The Court overruled said motion and entered its judgment 
in accordance with said verdict, to which ruling and actiort 
of the Court the defendant thereupon excepted, and tender~ 
thi.s his :Bill of Exception No. 11, and prays that the same 
may be signed, sealed and enrolled as a part of the record, 
which is accordingly done this 13 day of May, 1944. 
JOEL W. FLOOD, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County. 
page 86 ~ Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Holman Thomas 
OPINION. 
The defense moved that the verdict of the jury be set aside 
and a new trial awarded for the foil owing reasons : 
1. '' 1. The action of the Court in instructing and com-
municating with the incompleted panel of jurors, and in 
swearing officers to take charge of said panel, and in later 
swearing officers to take charge of the jury sworn to try the 
issues, during the trial of the case and in the absence of the 
accused, constituted reversible error.'' 
Defense counsel moved the Court to declare a mistrial, 
basing their motion upon the following facts and occurrences~ 
A panel of 14 men had been selected. These 14 men were 
sent out to lunch in the custody of two officers of the Court 
who had been sworn according to law to take charge ·of the 
incomplete panel during the time they were at lunch and l)ntil 
returned to the Court, in conformity with the law in such cases 
provided. After the Court had selected a list of 20 additional 
veniremen from the regular jury list as required by law, 
when the court finds it impossible to complete its panel in 
a case from the veniremen previously summoned and in at-
tendance, the incompleted panel then returned to the court 
• 
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room in charge of the officers who had been duly sworn as 
aforesaid to take charge of them while they were out at 
lunch. In the absence of the accused, the Court then had two 
additional officers of the Court sworn to take charge of the 
incompleted panel in the same manner as the . first two had 
been sworn and in compliance with the law, as the first two 
officers were to be used in summonsing the additional venire-
men selected by the Court. The Court then, also in the ab-
sence of the accused, instructed the four~een men who com-
prised the incompleted panel that a recess would be taken of 
45 minutes, and that during this time they would be in the 
custody of the two officers who had been duly sworn 
page 87 ~ to take charge of them, and that they would not 
discuss the pending case with anyone or permit 
any one to discuss it with them, or in their presence; that 
they would remain together in the custody of the two officers 
aforesaid, and return to the Court at 1 :45 P. M. The Court's 
attention was then called by defense counsel to the fact that 
the accused was not in the Court room. The accused ap-
peared from the jury room with two officers. The door of 
the jury room had been closed. The jury room adjoins the 
Courtroom. The motion referred to above was then made. 
The court then recalled the 14 members of the in.completed 
panel and in the presence of the accused again instructed 
them that they would remain in the custody ·of the two offi-
cers referred to above who had last been sworn to take 
charg·e of the incompleted panel in accordance with the law; 
that they would not discuss the pending case with anyone, 
nor permit anyone to discuss it with them, or in their pres-
ence; that they would remain together in the custody of the 
officers as aforesaid, and return to the Court room at 2 P. M. 
The Court overruled the motion made by counsel for def end-
ant based upon the foregoing· facts and reasons, to which rul-
ing the accused notes his exception. 
'-'The Court overruled the motion for the defense as out-
lined above for the following reasons: First, that the ad-
monition of the Court to the incompleted panel not to discuss 
the case with anyone or permit anyone to discuss it with 
them, or in their presence, and to remain together and in 
the custody of the officers duly sworn to take charge of them 
as aforesaid, is not required by law, and therefore iR no part 
of the trial and would not be reversible error bad the Court 
failed to do it. and for the further reason that we ·are not 
dealin!?; with a jury who bas been sworn to try the 
page 88 } case, but merely an incompleted panel of 14 men 
who had been examined on their voir dire and 
• 
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f ouhd without exception. And for the f urthei· reason · that 
the incompleted panel \Vas, as stated above, recalletl to the 
Court room in the prescn~e of the accused, given the sam·e 
instructions by the Coui't as fo1·merly given in the absence 
of the accused~ 
At a later stag~ of the trial, to.;.wit: ·when the Court was 
prepaiing to adjoui'i1 on Tuesday; February 8, and after the 
jury had been sworn and several witnesses he~rd, the Coui.·t 
directed that the accused be removed from the Courtroom 
and in bis absence two officers of the coul't were s,vorn to 
take chat·ge of the Jury in accordance with the law in such 
matters provided. Immediately the Court's attention was 
called by counsel to the absence of the accused, and the ac:.. 
cused was immediately retur1ied to the Courtroom and th~ 
officers ag·ain swori1 this time ih his presence. The accused 
bv his counsel 1~ene\ved their motion foi a mistrial for the 
reasons previously assig;ned and this motion was again over:.. 
ruled by the Court, to which the accused by couns·el again 
noted ah exception. 
The Court feels that if it was error to swear the two officers 
as aforesaid to take charge of the jury in the absence 9f the 
accused that it was cel'tainlv harmless error as the officers 
were immediately resworh f ollo,vihg the return of the ac;. 
cused to the. Courtroom, to take charge of the jury, in the 
presence of the accused and before the fury had left 'their 
seats in the fury box or the Ooiirt had adjoi"trned. 
2. '' The action of the Court in permitting the Common;. 
wealth to introduce into evidence the warrant and conviction 
of a pdor offense committed by the defendant constituted 
reversible error.'' 
page 89 ~ Several witnesses were introduced by the ac-
cused to prove 4is g·ood reputation. They testi~ 
fled, as such witnesses usually do, that they had never heard 
of the accused being in any trouble and that he had a good 
reputation for truth and veracity, and as being· a peaceful 
and law abiding person. . 
The prosecution on rebuttal introduc~d a warrant with the 
co:Qviction. and judgment thereon which appears as an Ex-
hibit in this case, and which shows that the officer who was 
!Slain by the acc·used. ,vas the co~plainant in the warrant. It 
is my opinion that the introduction of the warrant and con .. 
viction. thereon was permissible in rebuttal o:f the testimony 
of the defense witnesses that they had never heard of the 
accused .being in any trouble, and for the further reason that. 
it was admissible to show a motive for the crime (even though 
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slight) that the .offi~er had been the one on whose complaint 
the warrant had bMn issuetl. . 
3. '' The coui.·t ·erred in tefUsing to grant and giye to the jury Instruction '' L'' as tei.1uested by the defendant.'' 
This assigiiment of error is based upon the refusal by the 
Coutt to give def e11se Instr1tction No. L as offered and giving 
it as amehded. ~t is tltought that Instruction L as given 
sufficiently describes i.·easonable doubt and the presumption 
of ·inhocen·ce without including that part referring to hypothe-
sis, which would only confuse the jui'y. 
4. '' The Court erred in refusing to grant and give to the 
jury Instruction "G'' as requested by the defendant." 
It is assigned as error that the Court erred in refusing to 
gi.·imt instruction "G'' as requested by the defense. This 
instruction defines manslaughter.. But, there is no evidence 
in this case on which the jury should have found 
page 90 ~ a verdict of that degree of homicide, and this in-
cludes of course, the eyidence of both the pi·ose-
cution and the defense as certified in the record-. 
5. ''The Court erred in admitting into evidence certain 
state~ents allegedly made by the decedent as dying declara-
tions.'' 
It 1.s further alleged the Court erred in admitting in evi-
dence certain statements made by the deceased as dying dec-
larations. It will appear fr~m the evidence_ certified that the 
deceased was convinced at the time the declaration was made 
that he would die as the result of his wounds. It seems at a 
later time he asked a Doctor whether he thought ·he would 
live, thus indicating an uncertainty on his part of his physi-
cal cqndition and his resulting· demise. It is thought the 
eriterion ·is the opinion of the deceased at the time the state-
ment was made, and not at some l_ater time, even though it 
be thought his question to the Doctor indicated a change of 
opinion, which in my opinion it 'did_ not, but was only the nat-
ural. question which would be asked by a wounded man of a 
medical expert who would naturally know more of such· mat-
ters than the wounded mail himself. 
6. "The Court erred in admitting into evidence photo-
f):raphs purporting- to reproduce the scene of the shooting 
according to the theory bf the Comrhonwealth. '' 
It is assig11~.d as error tha.t the Court erred in admitting in 
evidence certain bhotograpbs offered bv the p·rosecution. In 
all six pbot<;>graphs were offered in ¢vidence by the -prosecu-
tion, two of these were n~t admitted, the remaining four 
were. The photogtapbs which were admitted will as clearly 
appears show the position ·of certain buildings and one the 
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position of two cars. It clearly appeared from 
page 91 ~ the evidence that these photographs were admissi-
ble to show the jury the position of certain ob-
jects, which positions appeared from the testimony of prose-
cution witnesses. The use of photographs in evidence is 
constantly i,ncreasing and in my opinion properly so, because 
if sufficiently identihed they are a valuable asset to the jury 
in arriving at an accurate, sensible, and fair verdict. 
7. ''The verdict was contrary to the evidence, and lacked 
evidence sufficient to support it.'' 
This the last assignment of error was that the verdict was 
contrary to the evidence and lacked evidence to support it. 
It is perfectly apparent from the record that this assignment 
of error is not well taken. The evidence of the prosecution 
clearly proved murder in the first degree. Under the evi-
dence of the defense, if believed by the jury, they might have 
found a verdict of second degree murder on the theory that 
the accused was so intoxicated at the time of the shooting a8 
to be incapable of premeditation, or they might have found 
him not guilty if they had believed his unsupported testimony 
of self-defense. The jury elected to believe the tstimony of 
the proscution 's numerous witnesses that the homicide was 
murder in the first degree. Their determination was in my 
opinion entirely correct. · 
JOEL W. FLOOD, Judge. 
It is ordered that this opinion be included in and made a 
part of the recQrd in this case. 
J. W. F. 
page 92 ~ State of Virginia, 
.County of ~unenburg, to-wit: 
I, J. T. Waddill, Jr., Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
County and State .aforesaid, do hereby certify that the fore-
g·oing Bills of Exception numbered from No. 1 to No. 11, both 
inclusive, together with -the Opinion of the Honorable Joel 
W. Flood, is a true and correct transcript of the record in 
the case of Commonwealth of Virginia. Plaintiff, v. Holman 
B. Thomas, Defendant. as signed. sealed and enrolled AS n 
nart of the record in this case on the 13th day of Mav, 1944. 
bv the Honorable Joel W. Flood, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the Conntv of Lunenburg, Virginia, as the same appears 
on file and of record in my office afore said. 
. I 
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l further certify that the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
had notice in writing of the time and place when the forP-
going· Bills of Exception would be presented to the Honor-
able Joel W. Flood, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lunenburg· 
County, Virginia, for his certification. I also certify that the 
Attorney for the Commonwealth had notice in writing of tlw 
time and place that application would be made to me for a 
transcript of the recotd in the case of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. v. Holman B. Thomas, on an indictment for a felony, 
for the purpose of presenting the same to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia for application for a Writ of Error. 
Given under my hand and seal of said Court this the 19th 
day of May, 1944. ? 
.J. T. WADDILL, ,JR., 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
Lunenburg County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C . 
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